Post-Transaction Evidence in Securities Litigation by Kaminsky, Martin I
Boston College Law Review
Volume 19
Issue 4 Number 4 Article 1
5-1-1978
Post-Transaction Evidence in Securities Litigation
Martin I. Kaminsky
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Securities Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Martin I. Kaminsky, Post-Transaction Evidence in Securities Litigation, 19 B.C.L. Rev. 617 (1978),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol19/iss4/1
BOSTON COLLEGE
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME XIX	 MAY 1978
	 NUMBER 4
POST-TRANSACTION EVIDENCE IN
SECURITIES LITIGATION
MARTIN 1. KAMINSKY*
I. INTRODUCTION
Proving the basic elements of a securities fraud action normally in-
volves scrutinizing events prior to or at the time of a purchase or sale of se-
curities.' Particularly where claims require proof of scienter, as in 10b-5
cases, 2 the critical issues hinge on .the parties' respective knowledge and
*A,R, 1962, Yale University; LLB. 1965, Harvard Law School. Member of the New
York Bar. The author wishes to '.hank Ms. Jo Ann Cory for her generous assistance and help-
ful suggestions in the preparation of this article.
' See, e.g., Kogan v. National Bank of North America, 402 F. Stipp, 359, 361 (E.D.N,Y,
1975) where the court observed respecting rule 101)-5 claims that; "Rule 101)-5 provides that it
is unlawful to defraud or misrepresent '... in connection with the purchase or sale of any se-
curity,' The phrase 'in connection with' has been construed to mean that the fraud practiced
must have been prior to or contemporaneous' with the sale of securities." See also St. Louis
Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch. Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 562 F.2d 1040, 1048 (8th Cir.
1977) (same); Jackson v. Oppenheim, 533 F.2d 826, 829-30 (2d Cir. 1976) (claims brought
under § 12(2) require inquiry into events preceding securities transaction).
2 Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a 
o
 fraud or deceit upon any person,' in con-
nection with the purchase r sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.101.5 (1977). Similarly, suits brought under § 206 of the Investment Advisors
Act of 1940 require proof of' scienter. Section 206 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser, by use of the mails or any means or in-
strumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly —
(I) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective
client;
(2) to engage in any transaction, practioi, or course of business which operates'as
a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client;
(3) acting as principal for his own account, knowingly to sell any security to or
purchase any security from a client, or acting as broker for a person other than
such client, knowingly to effect any sale or purchase of any security for the ac-
count of such client, without disclosing to such client in writing before the com-
pletion of such transaction the capacity in which he is acting and obtaining the
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conduct leading to the sale. 3 This focus on events leading up to the transac-
tion is required because events occurring after a purchaser has already
committed himself to purchase cannot be said to have "caused" his pur-
chase. 4
 Similarly, a purchaser cannot be said to have "relied" upon post-
transaction events in deciding whether to make the purchase. 5 Given this
conceptual framework, evidence regarding facts after the purchase or sale
of securities appears, on its face, to be irrelevant, and indeed may hinder a
fair determination of what occurred at the time of sale.
In actuality, the role of post-transaction evidence in securities litiga-
tion is not that simple. Several types of securities claims—for example,
those arising under sections I 1 and 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 8 —
consent of the client to such transaction. The prohibitions or this paragraph shall
not apply to any transaction with a customer of a broker or dealer if' such broker
or dealer is not acting as an investment adviser in relation to such transaction;
(4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent, de-
ceptive, or manipulative. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this para-
graph (4) by rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably de-
signed to prevent, such acts, practices, and courses of business as are fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative.
15 U.S.C. § 80b-6. See notes 209 and 270 infra regarding the scienter requirements of these
provisions.
See, e.g., Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 540 F.2d 187, 194 (3d Cir. 1976) (1013-5
plaintiff must show a causal link between misrepresentation or omission and his purchase or
sale); Than Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 840
(1975); Gross v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 431 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Spielman
v. General Host Corp., 402 F. Supp. 190, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd, 538 F.2d 39 (2d Cir.
1976). See also note 58 infra.
See, e.g., Halperin v. Edwards & Hanly, 430 F. Supp. 121, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(fraudulent acts occurring after transaction are nut actionable under 10b-5, since the phrase
"in connection with" a securities transaction contained in lOb-5 requires fraud before or con-
temporaneously with the transaction); Petersen v. Federated Dev. Co., 416 F. Supp. 466, 476
3.D.N.Y. 1976) (same); Kogan v. National Bank of North America, 402 F. Supp. 359, 361
(E.D.N.Y. 1975) (same); Pepsico, Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 307 F. Supp. 713, 720 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) (same). See also Morgan v. Prudential Funds, Inc., [Current] FED. Sic. L. REP. (CCH) 1
96,345 (S.D.N... 1978); Pollak v. Eastman Dillon, [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 94,987, at 97,412 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Pierre J. Lelandais & Co. v. MDS-Atron, Inc.,
387 F. Supp. 1310 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd in part, 543 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1062 (1977); DiJullio v. Digicon, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 1289, 1291, (D.Md. 1972). But cf.
Lewelling v. First Cal. Co., 564 F.2c1 1277 (9th Cir. 1977) (actionable though the transaction
was complete before disclosure).
See, e.g., St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc.,
562 F.2d 1040, 1048 (8th Cir. 1977); Cf. Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 410 (3d
Cir. 1974) (proof of actual reliance is not always necessary in 10b-5 action). See also Kerrigan v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FEU Sr:. L. Rm.
(CCH) 1 96,446, at 93,602 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
" Codified as 15 U.S.C. §§77K, 771 (1970). Section 11 provides, in pertinent part:
(b) Notwithstanding the provision of subsection (a) of this section no person,
other than the issuer, shall be liable as provided therein who shall sustain the
burden of proof —
.... (3) that (A) as regards any part of the registration statement
not purporting to be made on the authority of an expert, and not
purporting to be a copy of or extract from a report or valuation of
an expert, and not purporting to be made on the authority of a
public official document or statement, he had, after reasonable in-
vestigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe at the time
such part of the registration statement became effective, that the
statements therein were true and that there was no omission to state
a 'material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make
the statements therein not misleading; and (B) as regards any part
618
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do not require proof of scienter. Moreover, those sections provide for lia-
bility based not only upon facts known to the defendant, but also upon
those facts which he could have learned through the exercise of reasonable
diligence.' In a similar vein, in the 'past some courts have predicated the
plaintiff's right to recover on a showing, in addition to fraud, that he acted
of the registration statement purporting to be made upon his au-
thority as an expert or purporting to be a copy of or extract from a
report or valuation of himself as an expert, (i) he had after reason-
able investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at
the time such part of the registration statement became effective,
that the statements therein were true and that there was no omis-
sion to state a material fact required to be stated therein or neces-
sary to make the statements therein not misleading, or (ii) such part.
of the registration statement did not fairly represent Ills statement
as an expert or was not a fair copy of or extract from his report or
valuation as an expert; and (C) as regards any part of the registra-
tion statement purporting to be made on the authority of an expert
(other than himself) or' purporting to be a copy of or extract from a
report or valuation of an expert (other than himself) he had 110 rea-
sonable ground to believe and did not believe, at the time such part
of the registration statement became effective, that the statements
therein were untrue or that there was an omission to state a material
fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the state-
ments therein not. misleading, or that such part of the registration
statement did not fairly represent the statement of the expert or was
not a lair copy of or extract from the report or valuation of' the ex-
pert; and (D) as regards any part of the registration stateme nt
porting to be a statement made by an official person or purporting
to be it copy of or extract. from a public official document, he had
no reasonable ground to believe and did not believe, at the time
such part of the registration statement became effective, that the
statements therein were untrue, or that there was an omission to
state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to
make the statements therein mit misleading, or that such part of' the
registration statement clicl not fairly represent the statement made
by the official person or was nut a fair copy of or extract from the
public official dticument,
15 U.S.C. fi 77k (1970). Section 12(2) provides, in pertinent part, that
Any person who-
....
(2) offers or sells a security ...,, by the use of any means or instru-
ments of trans/rot-union or communication in interstate commerce
or of the mails, by means of it prospectus or Oral communication,
which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to
state a material tact necessary in order to make the statements, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mis-
leading (the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission),
and who shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know,
and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of
such untruth or omission,
shall be liable to the person purchasing such security from hint ..., to recover
the consideration paid for such security with interest thereon, .. •
15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970). See also text at notes 170 & 267 iqfra.
See, e.g., Hill York Corp. v. American Intern, Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d. 680, 695 (5th
Cir. 1971) (plaintiff need not prove scienter' in action brought under § 12(2)); Feit v. Leasco
Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F, Supp. 544, 568 (F.D.N,Y, 1971) (civil liability established
under I I, by showing defendant failed to exercise reasonable care in preparing registration.
statement).
619
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
"reasonably" or with "clue diligence" in deciding whether to enter into the
transaction." The plaintiffs clue diligence may also be a factor in determin-
ing whether his claims are barred by the statute of limitations." In these
circumstances, judicial inquiry focuses frequently upon what a party could
or should have known. Post-transaction events may illuminate such mat-
ters.'"
Although post-transaction evidence may thus prove valuable, objec-
tions to the use of such evidence nevertheless persist. Those objections chal-
lenge both the discovery and the admissibility of evidence of post-
transaction facts as irrelevant to a claim based on events preceding the se-
curities sale. The issue whether post-transaction facts are discoverable or
admissible is significant to both plaintiffs and defendants in securities litiga-
tion. Consequently, in such suits, the relevance of evidence respecting
events transpiring after the sale creates a common problem for the courts.
This article examines the affirmative role post-transaction evidence
may play in securities litigation. The role of post-transaction information in
discovery is first explored. Thereafter, the article analyzes the relevance of
post-transaction evidence in proving intent, materiality, reliance and the
fact of fraud. Issues raised by the offer of post-transaction evidence in
cases involving lulling, continuing wrongs and multiparty situations are also
analyzed. Where pertinent, analogous common law fraud rules and those
involving other federal statutes are contrasted with the rules applicable to
securities fraud. The article then discusses how post-transaction evidence
may aid defendants in raising such defenses as lack of due diligence, es-
toppel and waiver. The article concludes with an examination of possible
objections—for example, those asserted under rules 403 and 407 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence—which may prevent the introduction of post-
transaction evidence. The discussion reveals that post-transaction evidence
does not constitute a special type of evidence susceptible to a set of black
letter rules, but rather is subject to the same considerations of relevance,
possible prejudice and weight applicable to evidence generally.
II. PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY OF POST-TRANSACTION FACTS
A. The General Scope of Discovery
The least difficult aspect of the debate over post-transaction evidence
in securities litigation appears to arise where an adverse party seeks to ex-
plore post-transaction matters in pretrial discovery. Post-transaction evi-
dence engenders few problems in this context because of the broad scope
" See text at notes 198.226 infra. For the current status of this facet of securities litiga-
tion, see Dupuy v. Dttpuy, 551 F.2(1 1005, 1013-24 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911
(1977); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 692-93 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 984
(1977); Straub v. Vaistnan & Co., 540 F.2d 591, 596-98 (3d Cir. 1976). As pointed out in the
text at note 206 infra, defenses premised on this basis are not available in a § 12(2) action.
" See iext at notes 227-238 infra.
See, e.g., Goldstara v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 522 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir. 1975) (evi-
dence of post-transaction events necessary for determination whether equitable tolling doc-
trine applies); Braunstein v. Laventhol & Horvath, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fin. Sc.i L. REP.
(CCH) 1 96,097, at 91,945 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (same). See text at notes 152-161 & 227-238 infra.
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of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." What is dis-
coverable under these rules exceeds what is admissible at trial;" the test for
determining whether material is discoverable is whether the information
sought is "reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence," not.
whether it is "relevant." Adding to the initially broad scope of discovery is
the principle that the discovery rules of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure are to be construed liberally." Consequently, regardless of when gen-
erated or dated, post-transaction material which leads to other evidence
casting light on relevant facts at the time of the transaction at issue is nor-
mally a proper subject of pretrial discovery. 14
Parties involved in securities litigation repeatedly seek to challenge
discovery requests for post-purchase information on the grounds that it is
not within the ambit of the "reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evi-
" Rule 26(1)(1) of' the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in part;
(b) Scope of Discovery. Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accord-
ance with these rules, the scope of discOvery is as follows:
(1) In General. Parties may' obtain discovery regarding any matter,
not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action .... It is not ground for objection that the in-
fitrination sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of ad-
missible evidence.
12 See note I I supra. See Morgan Smith Automotive Prods., Inc. v. General Motors
Corp., 54 F.R.D. 19, 20 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (applying the "reasonably calculated" test); Prudential
Ins. Co. v. Marine Nat'l Exch. Bank, 52 F.R.D. 367 (E.D. Wise. 1971) (same); ltew"s of
Roanoke, Inc. v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins, Co., 219 F. Stipp. 181, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (it is
not an objection to discovery that the information sought is inadmissible at trial, so lung as the
information is reasonably calculated to [earl to the discovery of' admissible evidence).q Red-
dick v. White Consul. Indus., Inc., 295 F. Stipp. 243 (S.D. Ga. 1969) (sustaining objection to
discovery which could not lead to admissible evidence). See also In re Penn Cent. Commercial
Paper Litigation, ail F.R.D, 153, 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Laird v. United Shipyard, Inc., I F.R.D.
772, 773 (S.D.N,Y, 1941).
11 See, e.g., Islallinckrodt Chew. Works v. C,oldmati, Sachs & Co.. 58 F.R.D. 348, 353
(S.D.N.Y. 1973). See also United States v. International Business Mach. Corp., 66 F.R.D. 215,
218 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Steamship Co. of 1949 v. China Union Lines, Hong Kong, Ltd., 123 F.
Stipp, 802, 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); Leonia Amusement Corp. v. ',mew's. Inc., 16 F.R.D. 583, 584
(S.D.N.Y. 1954); C. W141611'1% HANDBOOK Or TIIE LAW OF FEDERAL Cowers, § 81 (3rd Ed. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as Witiciri]. Thus, for example, in Steamship Co. of 1949 v. China Union
Lines, Hung Kong, Ltd., the court stated "discovery should be allowed unless it is palpable
that the evidence sought can have no possible bearing on the issues." 123 F. Stipp. 802, 805
(S.D.N.Y. 1954). cy: Midland Inv. Co. v, Van Alstyne, Noel & Co., 59 F.R,D. 134, 140
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (mem.) (although scope of discovery is broad, court will prohibit discovery
which causes defendant great annoyance and expense When the information sought has only
minimal relevance); Dolgow v. Anderson, 53 F.R.D. 661, 664 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (meta.) (saute).
"See 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, II 26.56(1) at 26.129 (2t1 ed. 1948 & Stipp. 1978)
[hereinafter cited as Moottrs], where, addressing the issue of' proper subjects of discovery, the
authors state that "[q]uestions as to acts subsequent to the events giving rise to liability are
permissible as ale questions regarding acts subsequent to the date of the complaint...." For
cases allowing discovery of post-transaction events in securities litigation, see, e.g., Cornaglia v.
Ricciardi, 63 F.R.D. 116, 421-22 (E.D. Pa, 1974); In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litiga-
tion, 61 F.R.D. 453, 460 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Midland Inv. Co. v, Van Alslyne, Noel & Co.,
59 F.R.D. 134, 137-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (mem.); Ross v. Paul Hardeman, Inc.. [1964-66 Trans-
fer Binder) Ft:a SEC:. L. REP. (CCH) 1 '91,485, at 94,850 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). This post-transaction
discovery issue has been resolved similarly in antitrust cases, see, e.g., Carlson Cos., Inc. v.
Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 374 F. Stipp. 1080, 1101-04 (1). Mimi. 1974); Goldinger v. Boron
Oil Co., 60 F.R.D. 562, 564 (WI). Pa. 1973); Bass v. Gulf Oil Corp., 304 F. Stipp. 1041,
1044-47 (D. Miss. 1969), and in other nonsecurities contexts. see, e.g., United States v. Interim-
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dente" test, even where the post-purchase materials relate back to events
prior to the purchase. Such materials may exist, for example, when a par-
ty's files contain post-mortem memoranda seeking to reconstruct the facts
leading to the sale or purchase either to advise shocked superiors of why
an investment failed or to anticipate possible litigation. 15 Such material may
tional Ass'n of B.S. & 0. Iron Workers, 438 F.2d 679 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 830
(1971); United States v. Sampson Mfg. Corp., 64 F.R.D. 83 (N.D. Ga. 1974); M.S.A. Constr.
Co. v. Crafts Corp.. 58 F.R.D. 215 (E.D. Wise. 1973); Buckley v. Vidal, 50 F.R.D. 271
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); Paiewonsky v. Paiewonsky, 50 F.R.D. 379 (D.V.I. 1970); Quonset Real Estate
Corp. v. Paramount Film Dist. Corp., 50 F.R.D. 240 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
15
 Rule 803(5) of the Federal Rules of Evidence excepts specifically from the hearsay
rule those memoranda or records which record a witness' past recollections when the witness'
recollection has since become hazy, so long as the memorandum was made by a witness when
the matter was fresh iii his memory and to reflect that knowledge correctly." But the rule also
contains the curiously worded limitation that "[or admitted, the memorandum or record may
be read into evidence but may not itself be received as an exhibit unless offered by an adverse
party." See also United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720, 770 (2d Cir. 1965) (collecting cases in
support of this rule and determining that this exception to the hearsay rule does not violate
the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment).
Rule 803(6) of the Federal Rules of Evidence also continues to permit the "business
records" exception to the hearsay rule, insofar as the source of the record is deemed reliable.
Cf. Hoffman v.'Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 991 (2d Cir. 1942), affd, 318 U.S. 109 (1943) (holding
business records exception inapplicable in circumstances where the statement was prepared
following the incident which is the subject of the litigation and the person making the
memorandum has, under the circumstances, great motivation to seek to exculpate himself or
his employer from liability). This exception to the hearsay rule, previously codified in 28
U.S.C. 1732 (1970). was often applied to reports following the events actually being litigated.
Compare Korte v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 191 F.2d 86, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S.
868 (1951) (defining what constitutes records made in the "regular" course of business) and
United States v. Foreign Zone Operators, 344 F.2c1 281 (2d Cir. 1965) with Matthews v. United
States, 217 F.2d 409, 413-16 (5th Cir. 1954) (holding that where the records are not relied
upon by the party making them in the normal course of his business, and where the truthful-
ness of the records is not necessitated by the party's own interests the business records excep-
tion does not apply; expressly 'rejecting the Korte approach) and Yates v. Bair Transport, Inc„
249 F. Stipp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
When such memoranda qualify as an attorney's work product, the extent to which the
records must be produced still frequently presents a difficult question for courts. See, e.g.,
Galambus v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 64 F.R.D. 468. 472-74 (N.D. Ind. 1974) (report
made in normal course of business and submitted to company's attorney); Richards-Wilcox
Mfg. Co. v. Young Spring & Wire Corp., 34 F.R.D. 212, 213 (N.D. Ill. 1964) (notes submitted
to the company's attorney made by member of company's inspection team). See also Goosman
v. A.D. Pyle, Inc., 320 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1963); Burns v. N.Y. Central R. Co., 33 F.R.D. 309
(N.D. Ohio 1963); Portman v. American Home Prod. Corp., 9 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). Cf.
Breedlove v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 57 F.R.D. 202 (N.D. -Miss. 1972) (discovery of expert re-
ports not allowed, where plaintiffs did not show special needs).
Thus, in Galambus, the court stated:
The authorities indicate that prudent parties anticipate litigation and often begin
preparation prior to the time suit is formally commenced. Thus the test should
be whether, in the light of the nature of the document and the factual situation
in the particular case, the document can be fairly said to have been prepared or
obtained because of the prospect of litigation. Conversely, even though litigation
is already in prospect, there is no work product immunity for documents pre-
pared in the regular course of business rather than For the purposes of litigation
.... The advisory committee note on Rule 26(b); (c) stated:
"Materials assembled in the ordinary course of business or
pursuant to public requirements unrelated to litigation, or for other
nonlitigation purposes are not under the qualified immunity pro-
vided by this subdivision."
64 F.R.D. 468, 472 (N.D. 111. 1964).
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also be generated when an underwriter or investment adviser has a con-
tinuing relationship with the subject of the investment or is assisting a fi-
nancially troubled issuer's attempt to work out or resolve its affairs.'" Mater-
ial of this sort is within the normal scope of discovery, since it frequently
may lead to admissible evidence. This is especially true when the material
sought to be discovered was generated before counsel was called in, since
such material does not present a question whether the "work-product" doc-
trine may prevent discovery."
Even where the information a party seeks to discover is clearly calcu-
lated to lead to admissible evidence, objections may be raised that the post-
transaction evidence is misleading. Post-purchase memoranda in particular
may be damaging for misleading reasons. Laymen writing such memoranda
may be oblivious to their legal significance, and consequently do not always
use language with the care and precision that they would prefer if they
knew that the memorandum was going to be used in litigation. A document
thus may reflect no more than carelessly worded recollections or theorizing,
causing a party in this situation to object to discovery because its use may
prejudice him. On the other hand, such post-transaction material may also
contain important admissions or provide an untainted statement of what
truly happened, and thus yield evidence admissible at trial.
While there are therefore competing considerations as to whether
such information properly should be discoverable, objections to discovery
premised on such possible prejudice should rarely succeed." Prejudice is
an issue best left to resolution at trial rather than during discovery. It is
unclear how a party may be prejudiced merely because discovery is permit-
ted; prejudice generally results only from allowing a jury to hear "prejudi-
cial" information. Moreover, prejudicial evidence, in the legal sense, is gen-
erally by definition relevant evidence.'" As a consequence, discovery of
1 " For example, in Cornaglia v. Ricciardi, 63 F.R.D. 416 (E.D. Pa. 1974), the court di-
rected defendant Drexel Burnham & Company, Inc., the lead underwriter of a public offer-
ing, to answer interrogatories regarding matters ahem the offering, stating:
Drexel Burnham has admittedly prepared followup reports concerning the pros-
pectus after March 30. 1972, and has continued to serve as Richton's investment
banker up to the present It is not unreasonable to conclude with some de-
gree of certainty that consultations and CAMDMIDICalions between Richton and
Drexel Burnham subsequent to March 30, 1972, referred to some extent to
events, decisions, or practices relative to the Richton prospectus and financial
statement which predated . March 23, 1972.
N. at 421-22. See alvo In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litigation, 61 F.R.D. 453, 461-62
(S. D.N. Y. 1973).
" The work-product doctrine prevents an adverse patty from obtaining discovery of
material prepared by opposing counsel. The doctrine was explicitly adopted by the Supreme
Court in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1946). FEn, R..Civ. P. 26(b)(3) now provides, how-
ever, that such materials may be discovered "upon a showing that the party seeking discovery
has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is unable with-
out undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means."
"See, e.g., Cameo, !Inc. v. Baker Oil Tools, Inc., 45 F.R.D. 384, 387 (S.D. Tex. 1968);
Payer, Hewitt & Co. v. Bellanca Corp., 26 F.R.D. 219, 222 (D. Del, 1960).
1 " Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits a court to exclude evidence when
"rallthough relevant	 its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, contusion of the issues or misleading the jury ...." See also C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF
EVIDENCE, § 185 (2c1 ed. 1972) (E. Cleary, gen. editor), where McCormick observes:
It should be emphasized that prejudice, in this context, means more than simply
damage to the opponent's case. A party's case is always damaged by evidence that
the facts are contrary to his contentions; but that cannot be ground kir exclusion.
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such material should be permitted since it is "reasonably calculated to lead
to admissible evidence," and the evidentiary rules applied at trial will nor-
mally be sufficient to prevent or minimize prejudice.
In those unusual circumstances where discovery itself is truly prejudi-
cial, a party may, of course, seek a protective order to prevent discovery."
A party seeking such an order will bear the burden of showing that permit-
ting discovery will unduly prejudice his case. 2 ' Such an objection is more
likely to be upheld as the material sought to be discovered becomes more
distant in time from the transaction involved in the litigation and the likeli-
hood of obtaining evidence with significant weight diminishes. 22
This presumption favoring discovery of post-transaction information
is illustrated by Ross v. Paul Hardeman, Inc. 23 In Ross, a purchaser of deben-
tures alleged that the issuer, underwriter, and several individuals involved
in the public offering of the debentures violated the antifraud provisions of
the securities acts by failing to reveal that at that time, Hardeman, the
issuer, was planning to merge with another company, Young Spring &
Wire Corp. Prior to trial, the plaintiff propounded interrogatories seeking
information relating to purchases of Young stock by Hardeman during
January and February, 1964, after the sale of the debentures to Ross. The
plaintiff claimed that the information might lead to proof that plans and
negotiations for the merger were under way at the time debentures were
offered for sale. The defendants moved to vacate the interrogatories. The
court denied the motion with a terse brushstroke:
[W]hile any negotiations that did occur for the purchase of
Young stock at the time of the debenture offering may have
been in fact for the sole purpose of obtaining a majority position
in Young and not to bring about a corporate merger, the court
may not make such a determination on this application. Plaintiffs
are entitled to discovery of the facts surrounding the said pur-
chase of stock. Hardeman has failed to demonstrate that the in-
formation sought by the plaintiffs is clearly irrelevant. The mere
fact that the transactions inquired about occurred subsequent to
What is meant here is an undue tendency to move the tribunal to decide on an
improper basis, commonly, though not always, an emotional one.
Id. at § 185, at 439 n.31.
" Rule 26(c) of the Fed. R. Civ. P. permits a party to seek to have a court prohibit or
limit discovery so long as the party can show good cause. The rule permits a judge to "make
any order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or.expense, ...."
21
 As noted in note 20 supra, the moving party under Rule 26(c) of the Fed. R. Civ. P.
must show "good cause" to have his motion granted. See, e.g., United States v. Nysco
Laboratories, Inc., 26 F.R.D. 159, 161 (E.D.N.Y. 1960). See also Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S.
286, 297 (1969). For examples of where a party has made such a showing, see Ecuno-Car
Intern., Inc. v. Antilles Car Rentals, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 8, 10 (D. V. I. 1973); Konrad v. DeLong,
57 F.R.D. 123, 124-25 (E.D. 111. 1972); Frost v. Williams, 46 F.R.D. 484, 485 (D. Md. 1969).
"See, e.g., Bass v. Gulf Oil Corp., 304 F. Supp. 1041, 1044-47 (S.D. Miss. 1969); Alex-
ander's Dep't. Stores, Inc. v. E. J. Korvette's, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 28, 29-30 (S.D.N.Y. 1961);
Mall Tool Co. v. Sterling Varnish Co., 11 'F.R.D. 576, 579 (W.D. Pa. 1951); Fletcher v.
Foremost Dairies of New York, 29 F. Supp. 744, 745 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), for instances in which
the court has indicated that the relevancy of material discovered is likely to become increas-
ingly attenuated the more removed in time the information sought is from the incident lead-
ing to the litigation, and has therefore refused to permit discovery of remote materials.
23 11964-66 Transfer Binder.] FED. SPA:. L. Rica. (CCH) 1 91,483 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
624
POST-TRANSACTION EVIDENCE
the time the debentures were offered to the public is not enough
to justify vacation of the interrogatories propounded by the
plaintiff under the liberal procedural rules of this court. 24
If one accepts the conclusion that prejudice is an issue more properly
resolved at trial rather than during discovery, the Ross court's refusal to va-
cate the interrogatories is undeniably correct. The defendant failed to show
the existence of any extraordinary circumstances or undue prejudice war-
ranting refusal to allow the discovery. Using similar reasoning, those few
courts which have passed squarely upon the discoverability of post-
transaction information in more recent. securities litigation have reached
the same conclusion as the court in Rins. 25
Similar authority for permitting discovery exists under other federal
and state actions as well. For example, in Goldinger v. Boron Oil Co.," a
former gasoline station manager sued an oil company for alleged violations
of the antitrust laws in connection with the termination of the parties'
mutual business dealings and contracts. Boron claimed that Goldinger was
merely its employee and that, accordingly, it did not violate the law since a
company has a right to set its own prices and cannot violate the antitrust
laws in dealing with itself. 27 Goldinger sought to show that Boron had
changed significant aspects of its contract with its dealers and its mode of
doing business a year after his dismissal. He suggested that these changes
might show that his contract should be interpreted as one creating an in-
dependent operator relationship, not a mere employment relationship. 28
The court overruled Boron's objections to the discovery request, emphasiz-
ing the differences between admissiblity and discovery of evidence:
[K]aiber than limiting discovery to the issues raised by the plead-
ings, the correct test for the scope of discovery is relevancy to the
subject matter of the suit, so as to accomplish the true purpose
of discovery, i.e., to arrive at the truth while at the same time not
permitting wholly irrelevant discovery. The requested informa-
tion sought in this present case falls within the permissible scope
of discovery. By and of itself, the agreement with present com-
mission managers may not be admissible at trial, but there is a
reasonable chance that by allowing the plaintiff to see such
agreement admissible evidence may flow from such discovery. 29
as
	 at 94,849.
"See cases cited at notes 14 and 16 supra. See also Transcripts of April 8, 1972 and De-
cember 26, 1972. Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litigation, No. MDL-56A (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
2" (30 F.R.D. 562 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
27
 Id. at 563-64. Compare Call Carl. Inc. v. 1W Oil Corp., 554 F.2d 623 (4th Cir. 1977);
American Oil Co. v. McMullin, 508 117.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1975); MatarazzO v. Friendly Ice
Cream Corp., 62 F.R.D. 65, 67-68 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) and Fagan v. Sunbeam Lighting Co., 303 F.
Supp. 346 (N.D. Ill. 1969) with Roberts v. Exxon Corp., 1976-1 TRADE CASES (CCH) 9 60,869
(W.D. La, 1976) and United States v. Richfield Oil Corp., 99 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1951) on
this interesting issue. See also Bernstein v, Universal Pictures, 517 F.2d 976, 980 (2d Cir. 1975).
" 60 F.R.D. at 563. Boron eventually prevailed on the merits on this issue. See Go]-
dinger v. Boron Oil Co., 375 F. Supp. 400 (W.D. Pa. 1974), gip, 571 F.2d 1393 (3d Cir. 1975)
(mesa.). The complex question of when one is an employee as opposed to a franchisee or inde-
pendent contractor was also directly confronted in Matarazzo v. Friendly Ice Cream Corp.,
No, 73-C-545 URI)), (E.D.N.Y. 1977). See Transcript of June 7, 1977, at 4201-21 (Jury
charge). See also earlier opinions reported at 62 F.R.D. 65 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) and 70 F.R.D. 556
(E.D.N.Y. 1976). The defendant in Matarmo won it jury verdict on that issue resulting in a
dismissal of the antitrust claims. See Wall Street journal, June 10, 1977, at 2, col. 3.
w (30 F.R.D. at 564.	 625
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In sum, so long as the post-transaction discovery sought may lead to rele-
vant evidence, it appears that such discovery requests should be and will be
permitted.
B. Cut-off Dates
An alternative method which parties, particularly defendants, employ
to prevent discovery of post-transaction information is to attempt to have
the court establish an arbitrary cut-off date after which material generated
is not discoverable. Examples of cut-off dates often suggested by defen-
dants include the service of the complaint, the last purchase by any plaintiff
in the action or the first notice to the defendant that the plantiff feels ag-
grieved. 3° When the plaintiffs complaint alleges a 'continuing wrong or a
securities fraud claim coupled with claims involving other ongoing wrongs,
such a cut-off date is obviously both logically and legally unfounded. 3 ' A
continuing wrong allegation necessarily implies an expansive notion of
fraud encompassing post-transaction as well as pre-transaction behavior.
Where a "single transaction" claim is involved, the question is not quite so
simple, because no expansive notion of fraud is alleged and it may appear
reasonable to conclude that material generated after the transaction oc-
curred will have little probative value. Even in this situation, courts have
generally refused to establish an arbitrary cut-off date for discovery unless
unusually compelling circumstances are shown. This result appears proper
since the discovery rules are to be construed liberally and permitting the
discovery may lead to relevant evidence; as observed earlier, if the dis-
covered material is irrelevant or unduly prejudicial, it may properly be sub-
ject to objection and exclusion at trial."
In determining the proper time period, the courts have generally de-
clined to limit the parties to the strict parameters of the pleadings. Carlson
v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.," an antitrust action based upon an alleged tie-
ing arrangement, is illustrative. The defendant objected to post-complaint
discovery on the theory that it would not be relevant until and unless the
plaintiff filed a supplemental complaint to update his claim. Relying upon
" See, e.g., Devex Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 275 F. Supp. 310, 313 (1). Del. 1967)
(antitrust action): Banana Distrib. Inc. v. United Fruit Cu.. 19 F.R.D. 244, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)
(antitrust action); O'Brien v. Equitable Life Cas. Soc'y. 14 F.R.D. 141, 141-42 (W.D. Mo. 1953)
(action on insurance policy). See also Carlson Cos., Inc., v, Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 374 F.
Supp. 1080, 1100-04 (D. Minn. 1974), a securities case where this type of discovery cut-off
date was attempted.
31
 Preventing discovery of post-transaction facts in a case alleging a continuing fraud is
illogical, since such post-transaction information will be admissible at trial to prove such' mat-
ters as knowledge and intent, See, e.g., Caplin v, United Features Syndicate, Inc., 8 F.R.D. 424
(S.D.N.Y. 1948). See aiso 4 MOORES, supra note 14, 1 26.56W at 26-126-28; Transcript of
June 4, 1977. Colocotronis Tanker Sec. Litigation, No. M-21-19 (CHT) (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Carlson Cos., inc. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 374 F. Supp. 1080, 1102 (D. Minn. 1974).
Since discovery of post-transaction fiicts is permitted when it is only reasonably calculated to
lead to admissible evidence, it surely cannot be justifiable to prevent discovery of facts which
may themselves be admissible evidence. But cf. Manitowoc Milk Producers v. Guernsey, 61
F.R.D. 499, 500 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (court conditionally adopted arbitrary cut-off date in action
claiming continuing violation where it appeared party seeking discovery was doing so more to
promote its competitive position, rather than to further the lawsuit).
33
 See note 31 supra.
33 374 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Minn. 1974).
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Professor Moore, among others, the court. rejected that claim on the
ground that, by it, "in effect, the cart is put before the horse."" The court
observed that supplementation or amendment of pleadings usually follows,
not precedes, the discovery of new current facts, adding: "unless the liti-
gant seeks to later use the information discovered as material at trial, in-
formation which is relevant to the subject matter of the pending litigation,
but not specifically within the scope of the issues pleaded, may be dis-
covered and the pleadings need not be amended at any time."'
C. Subsequent Remedial Measures
A potentially more troublesome objection than that posed when a
party seeks to prevent discovery merely because the information sought
may he inadmissible at trial arises where the post-transaction events about
which discovery is sought involve subsequent remedial action.' As will be
shown in greater detail below," parties opposing the discovery and admis-
sibility of' post-transaction facts usually rely upon rule 407 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence," 7 which bars the use of evidence regarding subsequent
remedial acts by'a party, and on the common law evidentiary rule in negli-
gence cases upon which rule 407 is premised. 38 Several common law deci-
sions have sustained this objection to discovery, reasoning that the infimna-
tion would be undeniably inadmissible at trial. 3" These courts have further
reasoned that the mere act of . revealing information about, subsequent re-
medial measures in discovery might so prejudice a party that the bar
against admissibility at trial would not sufficiently protect the party object-
ing to the discovery request. 4 " Underlying this reasoning is the fear that
admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures will discourage patties
34 Id. at 1102, quoting 4 MooRE's, supra note 14, i 26.513[5], at 26-187-88 (2d ed. 1972).
at 1103.
36 See text at notes 263-79 infra.
" Rule 407 provides:
When, alter an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have
made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event.
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures
when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasi-
bin), of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
"See generally 2 J. Wicisiottkl, EvIDENcE § 283 (3d. ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as 'WIG.
Num]; McCoRmicK.,supra note 19, § 275. Gf. 2 j. WEINSTEIN lk M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EV1-
11ENCE. I 407[06] (1975), [hereinafter cited as WEitss -aiN].
"See, e.g., Columbia and Puget Sound R.R. Co. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 207
(1892) (slating this evidentiary rule); Hanlon11 v. Hyster Co., 42 F.R,D. 173, 174 (E.D. Wis.
1967) (refusing to permit discovery of subsequent remedial measure); Needles v, F.W. Wool-
worth Co., 13 F.R.D. 460, 461-62 (E.D. Pa. 1952) (refusing to permit discovery).
4° See cases cited at note 39 supra. In his recent treatise on the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, however, Judge Weinstein has cautioned:
The standard of admissibility established by Rule 401 for evidence of sub-
sequent remedial Measures is not the same as that for pretrial discovery, Some
courts have fitiled to make the distinction and denied discovery on the grounds
of relevancy. De better view is to permit discovery, not only because Rule 407 is es-
sentially a rule of public policy rather than of relevancy, but also because sub-
sequent remedial measures might be admissible to prove a consequential, mate-
rial fact in issue other than negligence.
2 WED,:smiN„supra note 38, at 1407[06] (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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from undertaking such measures and thus harm the public. Courts there-
fore have sometimes determined that it is more important to encourage
safety precautions necessary to prevent future repetitions of an injury than
it is to redress past wrongs, and accordingly have barred discovery related
to such precautions. 4 '
Since the rule barring evidence of subsequent remedial measures
stems from a public policy consideration—preventing future injury—it has
significant limitations in contexts where this purpose is not served. As dis-
cussed more fully below, there are several exceptions to the "rule" against
admissibility of subsequent remedial measure's." Even in negligence ac-
tions, evidence of subsequent remedial measures may be admitted to prove
matters such as the fact that the accident or injury occurred or the feasibil-
ity of preventing it." In recognizing that subsequent remedial measure
evidence may serve a variety of legitimate purposes, a number of courts
have permitted discovery or subsequent remedial measures in negligence
cases, and deferred for trial the question of admissibility. 44 For example, in
Richards-Wilcox Mfg. Co. v. Young Spring & Wire Carp., 45 the court permitted
discovery of notes and reports by an inspection team sent to observe the al-
legedly defective conveyor system at the defendant's factory, reasoning that
"the subsequent repair exception to the admissibility of evidence, consid-
ered in the light of its public policy rationale, would not apply to the pres-
ent situation."'"
A reasonable analogy can be drawn between this line of common law
negligence cases and securities litigation. In both instances, discovery of
remedial post-transaction actions may lead to admissible evidence.
Moreover, the function of post-transaction evidence in most securities liti-
gation is to prove matters such as intent, materiality, the fact of deception
or the feasibility of learning facts claimed to have existed at the time of the
4t
 The Advisory Committee which drafted Ft:o. R. EVlo. 407 explained its rationale as
follows:
The rule rests on two grounds. (1) The conduct. is not in fact an admission, since
the conduct is equally consistent with injury by mere accident or through con-
tributory negligence. Or, as Baron Bramwell put it. the rule rejects the notion
that "because the world gets wiser as it gets older, therefore it was foolish be-
fore." Hart v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry. Co., 21 L.T.R. N.S. 261, 263 (1869).
Under a liberal theory of relevancy this ground alone would not support exclu-
sion as the inference is still a possible one. (2) The other, and more impressive,
ground for exclusion rests on a social policy of encouraging people to take, or at
least not discouraging them from taking, steps in furtherance of added safety.
Quoted in 2 WEiNsmiN, supra note 38, 1 407. at 407-2 (1977). See also Vockie v. General
Motors Corp., 66 F.R.D. 57, 61 (E.D. Pa.), affd, 523 F.2d 1052 .(3d Cir. 1975): Camillo v. Rose,
43 App. Div. 2d 831, 350 N.Y.S. 2d 929 (1974).
la See notes 142-51 and 275-83 infra.
"See notes 275-79 infra. As noted there. rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence it-
self provides such a limitation to applicability of the subsequent remedial measures rule.
" See, e.g., Caulk v. Baltimore & 0. R.R.., 306 F. Supp. 1171, 1172 (D. Md. 1969);
Richards-Wilcox Mfg. Co. v. Young Spring & Wire Corp., 34 F.R.D. 212 (N.D. Ill. 1964);
Stovall v. Gulf and South America S.S. Co., Inc., 30 F.R.D. 152, 155 (S.D. Tex. 1961); Novak
v. Good Will Grange No. 127, Patrons of Husbandry, Inc., 28 F.R.D. 394, 396 (D. Conn.
1961).
4' 34 F.R.D. 212 (N.D. 111. 1964).
"Id. at 214.
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wrongs.'" The subsequent remedial measure objection, predicated upon a
desire to encourage persons to remedy injurious conditions, has little rele-
vance to a party's desire to discover information about state of mind, rather
than about the injury itself." Objections to discovery based on the sub-
sequent remedial measures doctrine . thus appear inappropriate in most se-
curities cases," in the same way that such objections are inappropriate in
negligence actions when the evidence is sought, for example, to show the
feasibility of correcting a dangerous condition. As a result, the burden is
and should be decidedly upon the objecting party to show specifically that
actual serious prejudice will result from permitting discovery of its sub-
sequent remedial measures if the objection is to succeed."
III. THE ADMISSI13IUTY OF POST-TRANSACTION EVIDENCE AT TRIAL.
A. Conditional Relevance: Fixing the Time of the Transaction
While post-transaction information is generally discoverable, its admis-
sibility at trial is a more complex issue. Before turning to this issue, how-
ever, it seems advisable to establish what the terra "post-transaction" en-
compasses. Essentially, this involves a question of time, since fixing the time
when the transaction is deemed to have occurred determines which evi-
dence is pre-transaction and which is post-transaction.
Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz" contains perhaps the most
explicit higher court pronouncement concerning the time at which a securi-
ties transaction is deemed to have been completed. A seller of securities
sued the purchasers under rule 10b-5, alleging that they had failed to dis-
close inside information known to them at the time of the sale, specifically
that merger discussions were being conducted between the corporation in
which plaintiff had held his stock and another corporation. 52 The merger
was concluded a month after the plaintiff sold his stock in the company."
At trial, the district court allowed the plaintiff to introduce evidence
regarding the merger talks and their subsequent consummation. The court,
however, charged the jury that the materiality of that. evidence must be de-
termined as of the time the transaction was completed, and that such date
occurs upon
" Sec text at notes 96- 102 infra. For example, in In re Penn Cent, Commercial Paper
Litigation, 61 F.R.D. 453 (S.D.N,Y. 1973), the court ordered pre-trial discovery of a
memorandum by the attorney for the underwriters of a public offering of debentures which
had been written months after certain of the plaintiff's had purchased other securities of' the
issuer. Emphasizing that the plaintiffs were alleging claims under section 12(2), which allows
liability to attach upon a showing of' mere negligence, the court concluded: "What, when and
how Williams (the attorney] learned about the financial condition of PCTC [the issuer) may be
relevant for plaintiffs in rebutting any claim by defendant that it could not in the exercise of
reasonable care have learned about the alleged false statements and material omissions." Id. at
461-62.
45 See comments of Judge Weinstein quoted in note 40 supra.
" An example of the rare situation in which the subsequent remedial measures objec-
tion has been successfully asserted at trial in securities litigation is SEC v. Geon Industries,
Inc., 531 F,2d 39, 52 & n, l6 (2d Cir. 1976), discussed more fully at notes 272-74 infra.
5" See Ens, R. Civ, P. 26(c), 33(a).
'' 464 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1972).
52 Id. at 879.
55 1d. at 882, 884.
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the date when an insider has committed himself to purchase the
stock. It is not any later date, such as, for example, the formal
closing date when the delivery and payment are formally com-
pleted and cleared. To determine whether fraud was perpetrated
you look to the situation at the date when the parties committed
themselves. There is no obligation to pull back from a commit-
ment previously made by the buyer and accepted by the seller
because of after acquired knowledge. 54
In effect, the Radiation Dynamics court was instructing the jury to disregard
any evidence which it found had arisen after the transaction. 55 The jury
found for the defendants. 55 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit sustained the jury instruction, emphasizing that the time rule
fixed by the district court was consistent with the underlying policy of the
antifraud provisions to prevent fraud "in connection with" the investment
decision at issue. 57
Proving when the parties committed themselves to the transaction
may often entail the introduction of evidence subsequently deemed post-
transactional, particularly when the two adverse parties disagree as to when
the transaction was actually consummated. The relevancy of evidence in-
troduced for this purpose is, thus, conditioned on the ultimate resolution
of when the transaction occurred. Such a conditional relevancy test is con-
sistent with the overall approach of the antifraud provisions, which focus
on a party's decision whether to buy or sell, rather than on some belated
change of heart or hindsight regarding the facts. 55 This does not mean that
the evidence is always irrelevant, 5" but rather that it cannot be the basis of
the fraud itself. In Radiation Dynamics, the jury obviously made a factual de-
termination that the post-commitment evidence did not prove the fraud
and thus was not material; but, as will be shown below, there are other
cases where such evidence has served that function.""
Determining when the plaintiff became "committed" to the transac-
tion is not always as easy as it was in Radiation Dynamics. For example, an
agreement may allow the parties to cancel the transaction prior to the clos-
51
 1d. at 890. This ride has been generally followed by the securities cases since Radiation
Dynamics. See, e.g., Morales v. Gulf Energy & Dev, Corp., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FE1). SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 9 96.222 (D. Cult. 1977); Pittsburgh Coke & Chem. Corp. v. Bono, 421 F.
Supp. 908 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), affd, 560 F.2d 1089 (2d Cir. 1977): Schuller v. Slick Corp.,
[1974-75 Transfer Binder] Fran. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 95,065, at 95,736 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See
also Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1050 (7th Cir. 1977); Vanderboom
v. Sexton, 460 F.2d 362, 366-67 (8th Cir. 1972); Fox v. Kane-Miller Corp., 398 F. Supp. 609,
646 n.31 (D. Md, 1975), affd, 542 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1976). But cf. Lewelling v. First Cal. Co.,
[1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,264 (9th Cir. 1977) (discussed in
notes 63 and 93 infra).
55
 464 F.2d at 890.
w Id. at 879-80.
" Id. at 889-90. See also Morgan v. Prudential Funds, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC L. REP.
(CCH) 1 96,345, at 93,172 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
" See, e.g., Speilman v, General Host Corp., 402 F. Stipp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), alp,
538 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976), where the court stated that determinations respecting materiality
in a 10b-5 suit are to be made at the time of the transaction, and not upon a 20-20 hindsight
view lung after the event." Id. at 194. See also Denny v. Barber. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 96,438, at 93,583 (2d Cir. 1978).
" See text at note 96-102 & 106 supra.
"See notes 130-34 infra.
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ing on the basis of specified post-contract but pre-closing events." In such
a situation, it must be decided whether the parties truly committed them-
selves at. the time they executed the sale agreement, or whether they have
remained uncommitted until the closing. Moreover, the courts have strictly
limited any duty of the plaintiff in such a case to uncover post-contractual
events;" 2 and in no case has a plaintiff' been required to renege on an
agreement even though a rescission action may have been legally avail-
able." But, evidence of facts which occurred after the initial commitment
date generally will be deemed post, transactionaland therefore not be ac-
corded much, if any, weight in determining whether such facts led to the
fraud.
In Pittsburgh Coke & Chemical Co. v. Both)," the court confronted these
difficulties of determining both when a transaction occurs and what consti-
tutes post-transaction evidence. The Pittsburgh Coke company entered into
an agreement in December 1968 with the Bollo family to purchase control
of their successful airliner parts company." The closing date for the acquis-
ition was fixed as June 30, 1969 to permit application for necessary ap-
provals for the sale from the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
Civil Aeronautics Board." Due to delays in obtaining the approvals, the
closing actually took place on September 18, 1969. 67 The long time lag be-
tween the contract and closing dates led Pittsburgh Coke to require that
Bollo deliver a certificate at the closing affirming that all representations
and warranties in the contract remained "true and correct as of the closing
date, with the same force and effect as though they had been made at the
closing date" and that there had been "no material adverse change in the
financial condition of the company" between the contract and closing
dates." One year following the closing, Pittsburgh Coke sued to recover
the purchase price of the stock, alleging that during 1968 the Bollos' com-
pany had "suffered severe setbacks because of material changes in major
distributor relationships which Bollo had failed to disclose during the 1968
negotiations and prior to the September 1969 closing."" Pittsburgh Coke
51
 In such situations, the degree of due diligence the purchaser has exercised in protect-
ing his interest between contract and closing may have a bearing on a cot's sympathy for the
plaintiff's position. Sre Pittsburgh Coke & Chem. Co. v. Bono, 421 F. Stipp. 908 (E.D.N.Y.
1976) (meat,), red, 560 F.2d 1089 (2d Cir. 1977). See also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Ross,
509 F.2d 930, 932 (2d Cir. 1975).
62
 See text and notes at notes 209-38 infra, particularly cases cited and discussed in note
224 infra.
" 3 See, e.g., Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1972)
(specifically holding that "there is no obligation to pull back from a commitment" based upon
post-transaction developments). As shown in note 93 infra, in Lewelling v, First Cal. Co.,
(1977-78 Transfer Binder] Feu, SEC, L. RE,t , . (CC1-1) I 96,264 (9th Cir. 1977), the plaintiff's
right to "pull back" was interpreted to defer the date of the sale to allow the plaintiff to sue
on the basis of deceitful conduct after his broker had committed him to an open market pur-
chase. As shown in the text at notes 64-81 infra, this type of interpretation was rejected in the
context of face-to-face merger negotiations.
" 4 421 F. Stipp. 908 (E.D.N.V. 1976), (iffd, 560 F.2d 1089 (2d Cir. 1977). In its affir-
mance, as explained in note 77 infra, the court of appeals avoided altogether the post-
purchase evidence problem.
"Id. at 913.
"Id. at 914.
trl Id.
58 Id
6" Id. at 914-15.
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also complained that it had been misled about the value and obsolescence
of the Bolos' inventory due to substantial inventory write-downs which oc-
curred in 1970. 70
Several facts rendered impossible a simple resolution of the issues
raised in Pittsburgh Coke. The company had remained profitable and exhib-
ited rising sales through 1969. 71
 Furthermore, Pittsburgh Coke personnel
had conducted a careful investigation of Bollo prior to both the contract
and the closing." Also complicating matters was expert testimony attribut-
ing the real cause of the company's decline in 1970, just after the closing,
to a general "aviation recession."" Finally, the inventory revaluation com-
plained of had not occurred until a 1970 audit by Pittsburgh Coke's ac-
, countants, and Bollo blamed the inventory obsolescence on the 1970 avia-
tion recession. 74
Pittsburgh Coke presented a threefold threshold issue concerning when
the transaction was completed. First, in light of the Radiation Dynamics rule
that the crucial date in a 106-5 action is the "commitment date," what
should be the effect of the certificate delivered to Pittsburgh Coke at the
closing date? Second, if the court determined that the contract date consti-
tuted the commitment date, should the court nevertheless receive evidence
of the post-contractual events and the post-closing facts? Third, assuming
the court did allow such post-contract evidence, what weight should be ac-
corded to that evidence?
In resolving these issues, the district court initially received the post-
contract evidence, but then found it "irrelevant."'" Determining that the
commitment date was the time the contract was signed rather than the clos-
ing date," the court held that "issues of non-disclosure, misrepresentation,
materiality and reliance are to be determined by the situation and knowl-
edge of the parties at the time they committed themselves, and not on the
basis of subsequent events."" Specifically, the court rejected Pittsburgh
70 Id. at 920, 928.
" Id. at 914.
"Id. at 918-19.
"Id. at 920.
"Id.
"Id. at 923.
?flu,
" The court's full statement was that;
For purposes of a Rule 1013-5 claim, events occurring after the commitment to
purchase stock has been made are irrelevant. Issues of non-disclosure, misrepre-
sentation, materiality and reliance are to be determined by the situation and
knowledge of the parties at the time they committed themselves, and not on the
basis of subsequent events, even though they occur prior to the formal closing
date when the delivery and payment are 'brutally completed and cleared.
Id. at 923. In affirming the district court's decision, 560 F.2d 1089 (2d. Cir. 1977), the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit did not decide whether this particular ruling was correct;
instead it found for the defendant on other grounds. See note 80 infra. The court of appeals
noted specifically that livle do not need to decide whether the District Court should have
considered events occurring between the contract and closing dates, because the District Court
in fact did consider those events and concluded that [plaintiff] had failed to sustain its charges
of fraud and nondisclosure. We agree...." 560 F.2d at 1091 (emphasis in original). The court
of appeals also observed that "despite the District Court's belief that post December 20, 1968
events were 'irrelevant' the Court admitted proof as to events in the intervening period and
relied thereon in its opinion." Id. at 1092. Cf. Lewelling v. First Cal. Co., [1977-78 Transfer
Binder) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,264 (9th Cir. 1977) (discussed in note 63 supra and note
93 infra).
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Coke's attempt to distinguish Radiation Dynamics on the ground that its pur-
chase contract had conditioned its duty to perform upon receipt of the Bol-
los' closing certificate updating their representations and warranties, while
in Radiation Dynamics all obligations of the parties involved were completed
as of the commitment date.'" The court found that "in the classical contrac-
tual sense, there was a meeting of the minds of the parties"" when the De-
cember 1968 contract was executed, and the parties were therefore obli-
gated on that date."
The district court also dismissed Pittsburgh Coke's common law
claims, based on the contract and the certificate delivered at the closing.
The court held that not even the warranty language of the certificate had
given Pittsburgh Coke any greater rights, reasoning that it was designed
only to assure the accuracy of the representations, not to broaden them.
The warranty, the court held, hence did not alter the pertinent date for
testing the relevancy of the facts proffered. 8 '
Although it had admitted the post-transaction facts into evidence, the
court in Pittsburgh Coke proceeded to ignore them or simply to discount
them. Given that result., one might. reasonably ask why the court should re-
ceive the evidence in the first place. Particularly in a jury trial, receiving
78
 4 2 I F. Supp. at 923.
7 " Id., quoting Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 891 (2c1 Cir. 1072).
"921 F. Supp. at 923. In reaching this conclusion, the district court employed the fol-
lowing rationale:
The, foregoing "representations" [contitined in the certificates of warranty deliv-
ered by Bono at closing] were obviously made on the basis of Bollo's knowledge
as of December 20. 1968. Rule 10b-5 liability could only attach if on that date the
material facts incorporated in the representations were untrue or misleadingly
incomplete to Bollo's knowledge at that time and were relied on by PCC in mak-
ing its commitment to acquire control of Standard.
Id. The district court's decision was influenced by Pittsburgh Coke's sophistication and the de-
tailed nature of Pittsburgh Coke's pre-contract and pre-closing investigation. See id. at 922,
926. Thus, in rejecting plaintiff's common law fraud claims, the court determined that
lilt also clearly appeal's that PCC was the active, sophisticated seeker of invest-
ment opportunities; that in acquiring Standard [Bollo's company] it acted in ac-
cordance with well-defined long range investment objectives; that [plaintiff's]
representatives were men of business skill and acumen well able to deal with
Boll°, who took full advantage of the protracted opportunity they had to
examine the financial status of Standard prior to closing the deal; and that the
acquisition was consummated on the basis of PCC's own assessment of Standard
and its compatibility with PCC's entry into the airline business and not in reliance
upon the matters alleged in this suit. See Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d
234 (2d Cir. 1975), holding that in a case such as this, where both misrepre-
sentations and material omissions are alleged, a plaintiff must show both mate-
riality and reliance—a burden PCC did not meet here.
Id. at 926-27. This determination by the district court also appears to have greatly influenced
the Second Circuit's decision to affirm. See 560 F.2d at 1091-92.
"' The court explained the significance of the warranty as follows;
The meaning of "warranty" as used in the agreement is also well understood in
New York law. "A warranty is an assurance by one party to a contract of the exis-
tence of a fact upon which the other party may rely." Metropolitan Coal Co. v.
Howard, 155 F.2d 780, 784 (2d Cir. 1946). And it has long been known that if a
material state of facts is warranted to . exist. which turns out not to be the case, the
warrantor is liable fo r the loss or damage caused; and it is no defense that he
acted upon misinformation in good faith. Brisbane v. Parsons, 33 N.Y. 332 (1865).
421 F. Supp. at 928. See nitro Fox v. Kane-Miller Corp., 398 F. Supp. 609, 623 (D. Md. 1975),
affd, 542 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1976), reaching essentially the same conclusion.
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such evidence might seriously taint the jury's minds and prejudice the de-
fendant's case. Given this possible adverse result, one might question
whether a court should seek to prevent such prejudice by excluding the
evidence altogether under the discretionary powers given to the judge by
rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 82
 Since the court can exclude
even relevant evidence which may be unduly prejudicial, it can be argued
that a court should not hesitate to do so where the evidence is "irrelevant."
Also, once the judge had determined the that the evidence was "irrelevant,"
should he have stricken the post-transaction evidence which had been al-
ready introduced and excluded any such evidence offered thereafter?
The answer to these questions appears to be that evidence eventually
deemed to be post-transactional often must be introduced to aid in deter-
mining precisely when the transaction actually occurred. That determina-
tion is, to a great extent, one of fact, and evidence may not properly be
characterized as post-transaction until after that threshold question has
been resolved. Moreover, the evidence may be relevant on a variety of
other issues, as set forth below. The potential problems of prejudice result-
ing from allowing a jury to hear such evidence, however, remain. Accord-
ingly, in many cases it may be advisable and proper for a court to voir dire
the evidence prior to allowing it to be admitted at tria1. 83
82
 Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
See also 2 WEINSTEIN, .stipm note 38, 1 403 for an extensive discussion of the rule and its ra-
tionale.
Examples of the rule in actual operation are provided in Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diner's
Club, Inc.. 550 F.2d 505, 511 & n.17 (2d Cir, 1977); Apicella v. McNeill Laboratories, Inc., 66
F.R.D. 78, 86-87 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Fox v. Kane-Miller Corp., 398 F. Supp. 609, 633 (D. Md.
1975), affd, 542 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1976). See also text at notes 251-56 infra.
"a Rule 104(a) and (c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence give the judge broad discretion
on such matters. But the Advisory Committee to those rules cautioned:
[Metailed treatment of when preliminary matters should be heard outside the
hearing of the jury is not feasible. The procedure is time consuming. Not in-
frequently the same evidence which is relevant to the issue of fulfillment of a
condition precedent to admissibility is also relevant to weight or credibility, and
time is saved by taking foundation proof in the presence of the jury. Much evi-
dence by preliminary questions, though not relevant to jury issues, may be heard
by the jury with no adverse effect. A great deal must be left to the discretion of
the judge who will act as the interests of justice require.
Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 104 Subsection (c), quoted in 1 WEINsTEIN.supra note 38, 1
104 at 104-8 (1977).
The rationale for first taking such evidence outside of the hearing of the jury was aptly
summarized by Professor McCormick in the first edition of his treatise on evidence law:
The judge of course ascertains and announces the rule of evidence law setting up
the criterion of admission or exclusion, but who is to decide ... preliminary
questions of fact upon which hinges the application of the rule of evidence law?
Issues of fact are usually left to the jury, but there are strong reasons here
for not doing so. If the special question of fact were submitted to the jury when
objection is made, this would be cumbersome and raise awkward problems about
unanimity. If the judge admits the evidence ... to the jury and directs them to
disregard it ..., the aim of the exclusionary rule is likely to be frustrated for two
reasons. First, the jury will often not be able to erase the evidence from their
minds. ... They could not if they would. Second, the average juror will not be
interested in performing this intellectual gymnastic of "disregarding" the evi-
dence. They are intent mainly on reaching their verdict in this case in accord
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B. Proper Uses of Post-Transaction Evidence: Overview
Three elements — causation," materiality" and reliance"—must be
shown to establish a typical securities fraud claim. Each must be shown to
have existed prior to or at the time of the plaintiff's decision to commit
himself to the transaction, normally a decision to purchase or sell a secu-
rity.'' Not every cognizable claim under the securities laws requires a plain-
tiff to show each of these elements;" and, even in those situations where all
three elements are required, the courts occasionally accept watered clown
versions of those elements by inferring their existence from the surround-
ing circumstances.'" But, in the usual rule 10b-5 fraud action, those ele-
With {Vital they believe to be true rather than in enforcing the long-term policies
of evidence law,
C. MCCORMICK, LAw or EVIDENCE, § 53, at 123 (1st. ed. 1954). McCormick cited examples and
concluded that - On all of those preliminary questions the judge, on request, will hold a hear-
ing." Id. FED. R. Evil). 104 has obviously limited this broad conclusion by Professor McCor-
mick. See also Maguire & Epstein, Rules of Evidence in Preliminary Controversies as to
36 YALE L. J. 1101 (1927) for an early but comprehensive and incisive discussion of this sub-
ject.
The principal difficulty in holding such evidentiary voir dires will be where the pre-
liminary fact issues going to the question of admissibility are intertwined with the lact issues
going to the merits of the controversy to be submitted to the jury. On that situation, a special
evidentiary voir dire will usually not be conducted; rather the court may rely upon limiting in-
structions to the jury under rule 105 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, See also text at notes
95 & 179-80 infra for a discussion or the use of and practical problems attendant to such limit-
ing instructions.
" For cases stating that causation is a crucial element in establishing most securities
fraud cases, see, e.g., Jackson v. Oppenheim, 553 F.2d 826, 829-30 n.8 (2d Cir. 1976) (12(2) ac-
tion); Competitive Assocs. Inc. v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516 F.2(1 811,
814 (2d Cir. 1975) (10b-5 action); Schlick v, Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380 (2d
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975) (same); University Hill Foundation v. Goldman,
Sachs & Co., 422 E. Stipp. 879, 893 (S.D.N.Y, 1976) (12(2) action); Cotner v. Fried, 373 F.
Supp. 4, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (101)-5 and 17(a) actions),
" See, e.g., Spielman v. General Host Corp., 538 F.2d 39, 40 (2d Cir. 1976) (per
curiam); Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen, 513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir. 1975) (1013-5 action). See also
notes 130-34 irtfra.
" See, e.g., Wright v. Heizer Corp.. 560 F.2d 236, 249.50 (7th Cir. 1977), Pollack v.
Eastman Dillon, [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEG. L. Rtm'. (CCH) 4 94,987, at 97,412
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also note 5 supra.
"See notes 4 and 5 supra and 144 it 	 for cases focusing on this facet of securities
claims, such as those brought under rule 10b-5. Not all securities claims are of the same type,
however. In a proxy rule action under rule I4a-9, for example, the claim focuses upon the
exercise of corporate suffrage, not a purchase or sale of securities. See, e.g., Goldberger v.
Baker, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 11 96,203, at 92,428 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); In re Clinton Oil Sec. Litigation, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FEL). Sul L. REP. (CCH)
96,015, at 91,575 (1). Kan. 1977); In re Penn Cent, Sec. Litigation, 347 F. Supp. 1327, 1342
(E.D. Pa. 1972), affel, 494 F.2d 528 (3d Cir. 1974), See also cases cited in notes 144-48 infra for
other such examples.
" See, e.g., notes 200, 206 & 270 infra.
8" For example, in cases involving non-disclosure, reliance will often be inferred from
materiality. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153.54 (1972). See
also St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, 562 F.2(1 1040 (8th Cir. 1977) for a discussion
of the current status of this "inference" of reliance.
In cases involving open market manipulation (e.g., inflation or depression of the market
price on a national securities exchange), reliance is inferred from the materiality of the defen-
dants' misrepresentations and omissions. See, e.g., Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th
Cir. 1975); Clayton v. Skelly Oil Co., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fur SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,269 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Weiss v. Drew Nat'l Corp., 71 F.R.D. 429, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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ments form the basis of plaintiff's case. Since most securities fraud actions
are brought under rule 10b-5, the "catch-all" antifraud provision of the
federal securities laws, it appears appropriate to focus upon 10b-5 suits in
analyzing the proper role of post-transaction evidence in securities litiga-
tion.
The principal argument against admitting post-purchase evidence in
10b-5 cases is that the plaintiff cannot claim to have relied upon omissions
or misrepresentations which occurred after his purchase; thus the transac-
tion at issue cannot have been caused by a misstatement or omission of
such facts." Likewise, it is argued, such facts cannot have been material,
because materiality in securities cases centers on those facts which induced
the decision to invest or sell, and only facts which preceded the sale can be
reasonably said to have influenced the plaintiffs decision. 9 ' Materiality is
tested "in the light of the circumstances" of the transaction, by reviewing
the facts known or knowable up to the time of the transaction. 92 Similarly,
it is contended, a statement cannot be false or misleading unless it was un-
true at the time of the decision to purchase or se11. 93 Nor can a party be
charged with failing to discover and disclose facts which did not exist at the
time of the investment decision." On the basis of these arguments, defen-
dants usually seek to limit plaintiffs offers of proof in securities actions to
evidence of the facts and events prior to the transaction.
It is significant, however, that in most cases in which a district court
has accepted the thrust of these defense arguments, the court has neverthe-
See also Reeder v. Mastercraft Elec. Corp.. 363 F. Supp. 574, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("re-
liance may be inferred from the totality of circumstances"). Cf., e.g., Kahan v. Rosenstiel 424
F.2d 161, 173 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970) ("Proof of reliance is not an indepen-
dent element which must be alleged to establish a cause of action").
u° See cases cited in notes 4 & 5 supra and 92-94 infra.
" See notes 130-32 infra.
92 See, e.g., Halperin v. Edwards & Hanly, 430 F. Supp. 121, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Phil-
lips v. Reynolds & Co., 294 F. Supp. 1249 and 297 F. Supp. 736 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Value Line
Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-66 Transfer Binder] FED, SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 93,523, at 94,973
(S.D.N.Y. 1965). See also note 4 supra.
" See, e,g., Cross v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 431 F. Supp. 1080, 1091 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Kogan v. National Bank of North America, 402 F. Supp. 359, 361 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
The "time" of the sale is sometimes different from the moment of payment. For exam-
ple, in Lewelling v. First Cal. Co., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,264 (9th Cir. 1977), a doctor who had reviewed the transactions in his account with his
broker after receiving the confirmation slips for the transactions was permitted to sue under
the antifraud provisions based on alleged misrepresentations and omissions in those post-
confirmation discussions. The court of appeals explained this unusual result as follows:
Precisely when the transactions were finalized is a question of intent for the find-
er of fact. See Reliance Finance Corp. v. Miller, 457 F.2d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir.
1977); Smith v. Onyx Oil & :Chem. Co., 218 F.2c1 104, 108 (3d Cir. 1955). The trial
court found 'that Lewelling had the power to reject any of the purchases and that
no transaction was complete until Lewelling had had the opportunity to exercise
his veto and had failed to do so. In deciding whether or not to call off the pur-
chases, Lewelling was guided only by the information given him by Smither. In
this respect, the omissions had a direct effect on the disposition of the transac-
tions. Thus, the failures to disclose did not come after the sales had been
finalized, and Lewelling therefore cannot be characterized as an aborted seller.
Id. at 92,730.
°A See, e.g., Pittsburgh Coke & Chem. Co. v. Rollo, 421 F. Supp. 908, 923-24 (E.D.N.Y.
1976), affd, 560 F.2d 1089 (2d Cir. 1977). See also Devonbrook, Inc. v. Lily Lynn, Inc., [1976-
77 Transfer Binder) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,835, at 91,010 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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less admitted the post-transaction evidence." 5 The court. has treated the de-
fendant's objection as going to the weight rather than to the admissibility of
the evidence. In a jury case, a judge faced with this admissibility issue may
admit the evidence, but later present:the case to the jury for decision with a
specific limiting instruction on the time question, namely that the only rele-
vant time and therefore the only relevant events are those prior to the
transaction. In a nonjury case, the court may accept. such evidence, but
then decline to credit it with any weight in reaching its decision.
Although post-transaction evidence may be irrelevant to the issue of
causation, it may nonetheless serve other valid purposes. Among the pur-
poses which such evidence may serve when offered by the plaintiff are:
proving the intent," purpose and state of mind of the defendant;" prov-
ing a continuing course of conduct by the defendant which operated as a
fraud and deceit on the part of the defendant;" proving what. the defen-
dant. could have learned in the exercise of reasonable diligence;"" proving
materiality;'" proving a lack of credibility on the part of the defendant;m 1
and proving the nature and quality of the relationship between two defen-
dants or the defendant and another party. 102
Defendants also offer post-transaction evidence in securities fraud ac-
tions. Usually, such an offer of proof will focus upon the so-called clue dili-
gence duty, 113 both on the merits and on corollary or subsidiary issues such
as the running of the statute of limitations. Defendants also sometimes
offer such evidence to disprove materiality, reliance, causation, scienter or
"' See cases discussed at notes 77 supra and 116, 119 & 262 infra for examples of such
situations. This is often necessitated by the fact that preliminary Lid determinations necessary
for a ruling on admissibility are intertwined with the underlying merits themselves, as dis-
cussed in note 83 supra. The taking of such evidence, even in the presence of the jury, is not a
novel procedure; indeed it has its roots in early English common law. See, e.g., Stowe v.
Querner, L.R. 5 Ex. 155 (1870). Br,/ cf Bartlett v. Smith, 152 Engl. Rep. 895 (Ex. 1843) (en-
tirely separate preliminary evidentiary issues were directed to be determined by the judge,
without the assistance of the jury).
"See, e.g., Walling v. Beverly Enterprises, 476 F.2d 393. 397 n.8 (9th Cir. 1973); A.T.
Brod & Co. v. Perlow, 375 F.2d 393, 397 (2d Cir. 1967); SEC v. Glass Marine Indus., Inc., 208
F. Supp. 727, 732-33 (D. Del. 1962); Jacobs, What Is A Misleading Statement or Omission Under
Rule I Ob-.5?, 42 Fintiiiimi L. Rev. 243, 270-71 (1973). See also Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S, 419,
433 (1909). 2 WIGNIORE, supra note 38, § 316 (3d ed. 1940).
" See, e.g., Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 353 F. Stipp. 795, 802 (W.D. Pa. 1973), uffd
and rend on other grounds, 491 F.2/1 402 (3d Cir. 1974); Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 785
n.3 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 379 (1965). See also Richardson v, MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35,
41 (10th Cir. 1971); Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Satree, 320 F.2d 92, 95 (9th Cir. 1963); Williams v.
United States, 199 F.2d 921, 922 (5th Cir. 1952).
" See, e.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 785 & n.3 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
379 (1965); Cooper V. North New Jersey Trust Co. of Ridgewood, N.J., 226 F. Supp. 972, 978
(S.D.N.Y, 1964).
"" See, e.g., Stier v. Smith, 473 F.2d 1205, 1208, 1210 (5th Cir. 1973); In re Penn Cent..
Commercial Paper Litigation, 61 F,R.D, 453, 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
'"" See text at notes 208-11 infra.
11" Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 785 n.3 (1st Cir.), cert, denied. 382 U.S. 879 (1965);
Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 433 (1909).
102 See, e.g., United States v. Pfingst, 477 F.2d 177, 193-94 (2c1 Cir.), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 941 (1973). See also Cornaglia v. Ricciardi, 63 F.R.D. 416, 421-22 (E.D. Pa, 1974); Ross v.
Paul Hardeman, Inc., D964-66 Transfer Binder) FED. Sec. L. Rem'. (CCH) 1 91,483, at 94, 850
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
1 "" See notes 198-238 infra.
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access to allegedly material undisclosed information,'° 4 or to establish
waiver, estoppel or other similar defenses to the plaintiff's claim.'"
Each of these permissible uses of post-transaction evidence is dis-
cussed in detail below. Where pertinent, an examination of the objections
which may be raised to each type of evidence accompanies the discussion.
In that regard, it. is important to keep in mind that the same evidence fre-
quently serves more than one purpose in the same action.'° 6 Thus, an ob-
jection to the evidence may properly prevent or counter one purpose for
which the evidence was offered, but it may nevertheless fail to exclude the
evidence because of the other purposes that the evidence may serve.
C. Intent and the Fact of Fraud
Post-transaction evidence frequently provides important clues to a de-
fendant's actual intent at the time of a securities transaction. Used for this
purpose, post-transaction evidence may prove the "fact" of the fraud,
rather than establishing the fraud itself.'" In such instances, post-
transaction evidence may also be pertinent to important collateral matters
such as credibility.'"
Janigan v. Taylor" 9 exemplifies the use of post-transaction evidence to
prove that fraud was committed, as distinguished from proving the ele-
ments of the fraud itself. Taylor and other former stockholders of Boston
Electric Steel Casting, Inc. alleged that Janigan, a Boston director, had mis-
represented several facts to them when he purchased their shares of Bos-
ton stock for a total of $40,000. 11 ° Two years later, Taylor had sold the
shares for $700,000. In a nonjury trial, the district court held that, at the
time of the stock purchases, Janigan had falsely represented that he did not
know of "any material change in the affairs of the company or in the past
months which could cause (Janigan et al.] to have any different opinion
about the company."'" Relying on evidence of changes in Boston's finan-
cial status, shown by bookkeeping changes in Boston's books within months
after the stock purchases, the court concluded that Janigan had really
known that Boston would show a profit and was healthier financially than
he had said.'" The post-transaction bookkeeping changes indicated that
Janigan had sought to conceal the improved condition of the company
L" Sec notes 120.29 infra.
L"1 See notes 241-45 infra.
155 See, e.g., note 115 infra.
tut See, e.g., Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 353 F. Supp. 795, 802 (W.D. Pa.), a/I'd and reu'd on
oilier grounds, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1973); See also Devonbrook, Inc. v. Lily Lynn, [1976-77
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REA.. (CCH) 1 95,835, at 91,010 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Stier v. Smith,
473 F.2c1 1205 (5th Cir. 1973). The use of post-transaction evidence to prove fraudulent intent
and the fact of fraud was recognized by the United States Supreme Court seventy years ago in
Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 433 (1909).
"" See, e.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 785 n.3 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879
(1965), discussed at notes 109-15 infra. See also Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35, 41
(10th Cir. 1971).
"9 344 F.2d 781 (Isi Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
"° Id. at 783.
"' Id.
Id. at 785 & n.3.
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until after he had bought out the plaintiff's interests." 3 The Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit affirmed, rejecting Janigan's argument that the
evidence had been improperly received since the plaintiffs "could not. have
relied" on it." 4
 Instead, the court of appeals found that the evidence was
"admissible as casting light on the defendant's state of mind, and, very pos-
sibly, to affect his credibility."" '
• Post-purchase evidence of a different nature was received to establish
the fact that a fraud had been committed in Rochez Brothers, Inc. v.
Rhoodes. 11 " In Rochez Brothers, an insider had bought out fellow stockhold-
ers, ostensibly as the result of a disagreement over whether the corporation
should take on a substantial contract requiring considerable expense for
new equipment and materials. Unbeknownst to the sellers, the purchaser
was in the midst of negotiating an acquisition of the company at the time.
Although he did not reach agreement with either of the two companies
with which he had been negotiating at the time of the stock purchase, some
months later such a take-over was consummated. Whereas the purchaser
had paid $598,000 for the plaintiff's' stock in the fall of 1967, under the
1968 take-over he sold it for $4,250,000, 50,000 shares of the acquiring
company's stock and an employment agreement. The district court found
that the purchaser's failure to disclose his pre-purchase merger discussions
was a violation of rule 101)-5 and section 17(a). In so doing, the court
found that the post-transaction evidence of the purchaser's continued
negotiations and actual consummation of a lucrative acquisition agreement
"might well be relevant to demonstrate fraud in the transaction,'" prior to
his purchase of the plaintiffs' stock.
These decisions have an obvious logic to them, particularly since they
appear to have involved blatant deception and the post-transaction evi-
dence was directly related to the subject of the fraud. Other equally com-
pelling circumstances are not difficult to imagine or recognize. For exam-
ple, if an underwriter or broker induces a buyer to invest with glowing
statements about its faith in a company's prospects, and then sells out its
own position in the company shortly after the transaction, one might con-
In its opinion, the district court found
that janigan was not a truthful witness either during the taking of his deposition
or while testifying in' Court. Specifically, I disbelieve his denials of knowledge of
the Firming of prices and increase of backlog in late 1955 and, not believing his
denials of such knowledge, I find that he did know about them at the time he
told 1krgen that things were just about the same.
Taylor v. janigan, 212 F. Supp, 794, 800 (D. Mass. 1962).
" 4 f anigan 344 F.2d at 786.
"5 Id. at 785 n.3. The complete text of the court of appeals' statement was:
Defendant is correct that since the bookkeeping changes occurred only after the
making of the representation, and were not seen by the plaintiffs, they could not
have been relied on. However, they were admissible as casting light. on the de-
fendant's state of mind, and, very possibly, to affect his credibility.
Id. This result. is analogous in some respects to the rule in criminal actions that evidence of
post-event facts such as the destruction of evidence or false explanations of' prior conduct may
he admissible to show intent or to attack credibility. See, e.g., People v. Leyra, I N.Y.2d 199,
208, 134 N,E.2d 475, 480 (1956); People v. Feldman, 296 N.Y. 127, 139, 71 N.E.2d 433, 439
(1947).
'" 353 F. Stipp. 795 (W.D. Pa. 1973), affd in part and rev'd ira part on other grounds, 491
F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974).
I" Id. at 802.
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elude that the broker-underwriter acted deceitfully. A similar conclusion
would be reasonable where principals of a company have acquired another
company in exchange for the stock of the acquiring company, but then sell
their personal holdings in the acquirer. In such cases, post-transaction evi-
dence can play a pertinent role in determining both scienter and the fact
that a fraud had been committed.
The foregoing analysis does not mean, however, that post-transaction
evidence should always be admitted when offered to show the alleged
"fact" of deception, or that the court or jury should necessarily credit. it or
draw the inferences which the proponent suggests from the evidence. The
post-transaction evidence may simply be too remote or tangential to war-
rant such a conclusion. Devonbrook Inc. v. Lily Lynn, Inc. "8
 provides a good
recent illustration. Devonbrook sold one of its subsidiaries to Lily in ex-
change for 42,000 shares of unregistered Lily stock, under an agreement
which committed Lily to use its best efforts to register the Lily shares upon
request by Devonbrook. Devonbrook's request the following year fell upon
deaf ears, and Devonbrook sued Lily under rule lOb-5, alleging that Lily
had never really intended to perform the registration provision of the
agreement. Relying upon evidence of transactions consummated after its
purchase from Lily, Devonbrook argued that Lily had been in the process
of negotiating a number of other major acquisitions at the time of as con-
tract with Devonbrook, and must have known that, as a result, it would not
be possible for Lily to process a registration statement through the SEC
for at least a full year. The district court admitted and carefully reviewed
the post-transaction evidence, but the court concluded that the evidence
was not sufficiently persuasive to prove that Lily lacked intent to perform
at the time of the parties' agreement. 19
The foregoing discussion focuses on the use of post-transaction evi-
dence by the plaintiff to attempt to establish scienter and fraud. That is, of
course, only one side of the equation. In contrast to showing fraudulent in-
tent and the fact of fraud, post-transaction evidence may be used con-
versely to aid a defendant to disprove the existence of scienter or otherwise
to prove his good faith and honesty. 12° For example, when a defendant
"8
 [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REY. (CCH) 1 95,835 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
""Id. at 91,010. The court does not appear to have had an easy time reaching its con-
clusion, but it obviously felt a strong obligation to give only limited weight to the post-sale evi-
dence. Thus, the court explained:
Although the Court finds disturbing the defendant's purchase of its own securi-
ties from the Devonbrook creditor banks [i.e., its post-transaction purchase of the
securities and those by the plaintiff which were subject to the registration pro-
vision), it recognizes that the defendant is the most likely purchaser of its own
unregistered securities. Further, plaintiffs evidence establishes that the defendant
made certain representations to the Devonbrook creditor banks of its intent to
register the securities which resulted in the banks' decision to delay foreclosure.
The Court does not conclude therefore that the purchase evidences that a limited
intent existed on the part of the defendant at the time it entered into the Miss
Devon agreement with the plaintiff. •
Id. (emphasis in original).
1 " The burden of proving scienter is on the plaintiff, not the defendant, see note 270
infra; but the defendant may, of course, seek to disprove scienter, see, e.g., note 128 infra, in
those cases where plaintiff is required to show scienter to establish his case.
As observed in note 270 infra, several possible securities claims do not require scienter.
Nevertheless, in those cases, including actions brought under section I 1 and where "control-
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broker itself has made substantial purchases of the issuer's securities after
recommending its sale to the plaintiff, such conduct evidence may help to
negate a claim that the broker intentionally misled the plaintiff into making
a bad investment.'"
Post-transaction evidence was used in this manner to disprove intent
in Franklin Savings Bank v. Levy." 2 The plaintiff bank had purchased Penn
Central securities from Goldman, Sachs & Co. in March, 1970. 12 :1 Three
months later, Penn Central filed a bankruptcy reorganization petition, 124
leading to the plaintiff's securities fraud action. Goldman, Sachs argued
that it had not intentionally misled the plaintiff, as shown by the fact that
its senior partner, a principal figure in its dealings with Penn Central, had
continued to hold, as a trustee of a blind trust, Penn Central securities
worth over ten million dollars until after PCTC's bankruptcy petition, re-
sulting in a multimillion dollar loss to the blind trust.' 25 This post-purchase
evidence, the defense argued, was a "badge of innocent good faith," negat-
ing any inference of scienter. 12 " The court of appeals criticized the district
court's rejection of the evidence, since the court of appeals determined that.
the evidence bore upon the rule I Ob-5 claim upon which the district court
had based its decision.' 27 Due in part to the district. court's exclusion of the
defendant's post-transaction evidence of alleged good faith, the court of
appeals reversed the lower court's judgment against the defendants under
rule 10b-5 and remanded the case for consideration of the plaintiffs sec-
tion 12(2) claim,' 28 on which proof of scienter would not be necessary to es-
ling persons" are stied under § 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or § 15 of the
Securities Act of 1933, the defendant still may defend by showing he acted in good faith. See,
e.g., Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Management
Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 807 (2c1 Cir. 1975); Finis, Liability fir Misleading Statements Under
Section 11, 21 PRAc. LAw, 35, 48-50 (1975). But cf. Roil v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc.,
[1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. Sec. L. REr, (CCH) 11 96,275, at 92,772.73 (2d Cir. 1978)
(good faith is not a defense to a 10b-5 action for aiding and abetting, when defendant's be-
havior was reckless).
While good faith is not a defense under § 12(2), the seller can defend by showing that
he did not know of the untruths and omissions, and could not have known of them, even with
reasonable diligence, See, e.g., DeMarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 840-41 (2d Cir. 1968); Gould
v. Tricon, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 385, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
"'Such conduct evidence would not be conclusive, of course, but it permits the draw-
ing of any logical inference that the court may consider, in the satne manner as any other pos-
sible inference, see, e.g., note 128 infra, —subject, of course, to the limitations usually cir-
cumscribing such inferences, see, e.g., FEn. R. ENID. 407, 608, and 609. See, e.g., Shull v. Dain,
Kalman & Quail. Inc., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fen. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,152, at
92,209-10 (8th Cir. 1977).
122 551 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1977).
123 1d. at 523.
124 M.
123 1(1.
126 Id.
1 " Id.
1 " Id. See note 6 supra for text of § 12(2). Cf. University Hill Foundation v. Goldman,
Sachs & Co., 422 F. Supp. 879, 895 11.15 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), where the court admitted this evi-
dence and, although holding the defendant liable under § 12(2), the court determined that
based upon this evidence, the defendant had "acted in the good faith belief that the Company
[PCTC] was credit-worthy," so that it was not also liable under rule 10b-5. Id, Interestingly,
the jury in Welch Foods, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., which heard the same evidence, held
the defendant liable under rule 101).5 as well as § 12(2). See New York Times, Oct. 10, 1974,
at 69, cal. 4; Wall St. Journal, Oct. 10, 1974, at 24, col. 4; N.Y.L.J., Oct. 10, 1974, at I, col. 5.
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tablish liability.' 29
Franklin, like the decisions discussed earlier involving offers by plain-
tiffs of post-transaction evidence, demonstrates that post-transaction evi-
dence may have substantial relevancy to such critical issues in securities lit-
igation as intent, good faith and the fact of fraud. Such evidence should
not be deemed inadmissible merely because it relates to facts arising after
the transaction occurred. Instead, the court's inquiry should focus, as with
evidence in general, upon whether the evidence is probative of the particu-
lar issue for which it is offered.
D. Materiality and Reliance
Post-transaction evidence also may have a valid role in determining
both whether the defendant's alleged misrepresentation or omission was a
material factor inducing a plaintiffs actions, and whether the plaintiff
actually relied on such misrepresentations or omissions. Proof of materiality
and reliance (and their corollary, causation), are key elements of plaintiffs'
' cause of action in most securities fraud actions, particularly those brought
under rule 10b-5.'" A plaintiff suing under rule 10b-5 must show that
123
 The case was settled before the district court determined the § 12(2) claims. All of
the other suits tried against Goldman, Sachs following Penn Central's collapse resulted, how-
ever, in findings against the defendant under § 12(2). See notes 128 supra and 188 infra. For a
detailed comparison of the standards of liability under § 12(2) and rule 10b-5, see Kaminsky,
Securities Litigation Under Section 12(2) and How It Compares with Rule 10b-5, 13 Hous. L. REV.
231 (1976).
loo
	 definitions and relationship of the elements of "materiality" and "reliance" are
not always easy to discern. Those elements are often jumbled together or merely considered
separately in the search for the element of' "causation." See, e.g., Titan Group. Inc. v. Faggen,
513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir. 1975); Mackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). See also Wright v. Heizer Corp. [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. Rte. (CCH) 96,101, at 91,965 (7th Cir. 1977); Kerrigan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., [Current] Fut. SEC. L. REP. (CCH), 1 96,446 (S.D.N.Y. 1978);
Ruszkowski v. Hugh Johnson & Co., 302 F. Supp. 1371, 1375 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
One recent attempt to sort out and explain the distinction between materiality and re-
liance is contained in Ketchum v. Green, 415 F. Supp. 1367, 1371 (W.11. Pa. 1976) where the
court explained;
The causation element of Rule 10b-5 may be evaluated through the application
of materiality and reliance tests The former is measured by the standard of
"whether 'a reasonable man would attach importance [to the undisclosed or mis-
represented facts) in determining his choice of action in the transaction in ques-
tion....' " The latter is judged by whether the plaintiff would have acted differ-
ently had he known the undisclosed or misrepresented information.... Obvi-
ously, neither objective materiality nor subjective reliance is present here.
Id. (bracketed material in original). See also St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 562 F.2d 1040, 1048-50 (8th Cir. 1977); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340
F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965); Note, The 'Substantial Likelihood' Stan-
dard of Materiality Under Section I4(a), 50 TEMP. L.Q. 437 (1977); Note, The Materiality Test—
Roman Mills Revisited, 14 DUQ. L. REV. 724, 729-33 (1976); Note, The Reliance Requirement in
Private Actions Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 88 HAM'. L. REV. 584, 602-03 (1975).
The United States Supreme Court recently formulated the test of materiality under sec-
tion 14 (a). According to the Court, a fact is material if "there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote" or stated differ-
ently, if there is "a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have
been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of infor-
mation made available." TSC Indus., Inc. v, Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). The test for
materiality is the same regardless of which securities law provision is involved. Alton Box Bd.
Co. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 560 F.2d 916, 920 (8th Cir. 1977); Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d
348, 355-56 (10th Cir. 1970).
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the defendant's omission or misrepresentation was material to the plaintiff's
purchase or sale of securities. Information is material if there is a substan-
tial likelihood that a reasonably prudent investor would consider it. impor-
tant in making his investment deciSion. 131 Materiality is thus an objective
test. Reliance, however, requires proof of what the plaintiff himself did or
believed, and thus involves a subjective test. 132
Post-transaction evidence may yield important information for both
plaintiffs and defendants respecting these issues. For example, the plain-
tiffs post-transaction statements, orally or in writing, regarding the Facts
which he is claiming constituted a fraud on him may show what he actually
deemed important to his investment decision. Similarly, post-transaction
evidence may be crucial to the issue of materiality when, for example, an
investor has purchased stock before the issuer reveals previously known but
undisclosed information about the issuer's prospects. Evidence of what
other holders of the issuer's stock — especially sophisticated investors —
did after the news was released may show the degree to which the informa-
tion was material to the prudent investor. If other investors reacted to the
information by selling their stock, and a reasonable correlation can be
shown between the news and the sales, one may infer that the information
was material. No absolute rules on such matters are possible, but the courts
should be advertent to the potential significance of such evidence.'"
'' TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). The test is what a "rea-
sonably prudent" investor, not necessarily the plaintiff, would have wanted to know, See, e.g.,
Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.. 560 F.2d 916, 920 (8th Cir. 1977); SEC v. Park.
land Hosiery Co., 558 F.2d 1083, 1088 (2d Cir. 1977). BO Cf. Titan Group, Inc. v. Faggen,
513 F.2d 234, 239 (2d Cir. 1975) (applying standard focusing on what the particular plaintiff
wanted to know).
However, it is not always easy to tell what a "reasonable investor" would have deemed
iinporlant. Obviously, not every minute detail meets this test; rather, the information appears
to be significant in the context of the "total mix" of information. See TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Spielman v. General Host Corp., 538 F.2d 39, 39-40 (2d
Cir. 1976). However, as the court of appeals recently reiterated in Cole v. Schenley Indus.,
Inc., 563 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1977), while —corporations are not required to address their stock-
holders as if they were children in kindergarten,' it is not sufficient. that overtones might have
been picked up by the sensitive antennae or investment analysts." Id. at 40, quoling Gerstle v,
Gamble-Skognio, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1297 (2d Cir. 1973).
The court in Cole v. Schenley Incl., Inc. specifically declined to adopt different tests of
materiality in terms of strictness for different types of proxy statements. Id. at 40 tt.9.
Continent, Shareholders and Wormed Voting; How Much Information Do They Need? 28 MEacut L.
Rrv. 725, 730.31 (1977) (suggesting that a distinction be drawn between "institutional inves-
tors" and the "small investor" for proxy statements).
See, e.g., List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2c1 Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
811 (1965); Kerrigan v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Feistier & Smith, Inc., [1977-78 Transfer Bind-
er] FEE. Sec. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,446, at 93,602 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Ketchum v. Green, 415 F.
Supp. 1367. 1371 (W.D. Pa. 1976); Arlinghaus v. Ritenour, [1974-75 Transfer Binder] Flat.
Sec. L. REP. (CCH) 9 95,288, at 98,472 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). As is true in common law fraud ac-
tions, in order to recover the plaintiff must show that he was actually deceived and did not
know the truth. See, e.g., Goldberger v. Baker, [1977.78 Transfer Binder] Fen. Sec. L. Rev,
(CCH) 11 96,203, at 92,426 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Spielman v, General Host Corp., 538 F.2d 39,
40-41 (2d Cir. 1976); Levy v. Vista Indus, Corp., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fen. SEG. L,
(CCH) if 96,012, at 91,552 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Architectural League v. Bartos, 409 F. Supp,
304, 309-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), as to the securities laws. See also Sinn) Bros. & Co. v. Indemnity
Ins. Co., 264 F. Supp. 273, 288 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 386 F.2d 798 (2d Cir. 1967); Sager v. Fried-
man, 270 N.Y. 472, 479 (1963), as to common law fraud, •
'" As the court of appeals stated in Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2c1
876 (2d Cir. 1972), "'materiality' must be determined on a case-to-case basis according to the
fact pattern of each specific transaction." Id. at 888.
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Several courts have observed that subsequent actions of the litigants
themselves may be a proper indication of information's materiality.'" For
example, if a broker-dealer is shown to have made a substantial investment
in a company after recommending sale of its stock to the plaintiff, or con-
versely has himself' held the stock and suffered losses on the same invest-
ment as the plaintiff, the fact-finder may consider such evidence significant
in determining the materiality of matters which the broker is claimed to
have misrepresented or 'omitted. To be sure, such evidence may not be
conclusive on the issue. The defendant may have been holding the stock or
otherwise acting for other (possibly even nefarious) purposes, but the jury
should normally be permitted to consider the post-transaction evidence and
determine what the defendant's true purposes and state of mind were, in
its fact-finding capacity.
Post-transaction evidence may also serve to disprove the materiality of
the defendant's alleged omission or misrepresentation or to disprove the
plaintiff's claims of reliance and causation. For example, if a plaintiff pur-
chaser continues to purchase a stock after learning of facts which he is con-
tending constituted material omissions, such later purchases may indicate
that he, and presumably a reasonably prudent investor, did not actually
deem the information material, or that he would not have relied on those
facts even if they had been disclosed to him.
Another aspect of the use of post-transaction evidence to disprove
materiality and reliance is found in Gelman v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.' 35
Gelman was a suit on behalf of a class of sellers of Westinghouse stock who
alleged that Westinghouse had misled them regarding its intention to divest
its unprofitable major appliance division."'' That misrepresentation, the
In this regard. the courts have often held that materiality presents a fact issue for trial.
See, e.g., SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1977); Froher v. New York Stock
Exch., [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. Src. L REp. (CCH) 1 95,416, at 99,106 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp.. 507 F.2(1 485, 490 (9th Cir. 1974). Bid cf. Johns
Hopkins University v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1129 (4th Cir. 1970) and . Oscar Gruss & Son v.
Natomas Co., [1976-77 Transfer Binder] I'm SEc, I... REP. (CCH) 9 96,258, at 92,703 (N.D.
Cal.' 1976) (indicating that materiality 'nay, in certain cases, be so obvious that it is determina-
ble as a matter of law). In other cases, the courts have ruled that materiality is a mixed ques-
tion of both law and fact. See, e.g., S. & S. Realty Corp. v. Kleer-Vu Industries, Inc., [1977-78
Transfer Binder] FEU. SEC. L. 12.Fib. (CCH) 1 96-270, at 92,750 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
Post-purchase evidence may give an indication of what was actually significant, although
not so obvious at the time of the transaction itself. In SEC Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301 (2c1 Cir.
1974), the court found:
But we need not merely speculate as to how a reasonable investor might
have received this informa.tion. The behavior of appellant, his partner Shapiro,
and others who knew of the merger, all of whom were sophisticated investors.
demonstrates empirically that the information was material. Almost immediately
after the January 6 luncheon at which Rosenbloom responded favorably to the
merger proposal, Shapiro and Berman purchased substantial amounts of Har-
vey's stock.
Id. at 1307.
" 'See,	 Mittendorf v. IR, Williston & Beane, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 821, 828 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), See also Hirsch v. duPont, 553 F.2d 750, 762-63 (2d Cir. 1977); Spielman v. General
Host Corp., 402 F. Supp. 190, 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd, 538 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976) (per
curiam); SEC v. Shapiro, 349 F. Stipp. 46, 53-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affd, 499 F.2d 1301, 1306-
07 (2d Cir. 1974).
135 73 F.R.D. 60 (W.D. Pa. 1976), appeal dismissed, 556 F.2d 699 (3d. Cir, 1977).
' 35 1d, at 62.,
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plaintiff's alleged, had artificially depressed the market price for Westing-
house stock."' Gelman offered post-sale evidence to show that, soon after
his sales, when the Westinghouse divestiture was completed, Westinghouse's
stock increased thirty-eight percent in value.' Westinghouse opposed
Gelman's motion for class certification on the grounds that the evidence
regarding its negotiations for the sale of the division extended over a six to
nine month period, during which the relative materiality of the facts in-
volved had changed dramatically.'"" Thus, the defense argued, noncom-
mon individual questions on the issue of materiality predominated, render-
ing Gelman's claim inappropriate for certification as a class action.'" The
district court agreed, and denied Gelman's motion for class certification,
stating:
Whe issue of materiality is	 one of the facts to be determined
on the basis of all the circumstances; and in this case, the rele-
vant facts as alleged by plaintiffs changed throughout. the selling
class period. Clearly, the question of materiality as it pertains to
the claim of a shareholder who sold stock in May or June is vast-
ly different from the question as it pertains to claims stemming
From sales in November or December.' 41
E. Post-Purchase Lulling
Post-transaction evidence self-evidently will play a pivotal role where it
is claimed that the defendant continued to mislead the plaintiff after the
transaction was consummated. In such a situation, the plaintiff may either
have continued to be misled, or he may have been prevented from learning
that he has been the victim of fraudulent conduct. The latter claim has
been termed "lulling. "142 For example, the plaintiff, having learned nega-
tive information about the issuer of stock which he has just purchased from
the defendant., may call the defendant for an explanation. But the facile
deceitful defendant may convince the plaintiff' that the information is noth-
ing to be concerned about lulling him into a false sense of security about
his investment.
Such a claim is quite difficult to posit under the federal securities
laws, particularly rule 101)-5. In Blue Chip stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,'"
the United States Supreme Court sought to remove any question that the
plaintiff in a 10b-5 action must be . a purchaser or seller to sue under the
principal sections of the antifraud provisions.'" Since Blue Chip, the lower
137
 id. at 64.
"Kid.
1 " N. at 67.
nom.
"'lei. at 68 (footnote omitted).
'" See, e.g., Hoglund v. Covington County Bank. [1977-78 Traiistr Binder) Ft:n. Src. L.
REP. (CCH) I 96,003 (M.D. Ala. 1977). But see, e.g., Halperin v, Edwards & Hanly, Inc., 431
F. Stipp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Manheim v. Wood Walker & Cu., [1976.77 Transfer Binder]
1 7 En. SEC, L REP. (CCH) 1 95,848, at 91,089 (D. Conn. 1977). See also Caruatz v. Sulk!,
Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1977).
"3 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
1 " a at 731. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently summarized the
policy underlying the lilac Chip decision as follows:
111 interpreting the express language of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in
Blue Chip, the Court expressed concern about suits by persons who neither pur-
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courts have been assiduous in dismissing attempts by plaintiffs to allege se-
curities frauds founded upon alleged decisions not to purchase or sell.' 45
But there are a variety of other possible securities claims under other sec-
tions — for example, section 36 of the Investment Company Ace" and
chased nor sold securities but who claimed that they would have purchased or
sold securities but for false representations made by someone whom they might
not even have known. The Court noted that the "purchase or sale" requirement
protected against vexatious suits by a potentially limitless class of plaintiffs and
avoided the difficult questions of determining whether a plaintiff would or would
not have purchased or sold securities but for the defendant's representations. Id.
at 745-47.
Far from holding that claims of persons who were neither purchasers or
sellers would be too speculative under the other securities acts, the Court inter-
preted the express language of Section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. And the Court ex-
pressly noted that many of the other securities acts have no "purchase or sale"
requirement. 421 U.S. at 733-34.
Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862. 877 n.25 (2d Cir. 1977).
The "purchaser or seller" limitation rule is not exactly the same for all actions arising
under the various sections of the securities laws. For example, section 12(2) covers only pur-
chasers, and is further limited only to misstatements in connection with the particular security
sold. See, e.g., Gross v. Diversified Mortgage investors, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. Sec. L.
REP. (Cal) 1 96,137, at 92,114 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). Under rule 106-5, provided there is a secu-
rity sale, the fraud need not he in connection with the particular security sold to or by the
plaintiff. See, e.g., Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275, 280 (2d
Cir. 1975); International Tel. & Tel., Inc. v. Vencap, Ltd., [1975-76 Transfer Binder] Fen.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,398, at 99,039 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Under 1 17(a), non-purchasers have
been given standing to sue by some decisions, even though section I7(a) is a close analogue of
rule 101)-5. See, e.g., Reid v. Madison, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fen. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
96,231 (E.D. Va. 1977).
Under the Investment Advisers Act, the principal standing requirement is that the
plaintiff must have been a client of the adviser being sued. See, e.g., Gross v. Diversified
Mortgage Investors at 93,113; Jones Memorial Trust v. TSAI Inv. Servs. Inc., 367 F. Supp.
491. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Recent authority, however, has permitted the plaintiff in an action
under the Investment Advisers Act to sue alleged aiders and abettors in addition to the in-
vestment adviser itself. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Chase Inv. Servs., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED.
Sec. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,224 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
l " See, e.g., St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
562 F.2d 1040, 1049-50 (8th Cir. 1977); Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2c1 Cir.
1977); Saber Corp. v. Johnson, [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,825,
at 90,977 (D. Minn. 1976); Gaudin v. KDI Corp., [1976.77 Transfer Binder] FED. Sec. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 95,785, at 90,843 (S.D. Ohio 1976), affd, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,453 (6th Cir. 1978).
' 4" Section 36 of' the Investtnent Companies Act, 15 U.S.C. 11 80a-35 (1970), provides, in
pertinent part:
(a) The Commission is authorized to bring an action in the proper district
court of the United States, or in the United States court of any territory or other
place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, alleging that a person serv-
ing or acting in one or more of the following capacities has engaged within five
years of the commencement of the action or is about to engage in any act or
practice constituting a breach of fiduciary duty involving personal misconduct in
respect of any registered investment company for which such person so serves or
acts—
(I) as officer, director, member of any advisory board, in-
vestment adviser, or depositor; or
(2) as principal underwriter, if such registered company is an
open-end company, unit investment trust, or face-amount certificate
company ....
(b) For the purposes of this subsection, the investment adviser of a regis-
tered investment company shall be deemed to have a fiduciary duty with respect
to the receipt of compensation for services, or of payments of a material nature,
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section 206 of the Investment Advisors Act"' — which are not charac-
terized by that limitation; wrongful retention or inducement of retention
may be the basis for a claim under such sections. Interesting facets of the
purchase-sale question also exist in merger cases, where a stockholder suing
under the proxy rules may claim to be a "forced" seller or holder.'"
Notwithstanding Blue Chip's strictures, the recent case of Hoglund v.
Covington County Bank"" suggests a possible exception to the purchase or
sale requirement in situations involving lulling. The plaintiffs in Hoglund
claimed that they were defrauded in two separate ways: first, that they
were induced to purchase a security; second, that they were afterwards
lulled into retaining the stock.'" The court denied the defendant's motion
to dismiss the portion of the case asserting a separate securities claim based
upon the lulling activity, reasoning that "[u]nder the mail fraud statutes,
paid by such registered investment company, or by the security holders thereof,
to such investment adviser or any affiliated person of such investment adviser.
An action may be brought under this subsection by the Commission, or by a se-
curity holder of such registered investment company on behalf of such company,
against such investment adviser, or any affiliated person of such investment ad-
viser, or any other person enumerated in subsection (a) of this section who has a
fiduciary duty concerning such compensation or payments, for breach of
fiduciary duty in respect of such compensation or payments paid by such regis-
tered investment company or by the security holders thereof to such investment.
adviser or person
15 U,S,C. § 80a-35. See also Brown v, Bullock, 294 F.2d 415, 420 (2d Cir. 1961); Boyko v. Re-
serve Fund, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 692, 096 (S.D.N.Y: 1975).
'" See notes 2 supra Sc 186 infra,
"" See, e.g., Goldberg v, Meridor, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Ft:n. SEG. L. REP. (CCH)
96,152. at 92,264-65 (2d Cir. 1977): Cole v. Schenley Indus. Inc., 563 F.2d 35, (2d Cir. 1977);
Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 380-88 (2c1 Cir.), cert. denied, 42l U.S. 976
(1975). For examples of a relaxation of the Blue Chip rule in forced seller cases, see Weisman v.
Darneille, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC, L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,278, at 92,796 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Houlihan v. Anderson-Stokes, Inc., [1977-78 Transfer Binder) FED, SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
1 96,139, at 92,121 (D.D.C. 1977).
However, in several forced seller cases the courts have held that no securities fraud
claim exists since the defendant. had a contractual right to compel the sale, See. St. Louis Union
`trust. Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 562 F.2d 1040, 1049-50 (811i Cir.
1977); Ryan v, J. Walter Thompson, 453 F.2d 444, 447 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
907 (1972); Fershtman v. Schectinan, 450 F.2d 1357, 1359-60 (2c1 Cir. 1971). But cf. Ayres v,
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 538 F.2d 532, 537 (3d Cir. 1976) (a cognizable
securities claim was stated where the decision to sell was partially at plaintiffs option, so that
defendant could not unilaterally force sale).
Ha [1977-78 Transfer Binder) FE.n. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,003 (M.D. Ala. 1977). But
cf. Morgan v. Prudential Funds, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,345, at 93,173
(S.D.N.Y. 1978), where the court dismissed a securities claim against alleged "aiders and abet-
tors" who had conspired to cover up the principal defendants' fraud. The court reasoned that
there could be no causal connection between the post-transaction actions of the "aiders and
abettors" and the securities fraud which had been committed several months earlier. That Yea-
soiling may be too narrow in some circumstances. At common law, it does not matter when a
party joins a conspiracy, see, e.g., Lesnik v. Public Indus, Corp., 144 F.2d 968, 973 (2d Cir.
1944); Meredith v. Art Metal Constr. Co., 97 Misc. 69, 78.79 (Stip. Ct. 1916), alfd, 176 App.
Div, 945 (4th Dept. 1917); Bedard v, La Bier, 20 Misc, 2d 614, 616-17 (Sup. Ct. 1958). And,
of course, criminal law recognizes the liability of an "accessory after the fact." The liberal pur-
poses of the antifraud provisions would appear to be better served by also recognizing the
possiblity of that type of liability in a securities fraud action. The fact finder at trial may, of
course, conclude that the alleged "aiding" conduct was too remote to sustain a judgment.
against the alleged aider and abettor, but that should not prevent the plaintiff from his day in
court and an opportunity to convince the fact finder otherwise,
"" Hoglund, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 91,513.
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post-purchase lulling by mail is considered part of a fraudulent scheme,
even where the money had changed hands before the mailing.... Thus
the lulling activity relates back to the fraudulent obtaining of the
money. ”151
Claims such as those presented in Hoglund will be difficult to prove,
since some additional fraudulent conduct after the sale must be shown to
make out a separate claim for lulling. But it is possible to plead such a
claim. For example, this requirement of additional fraudulent conduct may
be satisfied when a defendant, as part of the investment transaction, makes
additional representations specifically suggesting that a plaintiff hold his se-
curities. As a practical matter such evidence will usually be unavailable,
since normally the defendant is interested only in profiting from the trans-
action' itself, not in seeing that the purchaser continues to hold the security.
Nevertheless it may be aclducable in other situations as, for example, where
the defendant is hoping to avoid a demand for rescission or a lawsuit by
the plaintiff.
Evidence of lulling may also be an important factor in determining
whether the pertinent statute of limitations period has lapsed, barring the
plaintiffs action. Several recent cases have applied the equitable tolling doc-
trine to securities claims, holding that the statute of limitations may be
tolled when a defendant has concealed his wrongs and lulled the plaintiff
into a false sense of security.'" In Tomera v. Gall, ' 53 for example, an inves-
tor in a group of American corporations conducting Mexican mining oper-
ations sued the promoters of the companies under rule 10b-5 and the Il-
linois blue sky law.'" Tomera alleged that the defendants had misrepre-
sented the financial health of the companies, particularly that the com-
panies had valid mining leases in Mexico.' 55
 The defendants continued to
solicit her funds for further development of the mines.'" After her pur-
chases, the defendants had repeatedly ignored her requests for further
specific information regarding the companies.'" She therefore asked the
"'Id. (citations omitted). The court relied on two mail fraud cases, United States v.
Sampson, 371 U.S. 75 (1962), and United States v. Ashdown, 509 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1975), in
support of its holding.
'" The doctrine was recently summarized and placed in proper historical perspective in
Houlihan v. Anderson-Stokes, Inc., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
96,100 (D.D.C. 1977):
Plaintiffs seek to escape the effect of the statute of limitations by invoking
the federal tolling doctrine, That doctrine, which has been the law in the federal
courts "since the case of Bailey v. Clover, 88 U.S. 342 ... (1875) [states] that in
cases involving elements of fraud neither a statute of limitations nor the equitable
doctrine of laches can be said to begin to run until the fraud is or should have
been discovered." Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233, 1240 (8th Cir.),cert. de-
nied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970).
Id. at 91,954. See also Garnatz	 Nicolaus & Co., inc., 559 F.2d 1357, 1362 (8th Cir.
1977); Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank of Lincolnwood, 509 F.2d 1287, 1295-96 (7th Cir. 1975);
Fisher v. New York Stock Exchange, [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
95,416, at 99,108 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
The doctrine is not limited to securities actions. See, e.g., Thee v. Parker Brothers, Inc.,
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 1 61,966 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (antitrust action).
183 511 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1975).
134 Id. at 507.
85
 Id. at 508.
mid. at 509-10.
1 " Id. at 510.
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court. to conclude that "the defendant has taken positive steps after com-
mission of the Fraud (i.e. in connection with the securities transaction itself)
to keep it. concealed,"''" thereby entitling her to the protections of the
equitable Lolling doctrine. The .district court nevertheless dismissed the ac-
tion on the ground that Tomera's claims were barred by the applicable
statute of limitations.'" On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the dis-
missal, accepting Tomera's argument that fact issues were presented re-
garding whether the statute of limitations was equitably tolled by the de-
fendants' affirmative, continued concealment of the true financial status of
the companies alter the purchase.'"
'The co ndtict or the defendants which the plaintiff claimed gave rise to the equitable
tolling doctrine was summarized by the court of appeals as follows:
Briefly, she alleges that. the defendants did not. keep records of the funds in-
vested in their mining companies nor how these funds were disbursed. They re-
fused to make available even to Mohr, the secretary and treasurer of Astir, S,A.,
the charters of Astir, S.A. and Candemena, the leases held by Candemena, the
Nlexican !al and mine permits, any agreements between Astir, S.A. and Can-
demena, and the minutes of their stockholders' and directors' meetings. They re-
fused to answer any inquiries about the ownership of the mine sites, the mining
and processing operations, the companies customers and supplies and the re-
payment of the Arizona Nation ii Bank loan. Whether the plaintiff personally in-
quired into the business affairs of the two Mexican corporations is unimportant.
The defendant's conduct is reason enough to toll the limitations period.
Id. at 510.
"9 The district court applied the Illinois blue sky law three-year limitations period. Id.
at 509.
Determining which statute of limitations is properly applicable to federal securities law
actions often presents a difficult choice of law question for the courts. See, e.g., Gross v. Diver-
sified Mortgage Investors, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fpm, See. L. REp. (CCH) 1 96,170, at
92,303-04 (S.D.N.V. 1977); Bohem v. Singer, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 4 96,083, at. 91,901-02 (E,D. Pa. 1977); Arneil v. Ramsey, 414 F. Supp. 334, 337-40
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd, '550 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1977); Bailey v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc.,
[1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,711, at 90,462.64 (1). Mirm. 1976).
See generally Einhorn Penman, Choosing a Statute of Limitations in Federal Securities Actions, 25
MERCER L. Rev. 497 (1974); Martin, Statute of Limitations. in 10b-5 Actions: Vl'hich State Statute is
Applicable?, 29 BUS, LAW, 443 (1974).
After the HochPlater decision made clear that rule 10b-5 requires a showing of fraud,
the general conclusion of the courts has been that the policies underlying the federal securities
laws are best advanced by applying to such claims the state lit nitations period relating to com-
mon law fraud. SrO, e.g., Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774, 779 (2d Cir. 1977); Nickels v.
Koehler Management Corp., 541 F.2d 611, 618 (6th Cir. 1976); Gaudin v. KDI Corp., [1976-
77 Transfer Binder] FED. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,785, at 90,844-45 (S.D. Ohio 1976), affd,
[Current] Fur. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,453 (6th Cir. 1978). Interestingly, this choice of law
has also been adopted for cases under section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
which, as indicated in note 270 infra, often do not require proof of scienter. See, e.g., Stull v.
Bayard, 561 F.2d 429, 431-33 (2d Cir. 1977).
The statute of limitations for claims under sections 11 and 12 of the Securities Act of
1933 is provided in section 13 of that Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77m. See, e.g., Shull v. Dain, Kalman &
Quail, Inc., 561 F.2d 152, 155 (8th Cir. 1977). See also notes 228 et seq. infra.
"'The court of appeals explained the basis of its holding respecting the equitable tol-
ling doctrine as follows:
At least two types of fraudulent behavior toll a statutory period. [citations
omitted] In the first type, the most common, the fraud goes undiscovered even
though the defendant after commission of the wrong does nothing to conceal it
and the plaintiff has diligently inquired into its circumstances. The plaintiffs' due
diligence is essential here. [citations omitted] In the second type, the fraud goes
undiscovered because the defendant has taken positive steps after commission of
the fraud 0.1 keep it concealed. [citations omitted] This type of fraudulent
concealment tolls the limitations period until actual discovery by the plaintiff.
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When a post-transaction lulling claim is raised in addition to a securi-
ties fraud claim, post-transaction evidence will necessarily be offered to
prove the former claim. The court thus may find post-transaction evidence
"bootstrapped," albeit properly and reasonably, into the securities fraud as-
pect of the case by the lulling claim. Careful limiting instructions and care-
ful sorting of the evidence may be needed to preserve the identity of each
claim.' 6 1
F. Continuing Wrongs
Another claim necessarily involving the use of post-transaction evi-
dence is that the defendant's conduct was a "continuing wrong." Such a
claim may be based upon the provisions of either rule 10b-5 or other an-
tifraud sections which bar "any course of business or conduct which oper-
ates as a fraud or deceit" upon the plaintiff.' 62 A continuing wrong claim
may also arise when the defendant has been engaged in a continuing
course of wrongful conduct vis-a-vis a group of persons situated similarly to
the plaintiff.' 63
 The thrust of the continuing wrong theory is that the scope
of the fraud expands to encompass post-transaction as well as pre-
transaction acts. This expanded fraud theory, in turn, will obviously re-
quire post-transaction evidence for its proof.
Admission of post-transaction evidence for this purpose is roughly
analogous to the admission of evidence under rule 404(b) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which permits the introduction of evidence of other
wrongs to show matters such as "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." 64 Post-
511 F.2d at 510. See also Arneil v. Ramsey. 550 F.2d 774, 780-82 (2d Cir. 1977); Houlihan v.
Anderson-Stokes, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 1324, 1326-29 (D.D.C. 1977).
Houlihan v. Anderson-Stokes, Inc. demonstrates an important limitation of the equita-
ble tolling doctrine: that the defendant normally must be the one to have concealed the fraud.
434 E. Supp. at 1327. If the concealment is by another person, the statute normally will not be
tolled against the non-concealing defendant. Id. See also Koch v. Moseley, 11977-78 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,283, at 92.810-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1977). Another potentially
important limitation on the doctrine is the requirement, in some situations, that the plaintiff
use due diligence to discover the fraud. See notes 224-35 infra, as to this requirement.
1 " See note 179 infra.
362 See notes 2 & 6 supra for the provisions of rule 10b-5 and sections 12(2) and 17(a).
366
 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Tallant, [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FEE). SEC. L. Rim (CCH)
95,779, at 90,824 (S.D. Ga. 1976). One commentator on New York's law of evidence has con-
sequently noted:
Language is occasionally found indicating that the offenses must be so
connected as to raise an inference that both frauds were part of one general
scheme or plan. Nevertheless this rarely hinders admissibility as the fact that
another fraud was committed by the same person in the same manner, or upon
the same victim, or even in the same area, is generally held sufficient to raise the
required inference.
E. Fisch, Fisch ON Nov YORK EVIDENCE § 216, at 128 (2d ed. 1977), thing Zinman v.
Lockwood, 138 Misc. 592, 245 N.Y.S. 696 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1930); Boyd v. Boyd, 164 N.Y.
234, 58 N.E. 118 (1900).
164 FED. R. EvID. 404(b). Professor McCormick strongly recommended the admissiblity of
such evidence, stating:
[W]here there is testimony asserting the making of the misrepresentation
at issue, and testimony denying it ... [.] it seems evidence in reply of other like
misrepresentations by the party (whether or not part of a plan or scheme) will be
of much value to the trier of the disputed question and that this need outweighs
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transaction evidence may show, for example, that the defendant embarked
upon a plan to defraud which led to the plaintiff's injury, or that the de-
fendant knew that his earlier conduct was fraudulent. This facet of the
continuing course of conduct theory may arise in multiparty actions or in
actions where a defendant, such as an underwriter or accountant, has an
extended relationship with the issuer. In such situations, the defendant is
often required to perform a variety of duties or to perform repeatedly the
same duty.'" Evidence regarding such actions may show his knowledge at
a particular time or establish an inference based upon his continuing
course of conduct, even though it relates to specific events which took place
after the particular securities transaction at issue.
Black v. Shearson, Hanwill & Co.," 8 demonstrates the use of post-
transaction evidence to prove a continuing wrong. Purchasers of securities
brought suit. against a brokerage firm, Shearson, for issuing a series of mis-
leading reports and press releases concerning the issuer. The plaintiff's al-
leged that. one of Shearson's partners, who was also a director of the issuer,
had induced Shearson to issue the reports and releases. 1 ' 7 Throughout the
period that the reports were being issued, Shearson had continuously
bought. and sold the issuer's securities. Shearson attempted to limit its liabil-
ity, claiming that its partner had not known of the statements' falsehood at
the time the statements were made.'" The court., however, found all of the
the danger of prejudice. While such evidence standing alone would not of course
be sufficient to establish the issue, it can be of great value in resolving the con-
flict.
C. McCoRxitcx.supra note 83, § 164, at 346 (Ist ed. 1954). In particular, Professor McCormick
emphasized that evidence of other fraudulent conduct nay be appropriate for purposes other
than merely to show intent or knowledge, stating that Idourts often seem to overlook the
availability of this theory of admissibility and, by their strictness in limiting admissiblity to the
purposes of showing knowledge and intent, seem unduly to hamper the investigation of
fraud." Id. at n.4. One important caveat Professor McCormick raised is that the evidence of
the alleged prior fraud must show that there was in fact a fraud, that is, that the alleged mis-
representations were in fact false. See, e.g., Boyer v. United States, 132 F.2d 12. 13 (D.C. Cir.
1942); Darling v. Klock, 33 App. Div. 270, 53 N.Y,S. 543 (2d Dept. 1898). ofp, 165 N.Y. 623,
59 N.E. 593 (1900).
An example of the use of evidence of other fraudulent conduct to show something
other than knowledge and intent in common law actions is to show what might have been a
reasonable expectation of a party at the time. See, e.g., Avera v. Florida Towing Corp., 322
F.2d 155, 161-63 (5th Cir. 1963). But, as noted in United States v. 1,129.75 Acres of Land,
Etc., 473 F.2c1 996 (8th Cir. 1973), the admissibility of this type of evidence must "be decided
on the facts of each case ...." III, at 999. Due regard 111051 be given to possible "unfair prej-
udice" and the other factors under FF.o. R. Evio.403. See also cases cited at notes 254-59 info.
"" See, e.g., United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 111 (2c1 Cir. 1975); Fisher v. Kletz, 266 F.
Supp. ISO, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also Hirsch v. duPont, 553 F.2d 750, 761 (2d Cir. 1977);
State Mutual Life Assurance Co. of America v. Peat. Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 49 F.R.D. 202,
211-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Bui of [genii° v. Bermec Corp., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED, SEC.
L. REV. (CCH) 4 96,214, at 92,487-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Halperin v. Edwards & Hanly, Inc„
[1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fen. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,028 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); .Escort v. Bar-
Chris Constr. Corp., 283 F. ,Supp. 643, 697 et seq. (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (cases where plaintiffs' ac-
tions foreclosed recovery despite defendant's breach of duty). For norisecurities cases dealing
with situations where the defendant was held to have a continuing duty of disclosure, see also
Fitzgerald v. McFadden, 88 F.2d 639. 642-44 (2d Cir. 1937); Lower v. Harris, 57 F. 368,
373.74 (2d Cir. 1893); Strand v: Librascope, Inc.. 197 F. Supp. 743, 752-53 (E.D. Mich. 1961);
Hush v. Reaugh, 23 F. Stipp. 646. 652 (E.D. 111. 1938); RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 551(2)(b)
(1958).
156 266 Cal. App. 2d 362, 72 Cal. Rptr. 157 (Ct. App. 1968).
I " Id. at 365-66, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 159.
"" id. at 364, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 158.
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wrongs to have been part of a continuous course of conduct, and admitted
post-transaction evidence to prove the wrongful character of such con-
duct.'"" This holding is particularly significant because of what it suggests
about other related situations. Thus, if all the purchasers of the issuers' se-
curities had sued Black, evidence that was post-transaction with respect to
some of the purchasers presumably would have been relevant to Shearson's
intent and to other factors such as its opportunity to correct its wrongful
statements and its knowledge of the falsity thereof. Such evidence might
show that Shearson's partner adopted the same pattern of behavior
throughout the time that Shearson was trading in the issuer's stock. The
repeated issuance of false reports, and the failure to correct them through-
out Shearson's directorship, would then appear to be admissible under the
Federal Rules of Evidence to show the defendants' motive, opportunity to
correct past mistakes, preparation, intent or similar factors.
G. Multiparty Situations and Extended Time Spans
The most difficult questions regarding the admissibility of post-
transaction evidence arise when a court is confronted with a single trial of
multiple claims stemming from multiple transactions. Since different anti-
fraud sections require different. elements of proof,' 7 ° in multiclaim or mul-
tiparty litigation the same evidence may serve various functions. For exam-
ple, where a claim involves the sale of securities in a company which sub-
sequently goes bankrupt, the defendant's negligent failure to discover the
true financial condition of the security's issuer may be in itself a basis for
recovery under sections 12(2) and 11.' 7 ' Similar negligence would not,
however, be sufficient to impose liability under rule 10b-5, because actual
knowledge of the truth or reckless disregard for it must be established to
show a rule 10b-5 violation.
iniIn so doing, the court stated:
Appellant's argument is based upon their insistence that Dunbar did not know of
the falsity of each successive statement at the lime it was made. Their premise itself
is opposed by the evidence that Dunbar was kept closely and currently informed
of USAMCO's operations; it was these operations which were misrepresented to
Shearson's customers, including respondents. But, irrespective of whether Dun-
bar knew that each of the statements was false when made, the evidence is clear
that he permitted them to stand after he learned the truth and before respon-
dents relied on them. His knowledge and approval of the statements, accom-
panied by his knowledge of the truth about USANICO, were elements in a con-
tinuing course of conduct.
Id. at 367, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 160 (emphasis in original).
'v" See, e.g., Gross v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 431 F. Sup!). 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
In re Clinton Oil Co. Sec. Litigation, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fell, Sce, L. REV. (CCH) 1
96,015 (1). Kan. 1977); In re United States Financial Sec. Litigation, [1974-75 Transfer Bind-
er] FE1). Sri:. L. REV. (CCH) V 94,844 (S. D. Cal. 1974). See also Kaminsky, An Analysis of Securi-
ties Litigation Under Section 12(2) and How It Compares with Rule 10b-5, 13 Hoes. L. Rix. 231,
253 -75 (1976); Note, Causation rf Damages Under Section I1 of the Securities Ail of 1933, 51
N.Y.U.L. REv. 217, 219-20 (1976). For example, scienter is required under rule 10b-5 and sec-
tion 17(a) but not section 12(2) or rule 14a-9. See note 270 infra.
1" See, e.g., Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 560 F.2d 916, 923-24 (8th Cir.
1977). See also Fiflis, LiabililJ for ?distending Statements Under Section 11, 21 Fluke. LAW, 35, 48-50
(1975).
1 " See, e.g., Franklin Say. Bank of New York Y. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 528-29 (2d Cir.
1977). See.also notes 207 & 270 infra:
172
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Differing factual situations may likewise cause identical post-
transaction evidence to have differing weight or relevance, even though the
evidence is offered in actions under the same statutory provision. For ex-
ample, where the defendant has misrepresented a fact such as the financial
condition of the issuer, the inquiry will focus upon the truth or falsity of
the representation at the time of the sale and the defendant's actual knowl-
edge thereof.'" But where the defendant has merely offered his opinion
on the creditworthiness of the issuer, a court will inquire whether there was
a reasonable basis for the defendant's opinion and whether the defendant
used reasonable diligence in investigating the issuer." 4 In the first situa-
tion, post-transaction evidence may help prove the plaintiff's claim that, at
the time of the sale, the defendant knew that the financial condition of the
issuer was not as he had represented. In the second situation, revelations
after the sale, for example from post-mortem analyses of why the issuer
later went bankrupt, may be significant in determining whether the defen-
dant might have known the true status of the issuer had he exercised
greater care in forming his opinion and investigating the issuer. Post-
transaction evidence may play a valid role and thus properly be admissible
in either case, but that role may differ significantly in each.
In a multiparty action involving different sales of the same security
over an extended period of time, the same evidence may have different ef-
' 3 See, e.g., Gross v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, 431 F. Supp. 1080, 1087-88
(S.D.N.Y. 1977). See aim Heil v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909, 914 (2c1 Cir. 1968); Raskas v. Supreme
Equip. & Sys. Corp., 71 F.R.D. 672, 673-74 (E.D.N.N'. 1976); Lewis v. Marine Midland Grace
Trust Co. of New York, 63 F.R.D. 39, 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). But see Rich v. Touche Ross & Co.,
415 F. Snpp. 95, 98-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Vogel v. Brown, [1974-75 Transfer Binder) FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 94,831, at 96,785 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See note 209 infia re "recklessness."
174 See, e.g., Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 5(10 F.2d 916, 923 (81h Cir.
1977); Franklin Say. Bank ()I' New York v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 527 (2d Cir. 1977), regarding
the distinction between fact ual Statements and mere (pinions and the duties of a derder who
expressly or impliedly represents that securities are safe and sound investments.
As one leading commentator on securities fraud actions has explained:
A statement made with a reasonable basis is not misleading merely because
future events do not bear out the statement. However, if those future events
were reasonably forseeal)lc, that fact alone should be some evidence that the orig-
inal investigation was not sufficiently complete.
Unlike the other statements discussed in this section, opinions and esti-
mates 'nay relate to a presently existing fact, as well as to a future status. Present
lam can be classified into those which Can he ascertained with reasonable accu-
racy alter a reasonable investigation (such as the number of items in the inven-
tory of a small business), and those which cannot be so ascertained (such as the
amount of ore in a newly-found gold mine). An opinion or estimate regarding an
ascertainable fact (the former of the two classes) is the same as a representation
of a present fact. Therefore, a statement pertaining to ascertainable facts is mis-
leading if the data are not as represented, even though it is couched in terms of
an estimate or opinion. On the other hand, when the facts cannot be reasonably
ascertained, the speaker nevertheless should have a reasonable basis for his opin-
ion or estimate and should believe it. true, like any opinion or estimate of a fu-
ture event.
Jacobs, What is a Misleading Statement or Omission Under Rule lOh-f?, 42 FORrIUASI L. Rev. 243,
284-85 (1973). See also SEC v. Broadwall Sec., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 962, 967-68 (S.D,N.Y. 1965);
SEC v. Macon, 28 F. Supp. 127 (D. Colo. 1939).
Statements of ()pillion are also evidence of fraud when there is an intention to deceive
by them. See, e,g., Magnaleasing, Inc. v. Staten island Mall, 563 F.2d 567, 569 (2d Cir. 1977);
Gray v. Richmond Bicycle Co., 167 N.Y. 348, 357, 60 N,E, 663, 665-66 (1901). See also
Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1040-41 (7th Cir. 1977).
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fects for the different parties. What may have been material on one date
may not be on another. Thus, evidence may be relevant to the claims of
one party but irrelevant to those of the other parties, whose transactions
preceded or followed the first party's. 15 Yet, in an action involving either
multiple purchases over an extended time span or several different defen-
dants who each performed different roles in the transactions at issue, a
broad array of evidence may be introduced en masse. What is post-purchase
for some parties will be pre-purchase for others. The jury may have trou-
ble sifting through this broad array of evidence and deciphering which evi-
dence relates to which particular party or particular claim,"° Some of the
parties, particularly on the defense side, may be prejudiced by this confus-
ing array of evidence, or through juror sympathy evoked by hearing re-
peated stories of plaintiffs having been injured by the defendants' alleged
deceits. Of course, when there is a serious threat of prejudice or confusion
as a result of overlapping evidence, the court may sever the various claims
and try them separately."' In such a case, the court must determine
whether the claimed prejudice outweighs the need for efficient and prompt
judicial resolution of the controversy and the requirements that necessary
parties be joined in one action and that causes of action not be split. More
often than not, the court will probably conclude that severance is neither
desirable nor feasible, notwithstanding the potential prejudice from the fact
that evidence will be post-transactional on some of the claims."° When this
problem arises in a jury trial, careful limiting instructions and a special
verdict for each party on each claim may suffice to counter the claimed
prejudice.'" In a nonjury trial, the court presumably will be able to sort
'" See, e.g., Gelman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 73 F.R.D. 60, 68 (W.D. Pa. 1976), ap-
peal distnicsed, 556 F.2d 699 (3d Cir. 1977), discussed at notes 209-11 infra,
' 76 See discussion in text at notes 189.93 infra for an example. See also cases cited in
notes 177-80 infra.
' 7 FED, R. Civ. P. 42(b). The rule recognized that severance cannot be permitted where
one's jury trial rights would be impaired. It provides:
(b) SEPARATE TRIALS. The court, in furtherance of convenience or to
avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and eco-
nomy, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or
third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-
claims, counter-claims, third-party claims, or issues, always preserving inviolate
the right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitu-
tion or as given by a statute of the United States,
The rule is addressed to the discretion of the court. See, e.g., Garber v. Randall, 477 F.2d 711,
714-15 (2d Cir. 1973); Richmond v. Weiner, 353 F.2d 41, 44-45 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
384 U.S. 928 (1966).
'" See, e.g., Garber v. Randell, 477 F.2d 711, 714-15 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Benigno, [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,812, at 90,934-35 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Anderson v. F.i. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705, 711-12 (D. Minn. 1968); State
Mutual Life Assurance Co. of America v, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.. 49 F.R.D. 202,
207-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Goodman v. H. Hentz & Co., 265 F. Supp. 440, 443 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
See also Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, 161 F. Supp. 533, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); United
States v, Benigan, [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,872 (S.D.N.Y.
1977). See also note 189 infra.
'" See rule 105 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and rules 49 and 51 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See United States v. Kahn, 381 F.2d 824, 837.38 (7th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1015 (1967), and United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583. 596 (2d Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952), rehearing denied, 344 U.S. 889 (1952), for examples of
limiting instructions in a non-securities context. See generally l WEiNsTEIN, supra note 38, /
105[05] (1977).
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out the overlapping evidence to determine which is relevant to the differ-
ent parties and different claims. [ ""
Welch Foods, Inc. v. Goldman, Sacks & Co., t " i illustrates the complex
evidentiary problems which may arise in multiparty, multiclaim securities
litigation. Welch was the bellwether action of a large multidistrict proceed-
ing, In re Penn Central Commercial Paper Litigation, 182 brought by the holders
of the commercial paper which Penn Central Transportation Company
See also Anderson v. F.I. duPont & Co., 291 F. Stipp. 705, (1). Minn. 1968), a securities
action where the court stated:
DuPont and Ritter argue that die jury will become confused due to the
length of trial and the complexity of the issues, and will therefore he unable to
keep dearly in mind the facts as to each defendant. Such a claim has been held
to be not a showing of prejudice. Fleischman v. Harwood, 10 F.R.1), 139
(D.C.N.V. 1950); Eichinger v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 20 F,R.I). 204 (D.C. Neb.
1957). But it is also dear that any danger of prejudice resulting from a joint trial
can be avoided by proper instructions to the jury. Grissom v. Union P.R.R., 144
F.R.D. 263 (1).C. Colo. 1953); Psaroumbas v. United Greek Shipowners Corp., 5
F.R.D. 398 (D.C.N,Y. 1946). As the Court in Psaroutabas points out, the refusal to
try the cases separately also avoids the possibility of perverse verdicts against
plaintiffs.
Id. at 711-12.
There is also much authority for the proposition that a jury is presumed to have under-
stood and heeded the coun't's instructions. See, e.g., Kuku•uza v. General Eke. Co., 510 F.2d
1208, 1218 (1st Cir. 1975). See also United States v. Kilcullen, 546 F.2d 435, 447 (1st Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 906 (1977): Peelers Co. v. Wendt, 260 F. Supp. 193, 203 (W.D.
Wash. 1966). But see Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) (Jackson, j.. con-
curring). Whether or not this is a realistic proposition, it is an essential one, if' there is to be an
orderly prosecution and trial of actions. Otherwise, the appellate courts would be deluged with
speculation as to the mental processes and responsiveness of the jurors. See also Garnatz, v.
Nicolaus Co., Inc., 559 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1977). Nevertheless, there are situations
where the use of a limiting instruction has been held to be an insufficient protection against
potential prejudice. See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 389 U.S. 818 (1968). Each situation must
be examined on its own particular facts to determine whether such an instruction will or will
not suffice,
Under rule 49 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the court "may require a jury to
return only a special verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact".
or "may submit to the jury, together with appropriate forms for a general verdict, written in-
terrogatories upon one or more issues of fact the decision of which is necessary to a verdict."
See generally 5A Moo Ith'S, .5/Pra note 14, 1 49 (1977). For an example of t lie actual use of the
special verdict procedure in a securities action, sec Fox v. Kane-Miller Corp., 398 F. Supp. 609
(O. Md. 1975), VW, 542 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1976).
's" At least. some of the concerns in allowing jurors to hear the evidence, as summarized
by Professor McCormick in note 83 supra, are obviously inapplicable on their like to judges. It
is presumed that the court will appreciate the importance of the rules of evidence and will
heed them. But judges too are only persons and, thus, may also be susceptible to suggestion as
a result of improper evidence, In recognition of that fact, trial judges in non-jury cases often
decline to conduct settlement discussions with counsel where settlement figures arc to be men-
tioned, so as not to taint their thinking. In such situations, a "neutral" judge or a magistrate
will often substitute lOr the trial judge at settlement conferences. On the other hand, the court
must rule on the evidence and, to do so, simply must often pass on preliminary matters going
to its admissibility (see note 83 supra). As a practical matter, if the court does not hear all of
the proffered evidence, it will not be able to conduct the trial. FED, R. Eviiu. 104(a) therefore
mandates that the judge make such evidentiary rulings. ln the last analysis. it will be incum-
bent upon the trial judge himself to determine whether improperly proffered or admitted .
evidence has been so prejudicial that it renders even him incapable of rendering ti just deci-
sion.
" 1 398 F. Supp. 1393 (S.D.N.Y. .1974).
I" 337 F. Supp. 1335	 1972) and 358 F, Supp. 284 (J.P.M.D.L. 1973). See
also notes 184-89 infra; In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 3'25 F. Supp. 309 (J.P.M.D.L. 1971).
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(PCTC) issued shortly before it filed for reorganization under the bank-
ruptcy laws on June 21, 1970. The plaintiffs sued Goldman, Sachs & Co.,
the commercial paper dealer which had marketed the commercial paper,
for rescission under sections 12(2) and 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933,
rule 101)-5 and section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
under the pertinent state blue sky laws and common law. 183 The litigation
resulted in several reported decisions on important questions relating to ju-
risdiction,' 84
 discovery, 185 multidistrict procedure,'" evidence's' and the
merits of securities claims.'"
The plaintiffs in Welch had purchased their holding of PCTC com-
mercial paper at different times, one in January 1970 (Anthony), one in
February 1970 (Younker), and another in March and April 1970 (Welch).
Following a jury trial, they won a multimillion dollar jury verdict under sec-
tion 12(2) and rule 10b-5 and, in Welch's case, under the New York blue
sky law. The facts applicable to the three different plaintiffs' purchases var-
ied, yet the same jury heard all of the facts offered for each plaintiff.
Goldman, Sachs' motion to sever the claims, grounded on the contention
that it would be prejudiced if the jury heard all the evidence, was de-
nied."" The court found that there was a reasonable relationship among
the claims of all of the parties and that considerations of judicial economy
outweighed the possible prejudice to Goldman, Sachs arising from a joint
trial.
The aspect of the case dealing with the events of the first quarter of
1970 illustrates the overlap of evidence problem. The year-end financial re-
sults of PCTC were issued on February 4, 1970, four days after Anthony's
"3
 The claims under § 17(a) were dismissed on the ground that that section does not
create a private right of action. 398 F. Supp. at 1401. Whether § 17(a) creates a private right
of action is a sharply disputed issue. See Kaminsky, An Analysis of Securities Litigation Under Sec-
tion 12(2) and How 11 Compares with Rule 10b-5, 13 Hous. L. REv, 231, 234 n.19 (1976). See also
Alloys Unlimited, Inc. v. Raeder, [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FEn. SEc, L. REP. (CCH) 1
95,639, at 90,170 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), affd, 55 App. Div. 2d 893, 391 N.Y.S. 2d 371 (1977).
The court in Welch also dismissed the common law claims and the blue sky claims of the par-
ties other than Welch. 398 F. Stipp. at 1401.
'" Welch Foods, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Cu., 398 F. Supp. 1393 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See
also Franklin Say. Bank of New York v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 523-25 (2d Cir. 1977); Mal-
linckroch Chem. Works v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 420 F. Supp. '231, '240 1976).
1 " Goldman, Sachs & Co. v. Edelstein, 494 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1974); In re Penn Cent.
Commercial Paper Litigation, 61 F.R.D. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (attorney-client privilege); Mal-
litickrodt Chem, Works v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 58 F.R.D, 348 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (discovery of
doctuttems turned over to SEC for confidential SEC investigation).
'"" In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litigation, 62 F.R.D. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd
sub nom. Shulman v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 515 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1975) (power of transferee
court to permit intervention in multidistrict actions). See also In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation,
325 F. Stipp, 309 (J.P.M.D.L. 1971) (severance of third party actions for purposes of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407); In re Equity Funding Sec. Litigation, 375 F. Supp. 1378 (J.P.M.D.L. 1974).
'" In re Penn Cent. Commercial Paper Litigation. 61 F.R.D. 453, 461-64 (S.O,N,Y.
1973). See also Alton Box Bd. Co. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 560 F.2d 916, 919 11.3 (8th Cir.
1977).
"" Alton Box 13d. Co. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 560 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1977); Franklin
_Say. Batik of New York v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1977); University Hill Foundation v.
Goldman, Sachs & Co.. 422 F. Supp. 879 (S.D.N.Y. 1976): Welch Foods, Inc. v. Goldman,
Sachs & Co., 398 F. Supp. 1393 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See also Mallinckroch Chem. Works v.
Goldman, Sachs & Co., 420 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1976): SEC v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.,
(1973-74 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 94,556 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
"" Sec Transcript of Pretrial Conference, Oct. 31, 1972, at 25-26, Welch Foods, Inc., 398
F. Supp. 1393 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). See also note 178 supra.
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purchase, but before Younker's and Welch's purchases. On February 5 and
6, two Goldman, Sachs partners met with officers of PCTC and received
inside information that PCTC's prospects for the remainder of 1970 were
bleak. Shortly alter that. meeting, PCTC bought back—at defendant
Goldman, Sachs' request—ten million dollars of PCTC commercial paper
which Goldman, Sachs was holding in its own inventory. Within two weeks,
Goldman, Sachs had sold the balance of its PCTC notes. While the defen-
dant was in the midst of selling its own holdings, it sold PCTC notes to
Younker without revealing its knowledge of these new developments.
Thereafter, Goldman, Sachs again began to carry PCTC notes in its inven-
tory. On March 23, 1970, before its sales to Welch, Goldman, Sachs' prin-
cipal commercial paper partner received a phone call from the financial
vice president of PCTC. The PCTC vice president provided him with in-
side information that PCTC's earnings would be "terrible" for the calendar
quarter to end March 31, 1970, the date of Welch's first. purchase.
Golchnan, Sachs failed either to investigate this tip or to inform any of the
plaintiffs of its contents. On April 14, 1970, two weeks after Welch's pur-
chases, Goldman, Sachs again was advised that PCTC's results for the first
quarter of 1970 (which had still not been publicly released) would be "ter-
rible." Goldman, Sachs promptly sold its own holdings of PCTC commer-
cial paper, just prior to PCTC's public announcement of the earnings fig-
ures. It never again carried PCTC commercial paper in its inventory, and
stopped marketing the notes altogether on about May I, I970.t`m
At the trial, the jury, which had to decide the Anthony claim, heard
all about the bad news of February 9-6, subject of course to a strict limiting
instruction from the court. The jury also heard all about the Goldman,
Sachs inventory reduction of mid and late February, even though it was to
decide the Younker claim relating to purchases before that in early Febru-
ary, again subject to a limiting instruction. The jury also heard about the
March events, since the nondisclosure of those events was claimed to be
part of Welch's case regarding its March and April purchases.
The admission of that evidence and the end results in Welch appear to
have been proper, but there remains the unanswerable question of whether
the limiting instructions actually worked,• particularly on Anthony's January
claim. In subsequent actions by single plaintiffs, purchasers as of mid-
February and mid-March also prevailed without the benefit of the late
• March evidence, but their successes are less informative since they also had
the benefit of the crucial February evidence)" A more interesting'com-
"" A detailed statement of the factual basis for the claims is contained in the ()pinions
in companion cases, particularly in University Hill Foundation v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 422
F. Stipp. 879, 885-92 (S.D.N,Y. 1976), An even more extensive factual chronology is contained
in the STAFF itEoicr, SEC, THE FINANCIAL. COLLAPSE Or THE PENN CENTRAL COMPANY, PART
tut, at 271-302 (1972).
191 See cases cited in note 188 supra. The potential importance of' that post-purchase
evidence is illustrated by the conclusion of the SEG Staff in its report, supra note 190; regard-
ing the February reduction of Goldman. Sachs' inventory of Penn Central notes following the
February 5 and 6, 1970 conversations with Penn Central's officers; the SEC report stated:
"Goldman Sachs' analysis about the significance of the [1969] year-end results may be ascer-
tained with greater reliability from the actions they took rather than from their statements."
Id. at 284. The plaintiffs in the Penn Central litigati on sought unsuccessfully to draw this same
inference from Goldman. Sachs' April reduction of its Penn Central inventory after the March
23, 1970 telephone conversation referred to in the text. As noted in the text, this particular
post-transaction evidence was ruled inadmissible.
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parison would have occurred if a January purchaser had tried its case alone
but none ever did. Welch demonstrates how post-purchase evidence can be
a knotty problem in securities cases, but it fails to tell us whether the sup-
posed safeguard of a limiting instruction really works.
There is of course an entirely different and equally plausible view on
the Welch case problem, and it may be the right one. This latter view holds
that the evidence was properly received, regardless of the time sequence,
because it was reasonably related to the chain of events at issue—the finan-
cial collapse of Penn Central. If the plaintiffs were arguing too broad a
view of the post-purchase evidence, this view maintains, Goldman, Sachs
could and should have shown that and explained it to the jury. The jury
then could decide what significance to give to the evidence. Indeed, plain-
tiffs may be making a tactical error in offering post-purchase evidence of
the type offered in Welch, because the defendant may be able to point to
such evidence to show that the defendant did not actually know what was
happening and only learned the facts after the purchase at issue.' 92
Moreover, defendants may even argue that such evidence shows their lack
of bad faith and fraudulent intent at the time of the purchases.'"
Interestingly, to complete the story regarding the Penn Central litiga-
tion, the trial judge in Welch ruled out all evidence regarding the mid-April
events, since it. was post-purchase and therefore irrelevant to all of the
purchases at issue at the trial."' The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument
that, on their rule 10b-5 claims, the evidence showed Goldman, Sachs' in-
tent: for example, that Goldman, Sachs' April elimination of its own inven-
tory evidenced a predatory attitude and thus indicated Goldman, Sachs' in-
tentions when it sold to Welch. The plaintiffs also argued unsuccessfully
that the April evidence showed the nature and quality of Goldman, Sachs'
relationship with PCTC, insofar as Goldman, Sachs had ready access to im-
portant nonpublic information and, thus showed what Goldman, Sachs
could have learned with reasonable diligence which was directly at issue on
the plaintiffs' section 12(2) and blue sky claims. With respect to Welch's
purchases, the plaintiffs' argued that the evidence about the first quarter
results also showed PCTC's true financial status on the dates of the pur-
chases. This fact, they suggested was relevant on the section 12(2) claims,
which are analogous to innocent misrepresentation claims at common law,
since intent to defraud and scienter need not be proven under section
12(2). 1715 The district court rejected all of those offers of proof. Although it
did not state its reasoning, the court was apparently not convinced that the
plaintiffs had shown a sufficient link between the evidence and their claims.
The court may also have felt that the potential prejudice of the post-
1 " Cf., e.g., Pittsburgh Coke & Chem. Co. v. Rollo, 421 F. Supp. 908, 921.23 (E.D.N.Y.
1976), affd, 560 F.2d 1089 (2d Cir. 1977) (post-transaction evidence suggested that the defen-
dant was not aware at time of transaction); Devonbrook Inc. v. Lily Lynn. Inc., [1976-77
Transfer Binder) FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCM 1 95,835, at 91,009-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (evidence
does not establish lack of intent at the time of entering agreement).
'" See, e.g., notes 122-29 supra for an example of such a construction of post-transaction
evidence in some of the other Penn Central commercial paper cases.
"'This same post-transaction evidence was noted and apparently credited with signifi-
cance in another of the Penn Central commercial paper cases. See Alton Box Bd. Co. v.
Goldman, Sachs & Co., 560 F.2d 916, 924 n.11.
195 See cases cited in note 270 infra.
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purchase evidence—the shock effect from the admittedly disastrous results
and Goldman, Sachs' prudent but self-serving conclusion that PCTC was no
longer a viable investment—was too great to risk admitting evidence which
appeared to be only tangentially, if at all, relevant to the claims of the par-
ticular plaintiffs.'"
Welch thus illustrates the balancing nature of the court's inquiry in
complex and multiparty securities actions. Evidence such as that ruled out
in Welch may well be deemed relevant. and properly admissible in a differ-
ent action or another securities context. The court must consider many fac-
tors in deciding whether to admit the evidence itself: for example, the time
lapse between the dates of the evidence and the securities purchases at
issue, whether the evidence can be said to relate back to earlier events,
whether the facts involve a continuum of events constituting one story or
merely a series of independent events, the claimed potential prejudice, the
feasibility of the defendant's explaining its meaning and the relationship of
the evidence to the other evidence in the action and whether it is merely
cumulative and hence unnecessary. It may well be proper to admit the evi-
dence and allow the fact finder to ascribe the degree of weight it warrants
to the evidence, but it seems wise to have that matter determined on a
case-by-case basis. 197
H. Lack of Due Diligence
Defendants often argue that plaintiff's in securities litigation should
not be permitted to recover because they failed to act with due diligence in
embarking on the transaction leading to the litigation. This defense is
analogous to the contributory negligence defense in negligence actions.
Somewhat analogously, defendants also argue that the plaintiff's reliance
upon an alleged misrepresentation or omission was unreasonable in light of
the circumstances surrounding the transaction. Post-transaction evidence
may help to prove or disprove the validity of' these proffered defenses. It is
in the context of these defenses that defendants most often offer post-
transaction evidence.'"
Recent United States Supreme Court securities decisions, however,
have literally changed the character of securities fraud litigation,' 99 neces-
sitating a rethinking of whether the clue diligence defense should be avail-
able to defendants. Such a defense might make sense where the claim is
premised upon the defendant's negligence; but most "negligence" securities
" 1' At the time or the Welch trial in 1974, the Federal Rules of Evidence, in particular
rule 403 (see notes 251.56 infra, were nut yet. in force. However, as judge Weinstein has ob-
served: "In the absence of redeeming probative value, exclusion of evidence because of its ca-
pacity for prejudice has long been the practice." WEiNsTEIN„supra note 38, 1 403(03), at
403-15 (1976).
1 " See notes 254 & 259 infra.
"8
 As one commentator has explained, lilt is perhaps more difficult to select an ap-
propriate name for the defense than it is to discuss its elements and use. Various courts have
required evidence that the claimant exercised reasonable care on his own behalf in connection
with the transaction, but few have employed the same terminology." Wheeler, Plaintiffs Duty of
Due Care Under Rule 10b-3: An Implied Defense to An Implied Remedy, 70 NW. L. REV. 561, 563 n.7
(1975). See also Note, Scope of the Due Diligence Defense, 50 TEmPLE: L. Q. 124, 127 n.25 (1976);
Campbell, Elements qf Recovery Under Rule 10b-5, 26 S.C. L. REV. 653 (1975); Note, The Due Dil-
igence Requirement for Plainbili Under Rule 10b-5, 1975 DUKE L. REV. 753 (1975).
I 99 See note 218 infra.
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sections have been held to exclude such a defense because of the legislative
and public policy underlying their enactment. 20° Claims under provisions
which require proof of scienter, moreover, are not negligence claims. It is
highly questionable whether a negligence-type defense such as the plain-
tiffs alleged lack of reasonable care should be permitted to defeat a claim
based upon intentional deceit, as rule 10b-5 and section 17(a) actions now
must be.'"
lf, as in common law fraud actions, proof of scienter is necessary to
sustain a rule 101)-5 claim against the defendant, then an analogy to com-
mon law fraud appears to be appropriate in determining the degree of
conduct to be required of the victims of the fraud."' It has been said that
the requirements of a rule 10b-5 action are less stringent than a common
law fraud action. 2 " Unless we intend to make the requirements of a securi-
ties fraud action more stringent than those needed to sustain a common law
fraud claim—a result which this writer submits would undercut the very
purposes of the securities laws 2 ° 4
 and render them mere surplusage—care
must be taken to limit defenses like the clue diligence defense which are
premised upon concepts analogous to contributory negligence and assump-
tion of risk. 20 ' Those defenses are not available in a common law fraud ac-
"" See, e.g., Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 696 (5th
Cir. 1971); Kaminsky, An Analysis of Securities Litigation Under Section 12(2) and How 11 Compares
With Rule 10b-5, HOUS. L. REV. 231, 233 (1976). See note 6 supra for the text of section
12(2).
'See notes 218-24 & 271 infra. Thus, in Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th
Cir. 1976), the court of appeals stated: "If the negligence standard were being applied it
might be appropriate to allow due diligence to be exacted From the victim, but where liability
of the defendant requires proof of intentional misconduct, the exaction of a due diligence
standard from the plaintiff becomes irrational and unrelated." Id. at 692. Accord, Sundstrand
Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1040 (7th Cir. 1977). See also Calhoun, Divining the
Implications Hochfelder, 2 Coat'. L. REV. 99 (1978).
2 " 2 See cases cited in note 224 infra. See also Alloys Unlimited, Inc. v. Raesler. 11976.77
Transfer Binder] FED, SEC. L. REP. (CCH) II 95,639, at 90,170 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1976), alit!,
55 App. Div. 2d 893, 391 N.Y.S.2d 371 (1st Dept. 1977), where the court stated:
The defendants-by-counterclaim also contend due care was not exercised
by defendants in discovering the alleged omissions and misrepresentations and
that the defendants are therefore barred from maintaining a cause of action (by
Ivay of counterclaim) based on fraud. This contention is without merit since the
absence of due care in a fraud action is not a defense.
2" See, e.g., Norris & Hirschberg, Inc. v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1949);
Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969, 975-76 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F.
Stipp. 808, 828 (I). Del. 1951). See also Fischman v. Raytheon Corp., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir.
1951).
2"
 As a leading securities commentator noted more than a decade ago: "Mt must be
remembered that the broader concern for the integrity of securities markets is the dominant
policy theme." Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The implications of
the Texas Gulf Sulpher Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1275 (1965).
The United States Supreme Court stated in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau,
Inc., 375 U.S. 180. 186 (1963), that the policy of the federal securities laws was "to substitute a
philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor" that existed under the old
common law. See also note 211 infra.
265 Thus, e.g., in Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976). the court of ap-
peals stated:
Use of the tort analogy pkiinly demonstrates the inappropriateness of due
diligence in 10b-5 suits under the Ernst & Ernst doctrine, for the due diligence
standard as applied to 101)-5 suits is about the same as the application of con-
tributory negligence. Just as contributory negligence is not a defense to an inten-
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lion, and should not be in a rule 101)-5 action either. 2"
While scienter may not be inferred from mere negligence at common
law, such an inference may be permissible where the plaintiff' is shown to
have acted with reckless disregard for the facts. Reckless indifference to the
facts may amount to constructive knowledge by the plaintiff,'" just as reck-
lessness may constitute constructive fraud by the defendant at common
law.'" On this theory, post-Hochfelder lower court. decisions have held that
proof' of the defendant's recklessness may satisfy the requirement of sci-
enter in rule I0b-5 actions, 2" and it thus may be appropriate to require
tional tort case of fraud, similarly due diligence is totally inapposite in the context
d intentional conduct required to be proved under Rule 101)-5.
Further support for this conclusion is fbund in the statutory language
upon which the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst placed reliance in determining
ihat the Act was meant to proscribe intentional conduct only. Nothing in the
wording of either the statute or the rule suggests that a plaintiff is to be barred
by failure to exercise due care or due diligence. Not is there evidence that the
framers if I 01)-5 intended due diligence to be applicable any more than it •had
been applied to common law fraud.
14. at 694. (emphasis in triginal).
See, e.g., Albany City Say. Inst. v. Burdick, 87 N.Y. 40, 48 (1881); Angerosa v. White
Cu., 248 App. Div. 425, 429, 290 N.Y.S. 204, 211 (App. Div.), affil, 275 N.Y. 524 (1936);
Rosenchein v. McNally, 17 App. Div. 2d 834. 834, 233 N.Y.S.2d 254, 256 (1962).
It should also be remembered, however, that those defenses are not available in an ac-
tion under * 12(2). Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton, 297 F. Stipp. 1165, 1221-22 (1). Md.
1968), rev'd on other grounds, 422 F.2d 1124 (41.1) Cir. 1970), See also American Bank & Trust.
Co. v. Juste, 323 F. Supp. 84:3, 847 (W.D. La. 1970).
2" See note 224 infra. See also PROSSER ON TORTS § 34, at 185 (1971), This concept ap-
pears to have been the intention of those pre-HochPlder cases which required due diligence
while also requiring scienter under rule 10b-5. See, e.g., Clement. A. Evans & Co. v. McAlpine,
434 F.2t1 100. 104 (5th Cir. 1970); Frigitemp Corp. v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524
F.2d 275, 282 (2d Cir. 1975); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 103 (10th Cir.
1971),
This concept has 'build its way into some 	 12(2) cases as a requirement that there be
some causal connection between the alleged untruth or omission and the stock purchase at
issue. See, e.g., Jackson v. Oppenheim, 533 F,2cl 826, 829 n.8 (2d Cir. 1976). But it is impor-
tant nit to elevate this requirement to the level of requiring scienter or reliance, neither of
which is required under § 12(2). See Hill York Corp. v. American Intl Franchises, Inc., 448
F.2d 680, 695 (5th Cir. 1971). See also University Hill Foundation v. Goldman, Sachs & Co..
422 F. Stipp. 879, 892-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
2 " 8 See United Slates v. Garcia & Diar., Inc., 291 F.2d 242, 245 (2d Cir. 1961); Pinney &
Topliff v. Chrysler Corp.. 176 F. Stipp. 801, 803 (S.D. Calif. 1959); Gonsalves v. Hudgson, 38
Ca1.2(1 91, 100, 237 P.2d 656, 662 (1951); State St. Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 112, re-
hearing denied, 278 N.Y. 704 (1938),
2"See,	 Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem, Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044-45 (7th Cir.
1977); Bailey v. Meister Brat'', Inc.. 535 F.2d 982, 993 (7th Cir. 1976); Bartels v. Algonquin
Properties, Ltd., [1976-77 Tran.sfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 5 95,870, at 91,204 (D.
Vt. 1977); Continental Assurance Co. v. American Bankshares, [1977-78 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEG. L. REP. (CCH) I 96,274, at 92,765-67 (E.D. Wisc. 1978). But see Maudlin v. Schaffer,
[1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SR:. L. REP. (CCH) 4 96,211, at 92,456 (M.D. N. C. 1977).
In Sanders v. John Nuyeen & Co., Inc., 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977), the court of ap-
peals defined such "recklessness" as follows: "We believe 'reckless' in these circumstances
comes closer to being a lesser form of intent than merely a greater degree of ordinary negli-
gence. We perceive it to be not just a difference in degree, but also in kind." Id. at 793. See
also discussion in Gross v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Frio. Stu.
L. R.1-:P. (CCH) 1 96,137, at 92,108-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Steinberg v. Carey, 439 F. Supp. 1233,
1237-39 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Coleco Indus. Inc. v. Berman, 423 F, Stipp. 275, 295-96 (E.D. Pa.
1976).
In Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978), the court of
appeals explained why and where it felt recklessness should be permitted to satisfy the scienter
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that the plaintiff act without recklessness in the transaction. Consequently,
where the plaintiff has acted recklessly, the defendant may be able to assert
a defense analogous to due diligence.
There is, however, another possible view of the admissibility of a reck-
lessness defense with which the courts are struggling in the wake of the
Hochfelder clecision.210
 Under this view, Hochfelder should not be react to "al-
ter the underlying purpose of the securities laws to" insure full disclosure
in securities transactions. 2 " Accordingly, it is argued, tipping the clue dili-
gence balance against the defendant is necessary and appropriate to en-
courage full disclosure and to deter wrongful conduct. According to this
view, Hochfelder and other recent Supreme Court decisions 212 restricting the
scope of securities fraud actions merely represent a response to prior ex-
cesses whereby the courts had imposed virtual strict liability on securities
defendants:213
 Pre-Hochfelder decisions had caused defendants to protest
requirement. Among its reasons was the following:
A final basis for applying a recklessness standard in certain instances rests
perhaps on the practical problem of proof in private enforcement under the se-
curities laws. Proof of a defendant's knowledge or intent will often be inferential,
see Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting,
Conspiracy in Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597,
635 (1972), and cases thus of necessity cast in terms of recklessness. To require in
all types of 10b-5 cases that a fact-finder must find a specific intent to deceive or
defraud would for all intents and purposes disembowel the private cause of ac-
tion under § 10(b).
Id. at 47. (Emphasis in original). See also Stratton Group v. Sprayregen, [Current] FEU. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 96,302, at 93,016.17 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
90 cf. the lines of cases cited in note 224 infra.
'n See note 204 supra. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 216-18 (2d Cir.
1977), for one recent reaction to Hochfelder and other recent Supreme Court decisions. See
also, Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 439 F. Supp. 945, 953-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
"2 See note 218 infra.
"3
 This trend had a particularly severe effect upon professionals, like lawyers and ac-
countants, who are not themselves "seekers" of securities in the cases involving them. See Van
Graafeiland, Forward: A Lawyer's Observations on Hochfelder, 51 Sr. JOHNS L. REV. 239 (1977);
Lowenfels, Expanding Public Responsibilities of Securities Latt7ers: An Analysis of the New Trend in
Standard of Care and Priorities of Duties, 74 Cowm. L. REV. 412 (1974).
Judge Van Graafeiland has observed that application of the Horhfelder rule continues to
leave much leeway to the courts in such actions:
Unfortunately, the boundary line between "mere negligence" and "something
more" is a hazy one, and'the Hochfelder rule could well be emasculated by defin-
ing too narrowly the nature of the conduct which may properly be described as
negligent. Where there have been knowing, material misstatements of fact, appli-
cation of rule 101-5 is simple. Where, however, liability is asserted because of a
failure to diScover and disclose what should have been known or because of a de-
viation from generally accepted accounting principles, difficulty may be encoun-
tered in distinguishing conduct which is actionable from that which is simply neg-
ligent.
Although it is well established neither accountants nor lawyers may close
their eyes to that which is plainly visible, the extent of their duty to inquire and
disclose is not so clear.
51 ST. JotiNs L. REV, at 245. See, e.g., Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwarth & Horwarth,
540 F.2d 27, 37 (2d Cir. 1976); Gross v. Diversified Mortgage Investors, [1977-78 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,136, at 92,108-09 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Oleck v. Fischer,
[1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED, SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,179, at 92,328.29 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
McLean v. Alexandra, 420 F. Supp. 1057, 1080-82 (D. Del 1976), indicating that the courts
are retaining flexibility in approaching the scienter question in cases involving professionals.
This is probably appropriate and important, notwithstanding the legitimate concerns raised by
Judge Van Graafeiland. The courts must strive to maintain a proper balance between the
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that both the courts and the SEC had lost sight of the practicalities and
realities of the securities industry. 214 But cases such as Hochfelder, Chris-Craft
Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft COrP.,2 15
 TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway,
Inc., 21 t' and Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores 2 " seem to have done
more than redress past excesses; they have severely narrowed the scope of'
rule 101)-5 and, according to advocates of an expansive reacting of 10b-5,
unnecessarily and perhaps unwittingly removed too much of its strength."'
need to insure that professionals approach their duties diligently and the also important need
to preserve their ability to function economically and realistically in the securities market. A
case-by-case analysis appears necessary to achi&e this balancing.
The court in one recent securities case summarized the duties of accountants with re-
spect to "after acquired" information as inflows:
[A]n accountant is under an additional obligation to conduct a reasonable in-
quiry, but not. an audit, to discover whether events subsequent to the audit
period up to the effective date of the registration require disclosure in order to
maintain the integrity of the portrayal. [citations omitted]. Where financial state-
ments have been certified and released to the public, courts have imposed a con-
tinuous duty to disclose after-acquired information which casts doubt on the re-
liability of the certified figures with respect to the period covered by the audit. [citations
omitted].
... The mere possession of adverse financial information regarding a pub-
lic company cities not require an independent auditor to disclose it. [citations
omitted]. This remains true even if the auditor previously has certified figures
for a prior period, so long as the certified statement is still accurate as of the date
of' its issuance. [citation omitted].
Ingenito v. Bernier: Corp., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fen. SEC. L. REY. (CCH) I 96,214, at
92,487 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (emphasis in original).
2"
 See Coles, Has Securities Regulation in the Private Capital Markets Become a Deterrent to
Capital GroatPth?: A Critical Review, 58 MARQ. L. Rev'. 395 (1975); Lipton & Mazur. The Chinese
Wall Solution to Conflict Problems of Securities Firms, 50 N.Y.U.L. Res'. 459 (1975); Ruder, Current
Problems in Corporate Disclosure, 30 Bus. LAW. 1081 (1975); See also Lanza v, Drexel & Co., 479
F.2d 1277, 1306-08 (2d Cir. 1973) (en haute).
sea
	 F.2d 341 (2d Cir,), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
2 " 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
2'r
	 U.S. 723 (1975).
2 " See Sante Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
430 U.S. 1 (1977); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drugstores, 421 U.S. 723
(1975). As one commentator recently wrote:
In the last four years the United States Supreme Court has fundamentally
altered the scope of the coverage and protection that the federal securities laws
offer to the investing public. The depth and sweep of this change have been par-
ticularly extraordinary when one considers the short period of' time involved. Be-
fore recent Supreme Court decisions, plaintiffs' lawyers and the Securities and
Exchange Commission had been relatively free to devise original and imaginative
causes of action based upon the federal securities laws. Following these decisions,
however, the entire momentum has shifted. In these recent holdings, the Su-
preme Court has consistently decided in favor of the defendants and has enun-
ciated principles that may circumscribe the rights of plaintiff's under the federal
securities laws for many years to come.
Lowenfels, Recent Supreme Court Decisions Under the Federal Securities Laws: 7'he Pendulum Swings,
65 Geo. L.J. 891, 891.92 (1977) (footnotes omitted). See also Castruccio, Developments in Federal
Securities Regulation, 32 Bus. LAW. 1537 (1977):
The courts have also taken note of this trend. See, e.g., Crane Co. v. American Stan-
dard, Inc., 439 F. Stipp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1977):
Chris-Craft does not stand alone. It is not sui generis, distinguishable from
all other cases because of unusual facts or esoteric points of law. Instead, it is one
of several recent Supreme COurt decisions which indicate that the Court is taking
a hard, new look at federal jurisdiction under the securities laws.
663
BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
Advocates of this view argue that the courts must resuscitate some of the
more protective provisions of the securities laws and reinstate less stringent
standards of proof favoring plaintiff's in order to revive the important role
that the securities laws play in protecting the public from shady and sloppy
securities dealing. 2 "
Prior to the Hochfelder case and the recent Supreme Court trend nar-
rowing rule 10b-5, the lower courts were moving decidedly toward requir-
ing a showing of due diligence, even in those circuits which had already re-
quired proof of scienter in rule 10b-5 actions. 2 " Since the Hochfelder deci-
sion, however, three appellate court decisions which have directly con-
fronted the continuing viability of the due diligence defense question,
Straub v. Vaisman & Co., 22 ' Holdsworth v. Strong, 222 and Dupuy v. Dupuy, 223
have all recognized that the changes effected by Hochfelder warrant a lessen-
ing of the burden previously placed on the plaintiff to show his own clue
diligence. The courts in these cases concluded, by analogy to tort law, that
the only contributory fault which nOw may defeat a rule 10b-5 claim is
recklessness or "gross fault somewhat comparable •to that of the defen-
dant."224
Id. at 953-54. For examples of how the courts are struggling with the broader meaning of the
recent Supreme Court holdings, compare, e.g., Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, (2d Cir.
1977) with St. Louis Union Trust Co. v, Merrill Lynch, 562 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1977).
Recent handling of issues such as "recklessness," see note 209 supra and cases therein,
and "due diligence," see notes 205 supra & 224 infra, by the courts of appeals and district
courts suggest that those courts are seeking to mollify some of the more extreme interpreta-
tions of the Supreme Court decisons. See also Graham v, Exxon Corp., [1977-78 Transfer
Binder] Fin. SEC, L. REP. (CCH) 9 96,279 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), and Clayton v. Skelly Oil, [1977-78
Transfer Binder] Fen. SEC. L. Rir. (CCH) 1 96.269 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) as further examples of
this possible liberalizing effect by the lower courts.
2 " See, e.g., Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 34 I, 369 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973); Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp.
544, 580-81 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp.. 283 F. Supp. 643, 696-97
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
As Judge Weinstein stated in Felt, "Dealer-managers
	 are expected to exercise a high de-
gree of care in investigation and verification of the company's representations. Tacit reliance
on management assertions is unacceptable; the underwriters must play devil's advocate." 332
F. Supp. at 582.
22 " See cases cited in note 207 supra. See also Spielman v. General Host Corp., 538 F.2d
39, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1976); Architectural League v. Banos, 404 F. Supp. 304, 313 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). But cf, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. v. Ross, 509 F.2d 930' (2d Cir. 1975) (holding
the defendants' fitilure to disclose actionable despite the plaintiffs ability to obtain the same
information from analysis of other materials); Stier v. Smith, 473 . F.2d 1205, 1208 (5th Cir.
1973) (holding that the defendant has a duty to disclose, even though the plaintiff felt it had
enough information). See also Comment, Two Different Standards of Reliance Applied in Individual
Private Actions Under SEC Rule 106-5 by the Second Circuit, 49 TEmp. L. REV. 182 (1975).
"' 540 F.2d 591 (3d Cir. 1976).
222
 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976).
223
 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1977).
224
 Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir. 1976). Accord, Dupuy v. Dupuy,
551 F.2d 1005, 1020-24 (5th Cir. 1977); Straub v. Vaisman 8c Co., 540 F.2d 591, 596-98 (3d
Cir, 1976). These cases draw a sharp and direct analogy to tort law in determining when and
to what degree due diligence should be required of the plaintiff. In brief, they conclude that,
just as negligence is not a defense to a common law fraud action, see, e.g., Wilcox v. American
Tel. & Tel. Co., 176 N.Y. 115, 117-18 (1903); Angerosa v. White Co., 248 App. Div. 425, 290
N.Y.S. 204, 211 (App. Div.), affd, 275 N.Y. 524 (1936); PROSSER ON TORTS § 10, at 715 (4th ed.
1971); REsTATEmENT OF TORTS § 540, it should not be 'a defense to rule 10b-5 after the
HoeVelder decision. They reason that that decision, by requiring scienter under rule 106-5, has
made rule 10b-5 more analogous to a common law fraud action than a negligence action. The
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This limitation of the prior due diligence defense will undoubtedly re-
sult in a reduction of the use of post-transaction evidence against plaintiffs
in securities actions. Under the pre-Hochfelder definition of this clue dili-
gence duty, the defendant could show that plaintiff "should have learned"
the truth by reference to post-event analyses and developments which
might indicate what discoveries and inferences were possible at the time of
sale by exercising due diligence. 225 Now, however, to avoid liability on the
basis of the plaintiff's conduct, defendants must provide a much stronger
showing to prove that the plaintiff acted recklessly."" Little room, if any, is
left for the mere inferences from post-transaction evidence that the plain-
tiff failed to exercise clue diligence.
This new limitation on the plaintiff's duty of due diligence may not
hold true with respect to statute of limitations questions. Inquiry into when
the statute of limitations begins to run frequently involves a review of post-
transaction facts. 227 The statutory limitations period for several securities
claims—e.g., sections 1 I and 12—is provided in section 13 of the Securities
Act, which expressly requires that the plaintiff act with reasonable diligence
to discover the alleged fraud. 22" Other antifraud provisions—e.g., rule
10b-5, section I7(a) and section I 8—have no express statutory limitations
period; when faced with claims brought under those provisions, the courts
have adopted the pertinent state fraud or blue sky law limitation periods. 2 "
The state statutes of limitations applicable to those claims often contain a
due diligence requirement, which the courts then also apply to the federal
antifraud provisions. 23" A reasonable diligence requirement has also been
presumed with respect to the equitable tolling doctrine."' In those in-
stances, what the plaintiff might have learned after the transaction, and
when he might. have learned it, will directly affect the conunencement of
the statute's running. 2 " 2
 His failure to do so will prevent tolling of the stat-
Seventh Circuit recently also accepted that analysis, although it did not discuss the question at
length. See Sundstrand Corp, v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 1.2d 1033, 1040 (7th Cir. 1977). ihri
see Hirsch v. duPottt, 553 F.2d 750, 762-03 (2c1 Cir. 1977) and First Va. Bankshares v. Benson,
559 F.2d 1307, 1314 (5th Cir. 1977), where the courts simply applied the old rule without
analysis of the changes warranted by the Horlifelder decision.
See olm Note, Scope of Due Diligence Defense, 50 Tom. L.Q. 124 (1976); Wheeler, Plain-
tiffs Duty of Due Care Under Rule lOb-5: An Implied Defense to An Implied Remedy, 70 Nov. L. REV.
561. 564 -68 (1976); Note, The Due Diligence Requirement Jiff Plaintiffs Under Rule 10b-5, 1975
DUKE LI 753, 760-61 (1975).
See cases cited in tunes 207 & 220 supra.
22°
 See note 224 supra.
2" See cases cited in notes 230-31 & 238 infra re the statute of limitations itself. See
cases cited in notes 152-59 supra regarding the equitable tolling doctrine.
22"
	 U.S.C. § 77ri (1970). Sec note 159 supra. See alsa Natural Resources Corp. v.
Royal Resources Corp., 427 F. Supp. 88(1 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
229
 See note 159 supra.
2 " Ser, e.g., Stull v. Bayard, 561 F.2d 429, 432-33 (2d Cir. 1977); Allied v, Ramsey, 550
F.2d 774, 779-80 (2d Cir. 1977).
Sri', e.g.. City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 1 7.2d 448, 461 (2d Cir. 1974); In re
Clinton Oil Sec. Litigation, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] rEn. SEc. L. R•v. (CCH) A ¶16,015, at
91,572 (0. Kan. 1977). See also Arneil v. Ramsey, 550 F.2d 774, 781 (2d Cir. 1977); Hilton v.
Mumaw, 522 F.2d 588, 595 (9th Cir. 1975); Morgan v. Koch, 419 F.2d 993, 997 (7th Cir.
1969). Compare, however, Tomera v. Galt., 511 F.2d 504, 570 (7th Cir. 1975) with Friedlander
v. Feinberg, 369 F. Stipp. 917, 919 (S.O.N.Y. 1974), afrd, 508 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1975). See
also notes 158-60 supra and the possible caveat in note 256 infra.
"See, e.g., Gaudin v. K01 Corp., [Current] FED. SEc, L REP, {CCH) ¶ 96,453 (6th Cir.
1978); Berry Petroleum Co. v. Adams & Peck, 518 F.2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1975).
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ute of limitations. Thus, post-transaction evidence will continue to be perti-
nent in determining when the statute of limitations begins to run and
whether the equitable tolling doctrine is triggered.
For example, in Braunstein v. Laventhol & Honvath, 233 the plaintiff was
barred from suing in 1977 based upon a 1969 private placement where he
should have known of another lawsuit by another investor alleging the
same wrongs by the defendant several years before. Had the plaintiff inves-
tigated the facts underlying the lawsuit or merely followed its progress, he
would have learned of the fraud within the statutory limitations period. His
failure to do so barred his claim that the statute of limitations had been
tolled. 23 "
Also illustrative is Golddant v. Bear, Stearns & Co. 235 Two partners of a
partnership known as II Williams sued Bear, Stearns, a national brokerage
firm, in 1975 under the securities laws and common law based upon short
sales which Bear, Stearns had arranged for II Williams in 1967. The short
sales violated NASD rules, but Bear, Stearns had repeatedly assured the
plaintiffs that the short sale arrangement was legal. The NASD filed a dis-
ciplinary action against II Williams in 1971, resulting in an adverse deter-
mination against it in 1973. At the time of the NASD complaint, the plain-
tiff had again asked Bear, Stearns whether the short sales had been legal,
and Bear, Stearns assured it. that they had been. The district court held the
action barred by the Illinois three year statute of limitations. The court
specifically rejected the plaintiff's attempt to invoke the equitable tolling
doctrine, stating:
Due diligence relating to discovery of the fraudulent tnisrepre-
sentation required the plaintiffs to obtain independent advice on
the legality issue so that they could determine if they had been
defrauded. Plaintiffs claim that there was no event to trigger
such an inquiry. But lilt is well established that a plaintiff may
not merely rely on his own unawareness of the facts or law to toll
the statute." ... Plaintiffs were obligated to 'bestir themselves to
inquire' especially since this would have been relatively easy for
them ... If their only concern was preventing fraud we might
always allow such suits no matter when they are filed. But fair-
ness requires a cut-off point and an exception is made to the
cut-off point only when a plaintiff, due to defendant's fraudulent
concealment, could not have known that a wrong occurred.
Here, the plaintiffs could have known. Their failure to act upon
the facts known to them resulted in their suit being time
barred. 236
233
 433 F. Supp. 1077 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
231 1d. at 1079. The lawsuit about which the court felt the plaintiff should have known
was Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwarth & Horwarth, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976). The
court found distinguishable and inapplicable the contrary decision of United States v. One
1961 Red Chevrolet, 457 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1972). 433 F. Supp. at 1080-81,
2"
 522 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1975).
""Id. at 1269. It is not yet clear to what extent this requirement of due diligence will be
lessened by the lessening of the other due diligence requirements on plaintiffs which has re-
sulted in the past two years since the Hochfelder decision. See notes 221-24 supra and discussion
of the Dupuy, Habiswarth and Straub cases there. The same considerations weighed there (e.g.,
the analogy and reference to tort law) would appear appropriate in determining when due dil-
igence should be required for the statute of limitations also.
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The Goldstant result may have been correct on the facts, but the
court's broad language appears to have gone farther than necessary. The
equitable tolling doctrine is intended to provide a remedy fbr lulling by
wrongdoers. 2 v In Goldlant, Bear, Stearns did not have such a purpose in
mind; it was merely stating its continued belief in the legal opinion it had
previously rendered. But where the defendant has attempted to induce in-
vestor somnolence, regardless of whether his attempt takes the form of af-
firmative concealment of his prior undisclosed wrongs, the tolling doctrine
would also appear to have proper application. 238
I. Estoppel and Waiver
A number of cases have recognized waiver and estoppel defenses to
securities actions, based upon the plaintiff's conduct following the transac-
tion at issue.239 The thrust of these defenses is either that the plaintiff, by
his actions following the transaction, has abandoned or so prejudiced his
rights that he is deemed to have waived them, or that he has committed in-
equitable acts that make it unjust to allow him to recover for his injury.
Post-transaction evidence will necessarily form the basis for such defenses.
xsT See notes 153-58 supra fur a discussion of the policy underlying the doctrine. The
cases there emphasize when the deception "should have been discovered," not the nature of
the defendant's conduct. This does not mean that the doctrine does not require a showing
that the defendant acted to prevent or discourage discovery of the deceit, but rather that such
conduct by the defendant may take on other forms than outright concealment. See also notes
230.33 supra & 238 infra.
23" In one recent decision, Natural Resources Corp. v. Royal Resources Corp., 427 F.
Stipp. 880 (S.D.N.Y. I977), the court. suggested several factors for determining whether the
plaintiff has acted diligently enough to meet his burdens under the statute of limitations:
It is impossible to lay down any general rule as to the amount of evidence
or number or nature of evidential facts admitting discovery of fraud, But, facts
in the sense of indisputable proof or any proof at all, are different from facts
calculated to excite inquiry which impose a duty of reasonable diligence and
which, if pursued, would disclose the fraud. Facts in the latter sense merely con-
stitute objects of direct experience and, as such, may comprise rumors or vague
charges if of sufficient substance to arouse suspicion. Thus, the duty of reason-
able diligence is an obligation ill -posed by law solelr under the peculiar circum-
stances of each case, including existence of a fiduciary relationship, concealment
of the fraud, opportunity to detect it, position in the industry, sophistication and
expertise in the financial community, and knowledge of related proceedings.
Id. at 888, quoting deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223, 1226 (10th Cir. 1970). In-
terestingly, the same district court judge also decided Friedlander v. Feinberg, 369 F. Supp,
917, 919 (S.D.N.Y, 1974), alfd , 508 F.2d 836 (2d Cir. 1975), where fact questions were held
to bar a limitations defense based on the duty to discover the fraud.
' 39 See, e.g., Moody v. Bathe & Co., (Current) FED. SEC. L. Rn'. (CCH) 9 96,368 (5th
Cir. 1978); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. Pat Ryan & Assoc., Inc., 496 F.2d 1255, 1267 n.9 (4th
Cir. 1974); Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 1970); Black v.
Riker-Maxson Corp., [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. Sic. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,270 (S.D.N.Y.
1975); Greenfield v. D.H. Blair & Co., [1975.76 Transfer Binder) EH), SEC. L Rn'. (CCH) 1
95,239, at 98,255 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Ferguson v. F.I. du Pont & Co., 369 F. Supp. 1099 (N.D.
Tex. 1974). But cf Woolf v. S.D. Cohn & Co., 515 F.2d 591, 602-05 (5th Cir. 1975) (in pari
d.e/icto defense may not be allowed, depending on the degree of plaintiffs' complicity and the
impact of defendants' actions on the public).
To a limited extent, similar defenses are also available in common law fraud actions.
See, e.g., Rothschild v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 204 N.Y. 458, 464 (1912); Glassman v.
Tompkins, 84 Misc,2d 174, 179 (Sup. Ct. 1975); Simmons v. Westwood Apartments Co„ 46
Misc,al 1093, 1096-97 (Sup. Ct., 1965), alp, 26 App. Div. 2d 764, appeal denied, 18 N.Y.2d
786 (1966).
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Post-transaction evidence may also bear upon the nature of the rem-
edy to which the plaintiff is entitled. For example, only a plaintiff who acts
promptly and with reasonable diligence in reacting to or discovering the.al-
leged fraud is permitted to seek rescission under rule 10b-5. 24 " If he fails
t.o act promptly, he must settle for seeking damages.
Investors Thrift Corp. v. Sexton 241 provides a good illustration of how
post-transaction evidence may be introduced to establish a waiver or estop-
pel defense. Investors Thrift Corp. (ITC) had purchased all of the stock of
two companies from the defendants. The two companies thereafter went
bankrupt, and ITC sued the sellers under the securities laws, alleging that
they had misled ITC as t.o the value of the companies. The sellers de-
fended the action by introducing evidence of ITC's mismanagement of the
companies during the two years following the sale, claiming that the mis-
management was the true cause of the companies' failure and ITC's losses.
Accordingly, the defendants argued, ITC should be estopped from re-
covering under the securities laws. ITC objected, contending that the issue
before the court was what the companies' stock was worth at the time of
ITC's purchases. ITC maintained that the post-transaction evidence was ir-
relevant, since evidence respecting the subsequent operation of the com-
panies could not determine the stock's value at the time of sale. The district
court overruled this objection and admitted the evidence. The defendants
thereafter won a jury verdict. On appeal, ITC successfully raised its objec-
tion to the evidence and won a new trial. However, although it found for
ITC on that issue, the court Of appeals did not flatly reject the defense's
theory For the admission of the post-transaction evidence. Rather, the court
of appeals merely held that, in raising such a defense, "the party offering
evidence of subsequent mismanagement [is] required to demonstrate a link
between the subsequent mismanagement and value of the stock at the time
of sale."242 The court of appeals concluded that, on the record before it,
the defense had failed to show that requisite link. 243 Hence, despite the re-
sult in'the case, Sexton demonstrates that the estoppel defense is available to
defendants where the proper causal link can be shown.
"" See, e.g., Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2(1 571, 574-75 (4th Cir. 1969); In re National Stu-
dent Marketing Litigation, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FEU SEC, L. REP. (CCH) 1 96.290, at
92,847 (D.D.C. 1978); Chelsea Assoc. v. Rapanos, 376 F. Supp. 929, 942-43 (E.D. Mich. 1974),
affd, 527 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1975); Marshall Assoc., Inc. v. Lite-Tronics, Inc., 372 F. Supp.
905, 908 (W.D. Pa. 1974). See also McLean v. Clapp, 141 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1891); Rochez
Bros., Inc, v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 415 (3d Cir. 1974); ,fohns Hopkins University v. Hutton,
488 F.2d 912, 917 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916 (1974); Friedman, Delay aS a Bar to
Rescission, 26 CoRmetr. L. Q. 426 (1941).
2"
 491 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1974). The litigation was only one of a series of related cases
arising from the same transaction. See Vanderboom v. Sexton, 460 F.2d 362 (8th Cir. 1972);
Investors Thrift Corp. v. Sexton, 347 F. Supp. 1207 (W.D. Ark. 1972); In re Peoples Loan &
Inv. Co., 316 F. Supp. 13 (W.D. Ark. 1970); Vanderboom v. Sexton, 294 F. Supp. 1 178 (W.D.
Ark. 1969), rev'd, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert, denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970); lo re Peoples
Loan & Inv. Co., 292 F. Supp. 594 (W.D. Ark. 1968), rev'd, 410 F.2c1 851 (8th Cir. 1969); City
Nat'l Bank of Fort Smith v. Vanderboom, 290 F. Supp. 592 (WM. Ark. 1968), affd, 422 F.2d
221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); Nliskimins v. City Nat'l Bank of Fort Smith,
248 Ark. 1194, 456 S.W.2d 673 (1970).
2 " 491 F.2d at 772.
zaa Id. "As graphically demonstrated by defense counsels' trial statements explaining
why this evidence was offered, no such link between subsequent mismanagement and value at
the time of sale was established," Id.
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Other forms of estoppel, waiver, and ladies may arise in securities
fraud actions. 244 Some may bar recovery completely. Others, as previously
noted, may affect only the nature or scope of the remedy—as for example,
the availability of rescission or damages—which the plaintiff may obtain. 245
In either event, post-purchase- evidence necessarily will play a cardinal role
in evaluating such defenses; and objections that the evidence is irrelevant
because it is post-transactional are misplaced.
J. Damages
Post-transaction evidence is often offered by both plaintiffs and de-
fendants in securities litigation on the issue of damages. Plaintiffs may try
to show what other reasonable investors did after the disclosure of the al-
legedly material information to prove that they would not have purchased
or held onto the securities at issue if they had known the facts, and that
this bears on the selection of the date as of which the amount of their
damages should be determined."" Defendants refer to post-transaction
evidence to argue that the plaintiff actually suffered no loss or datnage. 247
Defendant sellers thus sometimes attempt to introduce evidence of
subsequent market conditions to argue that the plaintiff's investment
actually increased or maintained its value, so "that he suffered no damage
on his investment. Such defense efforts to rely upon subsequent market
prices have met with little success. 248 The courts have recognized that the
	2a'
	 e.g., Nute, Equitable Defenses qf 	 Pail Delicto and Unclean Hands, Denied to TippiT
as Against Tippee, 40 Fokint A rd L. Ray. 725 (1972). See, also, Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein,
Horwarth Hot-mirth, 590 F.2c1 27, 35-36 (2c1 Cir. 1976); Knelmert v. Texstar Corp., 412
F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1969). See Lawler v. Gilliam, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED, Sac. L. Rat , .
(CCH) 1 96,277, at 92,794-95 (4th Cir. 1978) with respect to the relative degree of "fault"
necessary to sustain an in pari della° defense.
2 ' See note 241 supra.
2.1 " See, e.g., Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2c1 1005 (5th Cii•, 1977): "To determine the true
value of the stock, subsequent developments may be considered. -The jury may consider
whether the plaintiff would have held onto the stock absent the misinformation." id. at 1025.
See also Stull v. Bayard, 561 F.2d 429, 433 (2c1 Cir. 1977). But cf., Fox v. Kane-Miller Corp.,
398 F. Stipp. 609, 646 n.31! (D, Md. 1975), affd, 542 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1976) (damages fixed
as of date of contract, rather than closing).
212 See Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220, 224-26 (8th Cir. 1975). cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1054 (1976); Alloys Unlimited, Inc. v. Raesler, [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac.
L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,639,.at 90,171 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1976), affd, 55 A.D.2d 893, 39l N.Y.S.2c1
371 (1977). But see Investors Thrift Corp. v. Sexton, 491 F.2c1 768, 770 (8th Cir. 1974) (post-
transaction evidence admissible only to show price at time of sale).
The courts have held that a plaintiff cannot recover for lost profits, but rather only for
his losses in a securities transaction. See, e.g., Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 439 F.2d 328, 334-35 (2d
Cir. 1971); Estate Counselling Serv. v. Merrill Lynch, 303 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1962); see
also Byrnes v. Faulkner, Dawkins & Sullivan, 550 F.2d 1303, 1313-14 (2d Cir. 1977); Wolf' v,
Frank, 477 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 975 (1973); Lewis v. Bogin, 337 F. Supp.
331, 337.38 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). This rule is generally the same in common law fraud .cases. See,
e.g., Berkowitz v. Baron, 428 F. Supp. 1100, 1197 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Reno v. Bull, 226 N.Y.
546, 553 (1919); Ungewitter v, -Poch, 31 App. Div. 2d 583, 584 (1968).
2" The court in Harris v. American Inv. Co., 523 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1054 (1976), rejected that argument, stating; "The validity of the district court's hold-
ing rests upon its legal determination that the defendants may be absolved from liability by
showing that the plaintiff could have recouped his loss by selling his stock subsequent to his
discovery of their alleged frauds .... We disagree with this determination." Id. at 224. The
court specifically rejected the argument that the market price of publicly traded stocks neces-
sarily fixes their "value" on a given date. QUoting from the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 549,
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wrong in a securities action may be the inducement to purchase itself; 249 in
such a case, subsequent market fluctuations are irrelevant. Even where the
open market price is deemed to be a proper consideration for determining
damages, the courts have rejected a simplistic comparison of price fluctua-
tions shortly after the transaction, since other factors may account for the
price changes or the public may itself have been misled or may not have
reacted promptly when the facts constituting the fraud were revealed. 2" In
other cases, unique factual considerations—for example, that the plaintiff
purchased unregistered or restricted letter stock and hence was not at lib-
erty to sell upon the later public disclosure of the fraud—may render ref-
erence to the open market price inappropriate and hence unavailable to
the defense. 2 " These factors undercut significantly the probative value of
post-transaction market price evidence. The fact that there were a variety
Comment C, the court of appeals stated: "'In many cases [market] price is due to the wide-
spread belief of other buyers in misrepresentations similar to that made to the person seeking
recovery .... The fact that the market price is inflated or depressed by such misrepre-
sentations is the important factor which makes the price fictitious.' " Id. at 226. See also Schlick
v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 381-84 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976
(1975); Hotaling v. Leach & Co., 247 N.Y. 84, 90-91 (1928); Reder, Measuring Buyers' Damages
in 10b-5 Cases, 31 Bus, LAW. 1839, 1843-45 (1976). But see Tucker v. Arthur Anderson & Co.,
67 F.R.D. 468, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), where the court stated: "'actual value' may be calculated
by looking to the market price when the misrepresentation or omission is 'cured.'" See also
Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,683, at 90,372 (E.D. Tenn. 1976); People ex rel. Knickerbocker Fire Ins. Co. v. Coleman,
107 N.Y. 541, 544 (1887); Jones v. Healey. 184 Misc. 923, 926 (Sup. Ct. 1945), affd, 270 App.
Div. 895 (1946); 3A BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD I 9.1, at 228 (1974):
Moreover, in market depression cases, the plaintiff may look to the subsequent values to
prove his damages. See Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937,
946 (2d Cir. 1969). But cf., Levy v. Vista Indus. Corp., [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) I 96,012, at 91,550 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (plaintiff could not recover for losses due to
depressed market).
In one recent case, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ordered the district
court to reduce the damages award to the plaintiff "by the average percentage decline in value
of the Dow Jones Industries, the Standard & Poor's Index or any other well recognized index
of value, or combination of indices, or the national securities markets" during the period of
the defendants' alleged improper trading of the plaintiff's portfolio. Rolf v. Blyth Eastman
Dillon & Co., 11977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RE/'. (CCH) 1 96,275 (2d Cir. 1978).
249 See, e.g., Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicholaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1977); Dupuy v.
Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1024-25 (5th Cir. 1977); Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d
1167, 1173 (2d Cir. 1970); Baumel v. Rosen, 412 F.2d 571, 575 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied.
396 U.S. 1037 (1970). See also Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 951 (1968).
There are differing rules of damage for some of the different securities sections. Com-
pare, § 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77K (1970), with Rule 106-5. See, e.g.,
Beecher v. Able, [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,016, at 97,561-62
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litigation, [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 94,844, at 96,846 (S.D. Cal. 1974), See also Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552
F.2d 1239 (7th Cir. 1977) (regarding damages in proxy rule cases).
2"
 See discussion in note 248 supra. Where there is a long time delay between the
transaction and the post-transaction evidence, questions of causation may be raised. See dis-
cussion in Reder, Measuring Buyers' Damages in 10b-5 Cases, 31 Bus. LAW. 1839, 1846-48 (1976),
and Federman v. Empire Fire and Marine Ins. Co. [1975-76 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH 1 95,418 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). But the evidence may still serve the "other purposes"
discussed above. -
" 'See, e.g., Alloys Unlimited, Inc. v. Raesler, [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 95,639, at 90,171 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1976), affd, 55 App. Div. 2d 893, 391
N.Y.S.2d 371 (1977).
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of alternative investments available to the plaintiff, if he had not been in-
duced by the defendant: to purchase the security at issue, may also render a
simple comparison of prices before and after the sale an improper indica-
tion of the plaintiff's damages.
Nevertheless, there are situations where such evidence may be useful
on the issue of damages, particularly to prove damages rather than to dis-
prove damages. The difference between a plaintiff's purchase price and the
sale price after a downward turn in the value of the securities at issue fol-
lowing disclosure of the facts constituting the fraud may adequately reflect
the plaintiffs loss. Post-transaction evidence of price fluctuations therefore
may be of probative value, and hence admissible, but generally the weight
to be given to such evidence should be closely circumscribed and deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis.
K. Other Objections to Post-Transaction Evidence
While, as shown above, post-transaction evidence may be relevant to
such diverse purposes as intent, materiality, waiver and damages, there are
a number of objections aside from sheer irrelevance which are often raised
against the admission of post-transaction evidence. These include objections
that the evidence is unduly prejudicial to the objecting party, that it is too
remote to be probative, or that its admission would violate the rule pro-
hibiting use of subsequent remedial measure evidence. Each of these poten-
tial objections is discussed below.
1. Prejudice
Post-transaction evidence has been barred altogether in other ac-
tions, 252
 although not many reported decisions deal with the specific issue
of admissibility per se. The United States Supreme Court has specifically
recognized in at least one nonsecurities action the "established judicial rule
of evidence that testimony of' prior or subsequent transactions, which for
some reason are barred from forming the basis for a suit, may nevertheless
be introduced if it tends reasonably to show the purpose and character of'
the particular transaction under scrutiny." 253 Yet, the lower courts do not
always agree on what "reasonably" tends to show such matters, particularly
in jury actions. Thus, the lower courts often appear to strain, not necessar-
ily unfairly or unwisely, to be sensitive to the possible prejudice which the
evidence may cause and to other factors such as concern over unduly pro-
longing the trial, or the possibility of confusing or merely boring the jury.
. Even though evidence may be relevant, its probative value may
nonetheless be outweighed by its inflammatory or prejudicial nature. For
example, while the subsequent bankruptcy of a corporation whose stock has
been sold publicly may be relevant to a claim that the seller could have
known of the weak financial condition of the issuer, it may also unfairly in-
"2 See, e.g., SEC v. Geon Industries, Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 52-53 (2c1 Cir. 1976). See also
note 194 supra.
283 F.T.C. v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683. 705 (1948). See also 2 WioNtuRE. supra note
38, el:, e.g., United States v. 1,129.75 Acres of Land, Etc., 473 F.2d 996, 999 (8th Cir. 1973)
("under appropriate circumstances evidence of subsequent comparable sales is admissable as
an aid to determining the market value").
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'Thence a jury to sympathize with plaintiff-purchasers who have lost their
entire investment due to the subsequent bankruptcy. Furthermore, such
evidence may cause the jurors to be skeptical of the defendant's denial that
he knew of the issuer's weak financial condition. Due to this potential for
prejudice, the courts should carefully control the circumstances in which
such evidence is admitted through such means as limiting instructions. A
court may even determine that it is necessary to exclude the evidence, es-
pecially when it has only tangential or minimal relevance and is sensational
in nature or otherwise has great potential for causing prejudice.
Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides authority for such
an exclusion of relevant evidence. 254 Rule 403 expressly addresses the prob-
lem of prejudice, and permits a court to exclude admittedly relevant evi-
dence "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. "255 It is submit-
ted, however, that this power should be exercised sparingly in cases involv-
ing reasonably related post-transaction evidence. In a situation like the sub-
sequent bankruptcy referred to above, the jury should normally be permit-
ted to evaluate the evidence and make its own determination of what. it
shows. And, in nonjury cases, presumably the court will not be unduly in-
fluenced and will be able to weigh properly the evidence. Subsequent deal-
ings between an issuer and an underwriter may also show more clearly the
nature of the parties' relationship and, thus, the underwriter's access to in-
formation claimed to be beyond its purview or knowledge. 256 Subsequent
research and credit information, similarly, may demonstrate what the true
state of facts was at an earlier date, raising questions about the defendant's
version of the facts and his credibility."' The court should be careful in
dealing with such uses of post-purchase evidence to prevent a wholesale di-
version of the issues from the time frame to be litigated. However, it
should be apparent that there can be a multitude of instances where its re-
ception and relevance are appropriate for such inferential reasoning pur-
poses.
Particularly where the post-transaction events being offered have oc-
curred in close proximity to the stock sale itself, it appears reasonable to
require the defendant to bear the burden of showing that he will face
actual prejudice, as opposed to merely having to respond to damaging evi-
2" See note 82 supra. Judge kVeinstein has summarized the purpose of the rule as fol-
low s :
Rule 403 recognizes that "relevancy is not always enough. There may re-
main the question, is its value worth what it costs?" Will the search for truth be
helped or hindered by the interjection of distracting, confusing or emotionally
charged evidence? In making this determination, the court must assess the proba-
tive value of the proffered item as well as the harmful consequences specified in
Rule 403 that might flow from its admission.
1 WEI NSTEIN, supra note 38, II 403 [01], at 7-8 (1977). See also Schmertz, Relevance and its Policy
Counterweights: A Brief Excursion Through Article IV of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 33
FED. BAIT j. 1 (1974): Note, Relevancy and Its Limits in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 16
WAYNE L. REV. 167 (1969).
255 FED. R. Evil), 403.
"'See, e.g., Cornaglia v. Ricciardi, 63 F.R.D. 416, 42 . 1-22 (E.D. Pa. 1974). See also notes
47 & 99 supra.
2 "See note 108 supra. See also Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 433 (1909); FED. R. Evil),
607 and 608(h).
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deuce. The latter is not legal "prejudice." 2 ' 8 Moreover, rule 403 requires a
showing that the evidence's probative value be substantially out-weighed by
the claimed prejudice. 2" 8 Merely showing prejudice is not enough in itself
to cause exclusion of the evidence.
2. Remoteness
Another possible objection to post-transaction evidence stems From its
remoteness relative to the transaction, either in terms of its nature or the
time of the evidence or both. The more remote the evidence, the less pro-
bative it will be and the less likely to be admitted at the trial. The court
should be able to evaluate the question of remoteness in the same manner
that it determines any other aspect of relevance, by looking to see this is
reasonably probative to the issue presented. But, in practice, that determi-
nation is not so easy.
Harnett v. Ryan. Homes, Inc. 26" illustrates the problems created when
the courts seek to weigh the time lapse between the securities transaction
and post-transaction evidence. Ryan was a close corporation owned by its
principal officers and employees. Harnett, a Former Ryan Vice-President,
claimed that he had been defrauded into privately selling his stock at a
time when Edward Ryan, the principal officer and stockholder, was intend-
ing to permit other key employees to participate in a public offering of
Ryan's stock. Harnett's principal piece of evidence was a memorandum
written two weeks after the parties agreed upon the stock sale; in it, Ed-
ward Ryan had discussed the poSsibility of including certain Ryan
employees in the public offering. 261 Mr. Ryan himself' offered other post-
2" Syr, e.g., United States v. Ravich, 421 F.2d 1196, 1205 (2d Cir. 1970); international
Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 315 F.2d 449, 459 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 820 (1963).
In addition to "prejudice" per. se, the rule also permits the court to weigh such minters
as delay, cumulativeness of the evidence and possible confusion resulting therelimn. See, e.g.,
Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d 438, 442 (Gth Cir. 1975); ‘Vatkins v. United States, 287 1 7.2d 932,
934 (1st Cir. 1961); Vockie v. General Mofors Corp., Chevrolet Div., 66 F.R.D. 57, 60 (E.D.
Pa.), alp, 523 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1975).
25" The prejudice must be "unfair" according to the wording of the rule. At the con-
gressional hearings ori Rule 403, the use of that adjective was astutely criticized by one promi-
nent public interest lawyer since it "implied that some kinds of prejudice ate fair." Hearings be-
pre the Special Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Reps., on
Proposed Rules of Evidence, Serial No. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 197 (1973), quoted in 2 WkIINSTEIN,
supra note 38, 4 403, at 403-2 (1977). According Li) the Advisory Committee, prejudice is un-
fair when it has "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, cominonly,
though not necessarily, an emotional one." Id.
The court must weigh the various.consiclerations and determine whether the "probative
value" is outweighed by the "potential prejudice." United States v. Wright, 489 F.2d 1181,
1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Fox v. Kane-Miller Corp., 398 F. Stipp. 609, 631-33 (1). Md. 1975),
yid, 542 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1976). Thus, a matter which constitutes prejudice in one case may
not constitute prejudice in another case. Compare, Travis v. United States, 269 F.2d 928, 939
(10th Cir. 1959), rev'd on other grounds, 364 U.S. 631 (1961) (evidence of Communist Patty
membership permitted) with United States v. TurolT, 291 F.2d 864, 868 (2d Cir. 1961) (cvi•
deuce of Communist Party membership excluded). In addition, the pcitential prejudice may
sometimes be vitiated by cautionary or careful limiting instructions to the jury. See, e.g., United
States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 596 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952). See generally
W1,11N5TE N, supra note 38, 11 4031031 (1977). See also note 179.cupra,
25 " 496 F.2d 832 (3d Cir. 1974).
"I Id. at. 837.
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transaction evidence, including Ryan directors' minutes from 1966 to rebut
Harnett's claims, which suggested that Mr. Ryan's thinking on the matter
had not been "concrete" and that, in any event, the underwriters would
have opposed such employee participation. 262 The jury returned a verdict
for Ryan. On motions for judgment NOV and a new trial, the district court
held that the alleged undisclosed facts were "nothing more than Edward
Ryan's random thoughts reduced to paper," and hence could not form the
basis of a rule 10b-5 recovery. 2 " On appeal, the court of appeals further
brushed aside the evidence, stating:
[T]he document indicating that Edward Ryan contemplated
employee participation in the public offering, apart from possess-
ing on its face ambiguous import, is, quite significantly, dated
May 28, 1965, over two weeks after Edward Ryan and Harnett
initially reached agreement regarding the sale of the Ryan
Homes stock back to the corporation. Hence, even if it were to
be conceded that Edward Ryan's thoughts attained a greater de-
gree of substantiality by virtue of their reduction to writing, such
event did not occur until after Harnett and Edward Ryan had
agreed to the stock sale. Thus, it is difficult to see how this
memorandum, on which plaintiff relies so heavily could be con-
sidered material with respect to Harnett's earlier agreement to
sell back his stock. 264
It may be that the result in Harnett was justified on the particular facts
there; but the court appears to have worded its rejection of the post-
transaction memorandum too broadly and too harshly. The memorandum
in question was written barely two weeks after the sale, and might conceiv-
ably have contained important admissions against interest by Mr. Ryan. 265
2" See opinion of the district court, 360 F. Supp. 878, 888 n.17 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
263 id. at 889. The court of appeals therefore concluded that the evidence was "not ma-
terial:"
The district court's Finding that these undisclosed celebrations represented
no more than a set of the numerous thoughts that separately occupy, at their
early stages, slight portions of a business executive's time leads us to agree with
the district court's conclusion that they were not material. In the corporate world,
as elsewhere, the initial ruminations of executives must complete a circuitous
course before becoming, if ever, actuality. Further, if we were to require corpo-
rate officers to disclose inchoate ideas, musing as it were, on matters that relate
to the value of their companies' stock, few stock transactions in which they partic-
ipate would avoid the possible charge of.a Rule 10b-5 violation. If. on the other
hand, the district court had found that the undisclosed facts were something
more than Edward Ryan's thoughts and that they would likely have an identifi-
able impact on the fact of any proposal for employee participation in the public
offering, a conclusion that the undisclosed facts were material might well have
been warranted.
496 F.2d at 838.
21
 Id. at 837-38.
3 tl 5 Rule 801(d) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides:
Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if-
(1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement
is (A) inconsistent with his testimony, and was given under oath subject to the
penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or in a deposition, or
(B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied
charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, or
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It is recommended that the courts not construe Harnett to be a precedent
for broad application of a "two-week" or other time rule. No hard and fast
time limit rule appears either to exist or be advisable. In any event, it is
significant and should be kept in mind that the court in Harnett did not
criticize the admission into evidence of the memorandum; the court's em-
phasis was upon the weight to be given to it, not whether to admit it in the
first instance.
3. Subsequent. Remedial Measures
Another objection to post-transaction evidence sometimes asserted by
defendants is that the evidence deals with subsequent remedial action taken
to cure an allegedly improper condition. Such evidence may be excluded
under the authority of both rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidences [ "
and the case law upon which rule 407 is based.267 This subsequent reme-
dial measure objection is the same as that sometimes raised during dis-
covery. In the context of evidence at trial, however, the objection may have
greater force.
In securities litigation, the issue. of subsequent remedial measures may
arise in several situations. For example, when an investment goes sour, an
underwriter may undertake a study of what caused this failure, and then
change its procedures in an attempt to prevent its recurrence. Similarly,
where a claim against a broker-dealer alleges that he negligently failed to
investigate an issuer thoroughly, the broker-dealer may wish to restructure
its research department immediately, even if it feels the claim is un-
founded, rather than await the outcome of the action and face further suits
predicated on the same adversely litigated procedure. The subsequent re-
medial measure objection may also be raised when the SEC or another
regulatory body advises or requires the defendant to change his procedures
or auditing methods.
In circumstances such as these, defendants often contend that it is
more important to protect the public interest served by the subsequent
changes than it is to assist a private damage recovery. It is this rationale
which underlies the general prohibition contained in rule 407. Hence, de-
fendants maintain that the courts should encourage such remedial actions
by assuring the wrongdoer that evidence that it has mended its ways or
(2) Admission by prly-opponent. The statement is offered against a party and
is (A) his own statement, in either his individual or a representative capacity, or
(B) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in its truth, or
(C) a statement by a person authorized by him to make a statement concerning
the subject, or (I)) a statement by his agent or servant concerning a matter within
the scope of his agency or employment, made during the existence of the rela-
tionship. or (E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and
in Furtherance of the conspiracy.
"" The rule is quoted at note 37 supra.- As observed earlier, note 49 supra, the policy
underlying the doctrine may be inapposite in private civil securities litigation.
257 Sec cases cited in note 39 supra, Some commentators have called the subsequent re-
medial measures doctrine a "rule of privilege." For example, Professor McCormick has stated;
The dominant motive for exclusion, it seems clear, is the reason often relied
upon in the opinions; namely the policy against discouraging the taking of steps
to remove a danger. Manifestly, this is an external policy, not looking to the trial
and truth-Finding, but to the interest of public safety. if su, then according to the
analysis suggested herein, the rule is one of privilege.
McCotottcx„tupra note 83, §77 at 159 (1st ed. 1954).
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conducted a "safety study" is not admissible against it.. 2" - They also argue
that to admit remedy evidence might unfairly influence the jury into draw-
ing an inference of prior wrongdoing, when the change was actually made
for reasons other than a recognition or admission of' prior recklessness or
impropriety. 28 "
As a general evidentiary rule, the prohibition barring the introduction
of subsequent remedial measures is predicated on sound and reasonable
public policy concerns. However, the rule's logic fails when applied to the
garden variety securities case. The subsequent remedial measures doctrine
is a creature of negligence law. In contrast., most securities fraud claims are
necessarily based upon intentional wrongs, particularly fraudulent decep-
tion."" Accordingly, while there may be some basis for accepting the sub-
sequent remedial measure doctrine in securities cases which involve securi-
ties claims analogous to negligence, it appears anomalous to apply that
exclusionary rule in most situations where intentional fraud is involved."'
In cases alleging intentional fraud, it is not a dangerous negligently-created
condition which has caused the loss; rather the plaintiff's injury has been
brought about intentionally.
There are, however, situations where rule 407 is properly applied to
securities litigation. SEC v. Geon Industries, Inc."' provides an apt example.
"'See discussion and cases cited in notes 39 and 267 supra.
2"N
	 Columbia and Puget Sound R.R. Co. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202 (1892). the Su-
preme Court reasoned that allowance of subsequent repairs as evidence of prior negligence
"puts an unfair interpretation upon human conduct, and virtually holds out an inducement
for continued negligence." 144 U.S. at 208, quoting Morse V. Minneapolis & St. Louis ky..
Minn. 465, 468 (1883). Skepticism about drawing inferences from subsequent repairs can be
found in a number of Older cases. See, e.g., Ashland Supply Co. v. Webb, 206 Ky. 184, 185-86,
266 S.W. 1086, 1086 (1925). See atm Armour & Co. v. Skene, 153 F, 241, 244-45 (1st Cir.
1907); Engel v. United Traction -Co., 203 N.Y. 321, 323-24, 96 N.E. 731, 732 (1911) (cases in
which evidence of the discharge of an employee after the accident in question was ruled im-
properly admitted).
Evidence of subsequent repairs has been held admissible when it is offered for "other
purposes" besides the inference that the prior condition was negligent. See notes 278 and 281
infra. See also Norwood Clinic, Inc. v. Spann, 240 Ala. 427, 431, 199 So. 840, 843 (1941). Elul
see Smith v. Twin State Gas & Elec. Co., 83 N.H. 439, 450-51, 144 A. 57, 63 (1928) (holding
that such evidence cannot be used for other purposes unless reasons are "counterbalancing-).
"" See, e.g., Franklin Say. Bank of New York v. Levy, 551 F.2d 521, 528-29 (2d Cir.
1977); Gross v, Diversified Mortgage Investors, 431 F. Sup!). 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (dealing
with rule 10b-5 and § 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933). See, e.g., Abrahamson v. Fleschner,
537 F.2d 27 (2c1 Cir. 1975); Jones Memorial Trust v. TSAI 111V. Serv., Inc., 367 F. Supp. 491
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (dealing with § 206 of the Investment Advisors Act of 1940). See, e.g., Heit v.
Weitzen, 402 F.2t1 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969); Parotz v. Monarch
Gen., Inc., 11974-75 Transfer Binder] Fl SEC. L. Rrp. (CCH) S 94,933 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)
(dealing with § 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
Several types of securities claims do not require scienter. See, e.g., In re Clinton Oil Se-
curities Litigation, 11977-78 Transfer Binder] Fran. SEC. L. REP. (CCU') 1 96,015 at 91,574-75
(D. Kan. 1977). See also Comment, Shareholders and Informed Voting.' How Much information Do
They Need?, 28 MERCER L. REX', 725, 729 (1977) (re proxy rules and § l4(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934). See also, e.g., University Hill Foundation v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 422
F. Supp. 879, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1129
(4th Cir. 1970) (re § 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933). See also notes 148 & 209 supra.
271 This kind of distinction has also been recognized for other facets of securities litiga-
tion; e.g., for the degree of due diligence required of the plaintiff and the applicability of de-
fenses such as contibutory negligence and assumption of risk. See notes 205-07 supra.
272 531 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976).
Geon does not address itself to the type of distinction suggested at notes 270-71 supra
since it was an SEC enforcement proceeding, not a private civil action. Although the Supreme
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Geon involved inside information that was tipped by Geon's president. to a
stock salesman in a securities brokerage firm. The salesman had ap-
proached Geon's president, for the information on his own initiative. The
SEC brought an action against Geon, the stock brokerage firm, and certain
individual defendants. At, trial, the SEC sought to introduce evidence that,
as a result of the Geon tip and its aftermath, the stock brokerage had
promulgated a new regulation requiring its registered representatives to get.
branch manager approval before contacting any company whose stock they
or their customers 11(21(1. 273 The SEC maintained that this evidence permit-
ted an inference that. the brokerage's prior practice was inadequate. Relying
on rule 407, the district court rejected this argument and exonerated the
brokerage firm, although the court found that Geon and its president were
personally liable. On appeal, the court of appeals broadened the judgment
to cover all of the Geon defendants, but, affirmed the dismissal as against
the brokerage firm. The court of appeals agreed that the brokerage firm's
new regulation was a subsequent. remedial measure covered by rule 407
and held that the district court had correctly refused to draw negative in-
ferences against the brokerage based upon it.. 274 It would be hard to think
Court in Hoehfelder specifically lefi unresolved the question whether proof of scienter is re-
quired in SEC enforcement actions (as it is in private damage actions), 425 U.S. 185, 193-94
n.12 (1976), the cases since then appear to have made clear that it is not. See, e.g., SEC v. Co-
vell, [Current] FED. SEC. L. RER (CCH) 1 96,462 (2d Cir. 1978); SEC. v. L & S Petroleum,
Inc., [Current] FED. See. L. REP, (CCH) 411 96,467 (W.D. Okla. 1977); SEC v. Trans jersey Ban-
corp., [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) f 95,818, at 90,950 (D,N.j, 1976).
Cf: SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 505 F.2d 8, 14 (2d Cir. 1977) (which had left the matter
open, but itimlied scienter may be necessary). See also SEC v. Shiell, [1977-78 TranSfer Binder]
Flan, SEC L. REI'. (CCH) I 90,190, at 92,386 (N.D. Fla. 1977) (discussing split of authority);
SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., 546 F.2d 1044, 1047 (2d Cir. 1976) (holding that sci-
enter is not required for § 5 violations); SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535,
540-41 (1st Cir. 1976); SEC v. Geotek, [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CC•!) I
95,756, at 90,724 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Berner & Franklin, Scienler and Securities and Exchange
Cotamission Rule lOb-5 Injunctive Actions; A Reappraisal in Light of Huchfelder, 51 N.T.U. L. REV,
769 (1976); Van Graakiland, A Lawyer's Observations on Ilochfrlder, 51 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 239.
242 n.21. (1977).
Other distinctions between SEC enforcement actions and private civil actions under the
securities laws have also been recognized by the courts. As one court of appeals recently ob-
served:
ln an SEC enforcement proceeding, the due care of the victim generally does not,
receive consideration. SEC v. Doluick, 7 Cir. 1974, 501 F.2d 1279, 1283 (disre-
garding whether the victim was a knowledgeable investor); Hanly v. SEC, 2 Cir.
1967, 415 F.2d 589,.596 (disregarding the sophistication of the victims, as well as
their previous relationships with the defendants). But see SEC v. Coffey, 6 Cir.
1974, 493 F.2d 1304, 1312-IS, cert. denied, 1975. 420 U.S. 908, 95 S, Ct. 826, 42
I„ Ed. 2d 837 (on the peculiar facts of this case the defendant violated no duty
because the victims possessed sufficient knowledge about a representation to
avoid being misled by it). The dispositive element in these cases is that the de-
fendant owes a duly of fun and fair disclosure to the public, not to any particular
investor. Whether a private plaintiff might be precluded from recovery, then,
need not alter the distinct consideration whether a defendant has violated duties
imposed by the Act.
Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1015 (5th Cir. 1977). Ser also List v. Fashion Park, Inc„ 340
F.2d 457, 463 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom. List v. Lerner, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
"" 531 F.2d at 52,
"'' The court of appeals in Geon stated:•
the subsequent taking of measures which would have made a violation less likely
normally cannot be considered as proving that failure to take them earlier was
negligent, see Federal Rules of Evidence 407; Smyth v. The Upjohn Co., 529 F.2d
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of a more classic form of subsequent remedial measure in a securities ac-
tion and a more apt example of rule 407's application in a securities fraud
context. But it is significant that, once again, the court had admitted the
subsequent facts into evidence and had merely declined to give them
weight, thus again illustrating that post-transaction evidence often should
or must be allowed into evidence before its probative value can be evalu-
ated properly. Of course, where the action is being tried to a jury rather
than the court, a stronger argument for outright exclusion of the evidence
is presented.
A number of important limitations on the subsequent remedial mea-
sures doctrine should also be borne in mind. For example, rule 407, by its
own terms, does not proscribe all subsequent remedial evidence. Indeed, it
expressly provides that such evidence is admissible, even in negligence
cases, when offered to prove the feasibility of correcting an improper con-
dition if the _defendant disputes that he could have anticipated and cor-
rected the condition before the injury at issue."'
Boeing Airplane Company v. Brown 276 provides an interesting example
of the nuances of the feasibility exception. When a B-52 bomber crashed
over Tracy, California, the widow of one of the crew members sued Boeing
for damages, alleging that the crash was due to a faulty electrical part in a
wing which had exploded in flight. The trial judge, over Boeing's objection,
admitted evidence by Mrs. Brown that the part had been substantially
changed after the accident. 277 Boeing appealed from an adverse jury ver-
dict, insisting that the admission of that evidence was error since its counsel
had stipulated that it would have been and was feasible for Boeing to have
changed the. part before the accident. Mrs. Brown's counsel successfully ar-
gued at the trial that this stipulation did not go far enough, because Boeing
had not also stipulated regarding the nature of the changes which had later
been made. The court of appeals agreed that "an admission that un-
specified 'changes' would have been feasible and were actually made does
not render irrelevant evidence as to specific changes subsequent to the ac-
cident, when offered for the limited purpose of proving the feasibility of
such changes to correct the specific defects at issue." 2 " This may be going
803 (2 Cir. 1975), in part because "the supposed inference from the act is not the
plain and most probable one," 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 283 (3d ed. 1940). The
trial court, of course, declined to make the desired inference.
531 F.2d at 52. The court also stated that "kihe departure front the usual principle that evi-
dence should be achnitted if' a relevant inference is fairly possible is due to the strong policy
arguments against consideration of such evidence." Id. at 52 n.16.
225 See the second sentence of FED. R. EVID. 407, as quoted in note 37 supra. See also Davis
v. Fox River Tractor Co., 518 F.2d 481, 485-86 (10th Cir. 1975); Johnson v. United States,
270 F.2d 488, 491-92 (9th Cir. 1968); Slattery v. Marra Bros.. 186 F.2d 134, 137 (2d Cir.
1951). A corrolary of this exception is that such evidence is also admissible to show that the
defendant had control over the circumstances in question. See, e.g., Powers v. J.B. Michael &
Co.. 329 F.2d 674, 676 (6th Cir. 1964); Dubonowski v. Howard Say. Inst., 124 N.J. 368, 370-
71, 12 A.2d 384, 386 (1940); Mason v. City of N.Y., 29 App. Div. 2c1 922, 923, 288 N.Y.S.2d
990, 991 (1968); Priolo v. Lefferts General Hosp., 54 Misc. 2c1 654, 655 (Sup. Ct. 1967).
22R
 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961).
"2 Id. at 315.
228
 Id. But ef. Smyth v, Upjohn Co., 529 F.2d 803, 805 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding that, de-
spite limited exception, the general rule is still for exclusion); Daly v. McNeil Laboratories,
Inc., 509 F.2d 617, 618 (6th Cir. 1975) holding that post-event evidence was properly
excluded); Note, Exceptions to the Subsequent Remedial Conduct Rule, 18 HASTINGS L. J. 677
(1967) (discussing general rule that evidence of post -event remedial measures is inadmissible).
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too far. Stipulating to what could have been clone (i.e., was feasible) is one
thing. But one can fairly ask: if the defendant has to stipulate to the spe-
cific changes which it actually made in order to exclude the evidence'of what
it did, has the purpose of the rule and the objection itself been nullified?'"
Nevertheless, defendants had best take heed: the Advisory Committee's
note to the Federal Rules of Evidence cites Boeing as authority for rule
407.' 8"
There is, in addition, a broad array of settings in which rule 407 is
inapplicable. For example, some defendants object broadside to all studies
or internal memoranda generated after a bankruptcy or other financial
crisis suffered by an issuer, claiming that they were an integral part of a
single procedure leading to a subsequent remedial measure. In truth, such
studies frequently have other purposes—even if possible remedial action is
one of them—and may contain important admissions unrelated to any re-
medial measure which may later be taken. Where the latter is true, such
studies may not reasonably be termed part of a subsequent remedial mea-
sure and rule 407 should not apply."'
A further weakness of the subsequent remedial measure argument
stems from the frequent difficulty of determining what is a subsequent re-
medial measure in the securities context. For example, efforts by an
underwriter to help "salvage" an issuer which is suffering financial setbacks
or to administer a subsequent pay-out after the issuer had run into diffi-
culty are often designed to prevent lawsuits against the underwriter or to
minimize losses on the investment, not to prevent recurrence. Accordingly,
it would be improper to characterize such efforts as subsequent remedial
measures under rule 407. The courts must be careful to insure that a
claimed remedial measure really is one before upholding an objection to
post-transaction evidence under rule 407 in securities litigation.
Which parties may assert the subsequent remedial measures objection
is also limited. The courts have held that the objection may be raised only
by the party which made the remedial changes involved.'" Thus, the de-
"" Similar cautionary notes have been raises regarding whether the evidence proferred
is really necessary or is merely cumulative. 'Thus, Professor McConnick has stated:
It is apparent that the free admission of such evidence for purposes other than
as admissions of negligence is likely to defeat this paramount policy [of encourag-
ing remedial safety measures). It is submitted that, before admitting the evidence
for any of those other purposes, the court should be satisfied that the issue on
which it is offered is of substantial importance and is actually and not merely
Formally in dispute, that the plaintiff cannot establish the fact In be inferred con-
veniently by other proof, and consequently that the need for the evidence out-
weighs the danger of its misuse.
McCoRMIcK, supra note 83, § 252, at 545 (1st ed. 1954) and cases cited there. But see 2 WEN.
sTEIN.supra note 38, 1407 [021 (1975).
a"o Advisory Committee's Note Rule 407. reprinted in 2 WEINsTEtN„cupra note 38, if 407,
at 407-3 (1975).
2" In some circumstances, subsequent statements may be deemed part of the res grstae if'
close enough in time and spontaneous enough to be deemed reliable. See FED. R. Evt 0. 803(1).
See also 6 WIGNIME, .supra note 38, § 1750 (1942); McCoRmicx, supra note 19, § 275 (2d ed.
1972). The defense argument referred to in the text, however, does not appear to be analo-
gous to this situation.
282 Sec, e.g., Wanner v. Kitchens of Sara Lee. Inc., 419 F.2d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 1969).
On the other hand, such evidence is admissible For impeachment purposes. See, e.g., Polk v.
Ford Motor Co., 529 1 7.2d 259, 270 (8th Cir. 1976). Presumably that type of permissible use of
the evidence would apply to all persons, not only those actually making the repairs.
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fendant may not prevent the introduction of evidence of a subsequent re-
medial measure which was instituted by a third party. This limitation may
be significant in several situations. For example, the SEC or the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants may direct accountants to change
the handling of certain transactions in future audits of financial statements
issued to the public. If an issuer is later sued for securities fraud based on
alleged accounting improprieties in its treatment of such transactions, the
defendant would normally not be able to rely upon rule 407 to prevent the
introduction of the new standards into evidence, since they were not insti-
tuted by the defendant himself.'"
In summary, rule 407 may provide an appropriate objection to the
admission of post-transaction evidence respecting subsequent remedial
measures in situations typified by Geon, but this objection is subject to a
variety of limitations making its operative scope narrow.
CONCLUSION
While it may be irrelevant to issues such as causation in securities liti-
gation, post-transaction evidence has a significant direct and indirect role in
proving several other important matters in securities cases. The propriety
of admitting such evidence should not be rejected out of hand. Instead, the
courts should treat post-transaction evidence in the same way that they
treat other evidence. In ruling upon it, they should carefully review the
particular claim involved, the factual circumstances of the case itself, the
" 3
 Lolie v. Ohio Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1974), illustrates this point in a non-
securities context. Lolie's husband, a coal mutter, was killed when a per cable fell from the
roof of a mine. After the accident, a state mine inspector required the coal company to give
the power cable added support by binding it with a sturdy polypropene rope at 60 foot inter-
vals. In an action by Lobe against the company which had manufactured the metal clips previ-
ously used to hold the power cable in place, the court refused to allow Lolie to introduce evi-
dence of the subSeq trent change. Mrs. Lolie lost. On appeal she claimed that the exclusion of
the subsequent remedial measures taken to support the power cable was reversible error. The
court of appeals agreed that the evidence should have been admitted, explaining:
It is generally held that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is in-
admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct..See Rule 407 of the Proposed
Rules of Federal Evidence. The primary ground for exclusion 'rests on a social
policy of encouraging people to take, or at least not discouraging them from tak-
ing, steps in furtherance of added safety,' 	 This basis clearly has no applicabil-
ity when the evidence is offered against a party, such as this defendant, which
did run make the changes.
Since the proferred evidence was relevant and there existed no valid policy
reason fin• excluding it, the evidence was admissible.
502 F.2c1 at 744.
The court also noted that the evidence Might have been admissible under the feasibility
exception to the subsequent remedial measures rule. "Plaintiff, however, has not argued that
there was any dispute at. trial over the feasibility of tying sturdy rope at periodic intervals. And
it is highly improbable that a jury could reasonably believe that such an alteration was too
costly, impractical or technologically impossible." Id. at 745. The court of appeals nevertheless
affirmed the decision below, finding that the exclusion of the evidence did not rise to the level
of reversible error on the facts of Mrs. Lolie's case, because the evidence was merely cumulative
of other evidence in the record which supported the verdict for the defendant. Id. at 744.
Once again, although found admissible, the post-event evidence was given rather sparing
comparative weight.
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purpose For which the evidence is offered, the relationship of the evidence
to other evidence in the case, whether the evidence is necessary for a fair
determination or merely cumulative, and any possible prejudice it will
cause. Often, the objection to such evidence will relate more appropriately
to its weight than to its admissibility. No blanket rule is possible For post-
transaction evidence. Nor is such a rule desirable, For it may lead to inap-
propriate oversimplification regarding the proper role and purposes of
post-transaction evidence. Each offer of such evidence should be consid-
ered on a case-by-case basis.
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